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THESIS ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the stock market price variations associated with physical
asset expenditure announcements in Australia.  With the exception of the study
of Chen and Ho (1997) in Singapore, most capital expenditure studies in other
markets investigate the announcement effects associated with changes in
budgeted capital expenditures.  The fact that there is almost never any firm level
capital budget announcement in Australia presents a unique opportunity to
examine individual physical asset expenditure announcements.
Three primary hypotheses pertaining to growth opportunities, free cash flow
theory, and the capital market monitoring argument are developed and tested.
These arguments are formulated to explain the abnormal return variations
associated with physical asset expenditure announcements.  The growth
opportunities hypothesis posits that the abnormal returns at physical asset
expenditure announcements are positively related to a firm’s growth
opportunities.  Both free cash flow theory and capital market monitoring
hypothesis postulate that the abnormal returns at physical asset expenditure
announcements are negatively related to a firm’s free cash flow, and cash flow
respectively.  Other control explanators are incorporated from the merger and
takeovers literature.
Event study methodology is used to examine the abnormal returns associated
with physical asset expenditure announcements.  Two sets of data, intraday and
daily, are used to investigate the market reaction.  Intraday returns are calculated
von a time-weighted approach and two methods are used to calculate intraday
abnormal returns.  The first method defines abnormal returns as the difference
between actual returns and market returns.  The second method defines abnormal
returns as the difference between market-adjusted returns and market-adjusted
returns on a control portfolio.  Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the
market model.
Both univariate and multivariate analyses provide strong support for the growth
opportunities hypothesis.  The results suggest the quality of firms’ growth
opportunities is the key variable determining the direction and magnitude of the
abnormal returns at announcement.  Support for the capital monitoring argument
and the free cash flow theory is mixed, generally with a lack of support.  The free
cash flow variable is found to be significantly negatively related to abnormal
returns, only when a finer dummy is used in the multivariate regression.  All
other control variables are found to be insignificant in explaining the stock
market variations once the growth opportunities variable is included in the
regression.
This thesis makes the following contributions.  First, this thesis presents the
initial empirical evidence concerning physical asset expenditure announcements
in Australia.  Second, the thesis shows that the quality of a firm’s growth
opportunities is the key factor in determining the direction and magnitude of
abnormal returns around physical asset expenditure announcements.  These
results also suggest that the equity market in Australia reacts to physical asset
expenditure announcements which contain information pertaining to growth
vi
opportunities rather than the relative size of the physical asset expenditure
transactions to firm value.  Third, support for the capital monitoring argument
and the free cash flow theory is not strong.  Fourth, all other control variables are
found to be insignificant in explaining the stock market variations once market to
book ratio is included in the regression.  Fifth, the results suggest that prior
research which fails to segregate market to book ratio and free cash flow proxy
into finer partitions may have possibly underestimated the market to book and
the free cash flow effects.
vii
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Preview
This thesis examines the stock market reaction to announcements of physical
asset expenditures by Australian firms between 31 July 1989 and 31 December
1997 using both intraday and daily samples.1  The thesis adopts a narrow
definition of physical asset expenditure, which only includes expenditures that
are strictly physical in nature, so that results are not marred by different
interpretations to different type of capital expenditures.  Hence, by definition,
physical asset expenditures exclude expenditures such as research and
development, and acquisitions of interests.  Mergers, tender offers and takeovers
are also excluded due to their different nature and the valuation problems
associated with these acquisitions.  The scope of this definition is addressed
further in Chapter 2, and detailed examples of physical asset expenditures are
provided in Chapter 5.
Much of the corporate acquisition research has focused on mergers and
takeovers.  Corporate capital expenditures have received less attention.
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) provide a seminal study of capital
                                                          
1 It is possible that physical asset expenditures result in a change of the nature of a firm's existing
risk.  However, it is assumed here that all the investment expenditure studied is in a similar line
of business to the existing operations. This is a reasonable assumption since diversicifation is
more likely to be undertaken via mergers and takeovers rather than physical asset expenditures.
2expenditures.  Subsequent empirical studies in this area include Woolridge
(1988), Chen and Ho (1997), and Chung, Wright and Charoenwong (1998).
These studies report a significant positive market reaction to capital expenditure
announcements.2  This evidence is inconsistent with the empirical evidence
concerning mergers and takeovers which generally reveals insignificant
abnormal returns to acquirers.3
The position in Australia with respect to the market reaction to physical asset
expenditure announcements is unclear.  This thesis addresses the question of
what is the market reaction to physical asset expenditure announcements in
Australia? Does the market reaction follow merger and takeover announcements,
viz, an insignificant abnormal return to bidders generally?  Alternatively, if the
stock market does react to the physical asset expenditure announcements in any
significant manner, what factors explain the stock market returns, given that the
size of physical asset expenditure transactions is generally several times smaller
than a merger and takeover transaction?  Finally, the examination of physical
asset expenditure announcements provides further evidence concerning free cash
flow theory.4  It is not well understood why free cash flow, which appears to be
an important variable in the mergers and takeovers context, has not appeared to
be important in prior capital expenditure studies.
                                                          
2 Chung, Wright and Charoenwong (1998) do not report abnormal returns on the whole sample,
while it can be interpolated for their evidence that a small positive return is observed at the
announcement date.
3 For empirical evidence into mergers and acquisitions in Australia, see Dodd (1976), Walter
(1984), Bishop and Dodd (1987), Bishop, Dodd and Officer (1987), and Brown and de Silva
Rosa (1997).  In an American context, see Asquith (1983), Dodd (1980, 1983), Bradley, Desai
and Kim (1988), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), and Jarrell, Brickley and
Netter (1988).  For UK evidence, see Firth (1980).
4 The free cash flow theory is expanded in detail in the next chapter.  For brevity, it is a form of
agency problem where managers are endowed with cash in excess of the funding requirements
3The examination of physical asset expenditure announcements will shed light on
the aforementioned issues.  There is a lack of research in this area in Australia
and this thesis makes a contribution to the literature for this reason alone.
The thesis forms three primary hypotheses based on the three most commonly
cited explanations in both mergers and acquisitions, and capital expenditure
studies namely, growth opportunities, free cash flow, and the capital market
monitoring argument.  It is hypothesised that the relationship between abnormal
returns at physical asset expenditure announcement is positively related to a
firm’s growth opportunities, and negatively related to a firm’s free cash flow and
cash flow.
The thesis draws on the mergers and takeovers literature to provide control
variables which have been found to be significant in explaining the market
reaction in mergers and takeovers.  These variables are (1) relative size of targets
to bidders [Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983)]; (2) method of payment [Travlos
(1987)]; (3) bidder’s prior performance [Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and
Roll (1986)]; (4) managerial shareholdings [Jensen and Meckling (1976), and
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)]; (5) bidders’ leverage [Jensen (1986a, 1989),
and Hart and Moore (1990)]; and (6) prior capitalisation [Schipper and
Thompson (1983)].
                                                                                                                                                            
required to undertake profitable projects.  In the mergers and takeovers context, free cash flow
variable has been found to be important in explaining the bidders’ negative abnormal returns.
41.2 Summary of results and contributions
Using intraday and daily samples, univariate analysis indicates that positive
abnormal returns at physical asset expenditure announcement are associated with
firms possessing high market to book ratios.  This result corroborates the
findings of Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996), Chen and Ho (1997), and
Chung, Wright and Charoenwong (1998).  Conversely, negative abnormal
returns at physical asset expenditure announcements are found to be associated
with low market to book ratio firms.  This suggests that for low market to book
ratio firms, physical asset expenditures do not represent positive net present
values as perceived by the market.  Further analysis confirms that the market
reaction at announcements are not attributable to the equity market over-
extrapolating the performance of firms at physical asset expenditure
announcements.  Multivariate analysis shows that growth opportunities dominate
free cash flow, cash flow, and other control variables in explaining the market
valuation to physical asset expenditure announcements.
The evidence concerning the free cash flow theory is somewhat mixed, and is
sensitive to the sample used.  Generally, intraday analysis supports the free cash
flow theory, but daily analysis only provides partial supporting evidence.  The
results of this thesis, along with the existing studies, show a lack of support for
the free cash flow theory.  In contrast, the merger and takeover studies of Lang
and Litzenberger (1989), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), Smith and Kim
(1994), Nohel and Tarhan (1998), and Harford (1999) all find support for the free
cash flow explanation.  It is argued that if a firm is endowed with excess cash,
and if managers act in self-interest such that they are motivated to increase the
5size of their firms, it is possible that mergers and takeovers are better means of
achieving their goals than physical asset expenditures.
Finally, the capital market monitoring argument is not supported in this thesis.
This result suggests that there may be alternative mechanisms for monitoring
managers.  For instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) report
that for the majority of the 27 wealthy nations (other than the US), controlling
shareholders are important in monitoring self-interested managers, and have
power over the use of a firms’ excess cash flow.
Multivariate analysis shows that the control variables with the exception of
leverage are not significant.  Using the daily sample, leverage is found to be
significantly negatively related to physical asset expenditure abnormal returns,
which is contrary to the argument that debt can reduce managerial inefficiencies
[Jensen (1986a, 1989), Hart and Moore (1990), and Stulz (1990)].  However, this
finding is consistent with the findings of Bhabra, Bhabra and Boyle (1999) who
argue that high leverage constrains investment.  This result is not evident in the
intraday sample and may be due to the short time period associated with intraday
sample.
In summary, this thesis makes several contributions.  This thesis presents the first
empirical evidence concerning physical asset expenditure announcements in
Australia.  Second, this thesis confirms the existing findings of capital
expenditure studies by presenting evidence from various sensitivity analysis that
the quality of firms’ growth opportunities is the main factor determining the
6direction and magnitude of the abnormal returns.  Third, along with the existing
capital expenditure studies, support for the capital monitoring argument and the
free cash flow theory is limited.  However, free cash flow is found to be
significantly negatively related to abnormal returns when a finer proxy is used.
This suggests that prior capital expenditure studies which fail to find evidence for
the free cash flow theory may be due to their coarse proxy for the free cash flow
variable.  Finally, this thesis presents evidence inconsistent with those of mergers
and takeovers.  It is found that all other control variables (relative size of the
physical asset expenditure transactions, managers’ prior performance, managerial
shareholding, and bidder’s leverage) are not important in explaining the stock
market valuations once market to book ratio is included.
1.3 Organisation of the thesis
The thesis is organised as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a review of the empirical
evidence concerning capital expenditure studies.  The hypotheses are developed
in Chapter 3.  Descriptions of event studies and the methodologies used in this
thesis, and discussions of alternative methodologies and issues related to event
studies are set out in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 provides a description of both
intraday and daily data, and accounting proxies employed.  Descriptive statistics
for the intraday data are contained in Chapter 6.  In Chapters 7 and 8, both
univariate and multivariate analyses are conducted using the control portfolio
method for the intraday data.  Chapter 9 provides sensitivity results for the
intraday analyses conducted in Chapters 7 and 8, using the constrained market
model.  A further sensitivity analysis is conducted in Chapter 10 using daily data.
7Chapter 11 provides a summary of the thesis and its implications, and addresses
directions for future research.
8CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2 INTRODUCTION
This chapter first reviews the extant literature related to capital expenditure,
including research and development (R&D), and then reviews the three most
commonly cited reasons put forward to explain the market valuations associated
with capital expenditure announcements, namely, the growth opportunities, free
cash flow, and the capital market monitoring argument.  The final section of this
chapter reviews the literature concerning other relevant variables which might
explain the market valuation of physical asset expenditure announcements.
2.1 Definition of physical asset expenditure
Much of the capital expenditure literature examines the overall annual capital
budget of firms [eg, McConnell and Muscarella (1985), and Chung, Wright and
Charoenwong (1998)].  Other studies such as Chan, Martin, and Kensinger
(1990), Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996), and Zantout and Tsetsekos
(1994) examine R&D announcements.  An exception is Chen and Ho (1997) who
investigate individual expenditure announcements using Singapore data.  Their
sample includes both product strategies and capital expenditures as defined in
Woolridge (1988, p.32).  Woolridge defines product strategies to include new
product introduced into old business lines, the introduction of new products into
new business lines, and the introduction of old products into new geographic
markets, and defines capital expenditures to include capacity expansion, plant
9modernisation, as well as general expenditures to update equipment.  Chen and
Ho’s capital expenditure sample comprises general capacity expansion
construction, and plant modernisation construction announcements, which is a
subset of the definition of physical asset expenditure used in this thesis.
The definition of physical asset expenditure in this thesis excludes mergers,
takeovers and tender offers, and does not include expenditures that are non-
physical in nature such as R&D, acquisitions of interests, and maintenance of
existing assets.  In addition, acquisitions of businesses and acquisitions of
divisions of business are excluded because of their close resemblance to mergers
and takeovers.
Mergers and takeovers are excluded from the definition of physical asset
expenditure due to valuation problems associated with merger and takeover
studies.  These problems include information leakage [Aitken and Czernkowski
(1992), and Holland and Hodgkinson (1994)], multiple bidders [Asquith, Bruner
and Mullins (1983)], and substantial shareholder notices [Bishop (1991)].  While
these issues are difficult to control in mergers and takeovers, they can be avoided
in an examination of physical asset expenditure announcements.  For instance,
information leakage for mergers and takeovers is potentially greater because they
are more actively sought out by the market and hence subject to greater
anticipation than physical asset expenditures.  With regards to multiple bidders,
there are also fewer instances where multiple bidders exist in physical asset
expenditure announcements.  In cases where construction and installation are
concerned, there are no multiple bidders at all.  Finally, the implications of
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substantial shareholder notices for market valuation are completely avoided with
physical asset expenditure studies.  Therefore, the examination of physical asset
expenditure presents an advantage to the researcher as it avoids valuation
problems associated with studies of mergers and takeovers.
A further reason for excluding takeovers relates to “dis-synergies” associated
with some takeovers.  Assume that takeovers and mergers occur because bidders
want to acquire one (or some) major piece of the target’s assets (such as ‘crown
jewels’).  When these transactions take place, the equity market assesses the
valuation impact on bidders according to the incremental net present value
(NPV) resulting from the acquisition.  Some of the target’s assets may be
unrelated to the bidders’ business or may in fact create “dis-synergies” among
bidders’ existing assets.  This effect may result in insignificant abnormal returns
to bidders.  This argument may explain the gains generated from hostile bust-up
takeovers [Berger and Ofek (1996)].  The confounding valuation effect can be
minimised by focusing on individual physical asset expenditure rather than
“bundles of assets” found in takeover targets.
Acquisition of plant, equipment, facilities, shopping complexes, hotels and
properties which are physical in nature are included in the definition of physical
asset expenditure.  Plant expansion, upgrade and construction of new plants are
also included.
Detailed examples physical asset expenditures and reasons for excluding certain
categories of capital expenditure are discussed in Chapter 5.
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2.2 Capital expenditure announcements
2.2.1 Capital expenditures
The seminal paper in the area of the valuation effect of capital expenditure
announcements is McConnell and Muscarella (1985).  McConnell and
Muscarella examine capital expenditure announcements made by US firms
between 1975 and 1981, and categorise them into four groups: (1)
announcements that indicate an increase from previous year’s budget; (2) a
decrease from the previous year budget; (3) an increase in the current year’s
previously announced budget; and (4) a decrease in the current year’s previously
announced budget.  Only company-wide expenditure plans are included in their
study, and announcements of specific projects are excluded.  Further exclusions
apply to capital budget announcements made by financial institutions, and tender
offers related capital expenditures.
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) identify 658 capital expenditure
announcements and classify them into an industrial firm sample and a public
utilities sample.  The dichotomous classification is used to distinguish firms
(industrial firms) which could earn a return in excess of their marginal cost of
capital, and those (public utilities) which are regulated so that they are only
permitted to earn a return commensurate with their marginal cost of capital.
McConnell and Muscarella argue that if managers follow the market value
maximisation rule, then an announcement of an unexpected increase (decrease)
in capital expenditure should have a positive (negative) impact on the market
value of the firm, since in an efficient market, only the unexpected component of
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an announcement will result in a share price response.  McConnell and
Muscarella further conjecture that the same market reaction should not be
observed in the utility firm sample.  This is because shareholders’ wealth is not
affected by the unexpected increase or decrease in capital expenditure
announcements, given these utilities are assumed not to earn a return in excess of
their cost of capital.
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find evidence consistent with their
conjectures, viz, the announcements of unexpected increases (decreases) in
material capital expenditure are associated with significant positive (negative)
share price responses.  And for public utilities, neither increases nor decreases in
capital expenditure are associated with abnormal returns.  McConnell and
Muscarella argue that the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
managers act in the best interest of shareholders by maximising the market value
of their firms through capital expenditure decisions.
Woolridge (1988) examines whether the US stock market suffers from myopia
by examining the market response associated with strategic investment
announcements over the period 1972 to 1984.5  Strategic investments in his
definition include joint venture formation, R&D, product strategies and capital
expenditures.  Capital expenditures are further classified into general capacity
expansion construction, plant modernisation projects, and general increases in
capital budgets.
                                                          
5 Woolridge (1988, pp. 29-30) states that “…strategic investment decisions as those corporate
resource allocations that involve a substantial commitment of capital with the expectations of an
uncertain payoff in the future.  By definition, therefore, these decisions are made in anticipation
of increasing long-term growth at the expense of short-term earnings.”
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Over a two-day window, Woolridge reports a statistically significant positive
abnormal return of 0.71% for overall investment announcements.  Both product
strategies and capital expenditures announcements are associated with significant
positive abnormal return of 0.84% and 0.35% respectively over the two-day
window.  Over a thirty-day post announcement window, a cumulative abnormal
return of -0.35% and 1.50% is documented for product strategies and capital
expenditure announcements respectively.6  Overall, the results reported by
Woolridge are consistent with those of McConnell and Muscarella (1985).  To
the extent that strategic investment decisions reflect long-term growth
investments, Woolridge’s results provide evidence that the US market appears to
place considerable importance on prospective long-term developments in valuing
securities, and refute the claim that the US market is myopic.
Both McConnell and Muscarella (1985), and Woolridge (1988) examine the
market response to capital expenditure announcements per se, and do not control
for other potential explanatory variables such as growth opportunities.  A few
subsequent studies have examined other explanatory factors for market variations
in response to capital expenditure announcements.  For instance, Chung, Wright
and Charoenwong (1998), who conducted a similar capital expenditure study to
McConnell and Muscarella for the period between 1981 and 1995, argue that a
previous study conducted by Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990) in which firms
are classified into high-tech and low-tech groups lacks sound economic
reasoning.  Chung et al argue that it is the firm’s growth prospects rather than the
                                                          
6 A significance test is not reported for the post announcement window.
14
ad hoc classification of high-tech and low-tech firms, or industry affiliation
which determine the market valuation of capital expenditure announcements.
Chung et al find that the market reaction to announcements of increases
(decreases) in capital expenditure is explained by the firm’s q ratio regardless of
their industry affiliations.7  When high technology firms make announcements
concerning increases in capital expenditure given unfavourable growth
opportunities, the equity market discounts their share prices.  Finally,
announcements by low technology firms of decreases in capital spending result
in a negative market reaction when they are high q firms.
In contrast to capital expenditure studies which focus on an overall capital
expenditure program, and ignore each specific capital expenditure
announcement, Chen and Ho (1997) examine the market response to specific
product and capital expenditure announcements in Singapore.  Their sample
includes announcements of product strategies and capital expenditure by all
Singapore-listed industrial firms over the period 1983 to 1991. Capital
expenditure includes general capacity expansion, construction and plant
modernisation.  Announcements of product strategies include announcements of
new products in old business lines, new products in new business lines, and old
products in new geographical markets.  It is acknowledged by Chen and Ho that
                                                          
7 Most existing literature examining firms’ growth opportunities use Tobin’s q, or q ratio, as a
proxy for firms' growth opportunities.  In many cases, market to book ratios are used instead
since it is difficult to construct q ratios.
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since Singapore firms do not announce capital budgets, each specific
announcement should contain information.8
Chen and Ho’s results are consistent with those of Chung et al’s, in that they find
high q firms experience significant positive abnormal returns around the
announcement period, and low q firms experience insignificant abnormal returns.
Further, the median and mean differences between the abnormal returns for the
high and low q firms are significantly different across all samples.
Chen and Ho further classify the sample into four subsamples based on cash flow
and Tobin’s q ratio permutations.  The four subsamples are as follows: (1) high
cash flow and high q firms; (2) high cash flow and low q firms; (3) low cash flow
and low q firms; and (4) low cash flow and high q firms.  The quartile with the
high cash flow and low q combination is a proxy for free cash flow firms since
these firms are likely to have cash flows in excess of their growth opportunities.
Hence, if the free cash flow theory prevails, the quartile with the combination of
high cash flow and low q ratio should exhibit negative abnormal returns, and the
quartile with the combination of low cash flow and high q ratio should exhibit
positive abnormal returns.  Furthermore the difference between the two quartiles
should be statistically significant if the free cash flow theory is supported.
The results show that while the quartile with high q ratio and low cash flow
combination exhibits the highest positive abnormal return of 1.13% over a two-
day window, the quartile with low q ratio and high cash flow combination does
                                                          
8 As discussed in section 2.6.6, it is not traditional for Australian firms to announce capital
budgets.
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not exhibit negative abnormal returns.  Chen and Ho do not test for the difference
between the two quartiles (viz, high q and low cash flow combined quartile, and
low q and high cash flow combined quartile), hence it is not possible to conclude
whether their results provide support for the free cash flow theory.  In the same
univariate test, Chen and Ho find the two quartiles with high q ratios experience
significantly larger abnormal returns than the two quartiles with low q ratio,
irrespective of the level of cash flow.  This result provides evidence supporting
the growth opportunities hypothesis.  Finally, in multivariate analysis, Chen and
Ho find abnormal returns for capital expenditure announcements are significantly
positively related to q ratio, but not related to a free cash flow dummy, hence
providing further support for the growth opportunities hypothesis and rejecting
the free cash flow theory.
2.2.2 Research and development
Woolridge (1988) finds that R&D announcements are associated with a
statistically significant positive abnormal return of 1.195% and 1.46% over two-
day and thirty-day windows, respectively.  In particular, Woolridge reports that
the announcement of expenditures for ongoing R&D programs, are received
more favourably by the equity market than capital expenditures on new projects.
Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990) examine movements in market valuation
associated with announcement of increased R&D over the period 1979-1985.  As
in McConnell and Muscarella (1985), an announcement of R&D expenditure is
considered as new information if there is an unexpected change from the prior
year’s amount.  Chan et al report a significant positive two-day cumulative
17
abnormal return (CAR) of 1.38% for the sample of 95 announcements of
unexpected increases in R&D.  They also find evidence that the response to R&D
announcements tend to be positive even for firms that simultaneously report an
earnings decline.
Cross-sectionally, Chan et al find that statistically significant abnormal returns
are associated with a high-tech group, and statistically significant negative
abnormal returns are associated with a low-tech group.  The dichotomous
classification of high and low tech emerges as the dominant factor in explaining
the market variation, after controlling for size of the announced increases in
R&D budget to sales ratio, industry concentration and the firm’s dominance in its
industry.9  Chan et al results are also confirmed by Zantout and Tsetsekos
(1994).
Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996) seek to explain the valuation effect of
R&D expenditures using the growth opportunities and free cash flow hypotheses.
In their sample of 252 announcements of an unexpected increase in R&D
expenditures between 1979 and 1992, they find that firms with high Tobin’s q (q
ratio greater than unity) have a significantly positive excess return of 0.93%. In
contrast, firms with low Tobin’s q (q ratio of less than unity) experience negative
but insignificant excess returns of -0.16% over a [0,1] day window.  The
difference in abnormal returns between the two samples is significant.  These
results provide support for the investment growth opportunities hypothesis.  For
low q firms which do not have favourable investment opportunity sets, any
                                                          
9 Chan et al consider a firm as dominant if it is ranked in the top four in its industry in terms of its
sales.
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marginal investment is likely to be a negative net present value (NPV)
investment, on average.  Conversely, for firms with high q ratios, their
investment opportunity set presents them with a number of positive NPV
investments from which they can choose.  However, when the sample is divided
on high and low cash flow, no significant difference is reported for the two
subsamples.
Similar to the approach in Chen and Ho, Szewczyk et al classify their sample
into quartiles based on the cash flow and Tobin’s q ratio permutations.  They find
that the quartile with high q ratio and low cash flow combination experiences the
highest positive abnormal return of 1.11% over a two-day window, but the
quartile with low q ratio and high cash flow combination does not exhibit
negative abnormal returns.  Furthermore, the difference between the two
quartiles is not statistically significant, providing little support for the free cash
flow theory.  Finally, in a cross-sectional regression, Szewczyk et al find that
investment opportunities appear to be a dominant factor while the free cash flow
dummy is not a significant factor in explaining the market variation.  In addition,
the abnormal returns associated with R&D announcements are positively related
to the percentage increase in R&D spending, the firm’s debt-equity ratio, and
institutional ownership.  In summary, consistent with Chen and Ho (1997),
Szewczyk et al find support for the growth opportunities hypothesis but do not
find support for the free cash flow theory.
In summary, while Chen and Ho (1997), and Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout
(1996) both present evidence supporting the growth opportunities hypothesis,
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they do not find evidence to support the free cash flow theory.  McConnell and
Muscarella (1985) find some evidence to support the free cash flow theory.
McConnell and Muscarella find that announcements of increases in exploration
and development expenditures by oil companies are associated with negative
abnormal returns.  This is a prima facie evidence supporting the free cash flow
theory because at that time, oil companies were endowed with large cash flow
but with limited internal growth opportunities.10
2.2.3 Other types of expenditure
For somewhat different types of capital expenditure, Statman and Sepe (1989)
find a favourable stock market reaction to project termination announcements.
While in contrast, Blackwell, Marr and Spivey (1990), and Gombola and
Tsetsekos (1992) report negative abnormal returns to the announcements of plant
closing decisions.  Statman and Sepe (1989) argue that the positive abnormal
return associated with project terminations is due to signalling by firms about
their willingness to cut losses.  In contrast, Blackwell et al argue that the negative
market response conveyed by the announcement is related to an adverse signal
concerning the firm’s future investment opportunities.  Further mixed results are
provided by Alli, Ramirez and Yung (1991) who report significant positive
excess returns for announcements of relocations of corporate headquarters.
Similarly, Chan, Gau and Wang (1995) investigate the stock market reaction to
announcements of business relocation decisions during the 1978-1990 period,
                                                          
10 For a discussion of the free cash flow evidence in the oil industry, see Jensen (1986a), and
Griffin (1988).
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and find that the stock market reaction to such decisions is related to the motive
for the relocation and the implied prospects for the firm.
2.3 Growth opportunities
The term ‘growth opportunities’ has been mentioned throughout the previous
section.  As has been noted in the previous section, Chung, Wright and
Charoenwong (1998), Chen and Ho (1997), and Szewczyk, Testeskos and
Zantout (1996) all find that growth opportunities help explain the market
variation associated with capital expenditure announcements.
2.3.1 Tobin’s q
Because growth opportunities are unobservable, most literature uses a proxy such
as Tobin’s q for internal growth opportunities.11  Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio
of the firm’s market value to its replacement cost value.  Lang and Litzenberger
(1989) show that under certain assumptions, an average q ratio of one and above
is a necessary condition for a firm to be at a value-maximising level, while an
average q ratio of less than one is a sufficient condition for a firm to be
overinvesting.
In the context of capital expenditure, Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996),
Chung, Wright and Charoenwong (1998), and Chen and Ho (1997) seek to
explain whether Tobin’s q is an important explanatory variable in explaining the
announcement effects of capital expenditure.  The three studies find evidence
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that proxies for Tobin’s q (or growth opportunities) are important in explaining
the market reaction to capital expenditure announcements.
In the area of tender offers, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) use proxies for
Tobin’s q to distinguish firms whose investment opportunity sets are favourable
(q > 1) from those which are unfavourable (q < 1).
Bhabra, Bhabra and Boyle (1999) examine the market response to the
announcements of acquisition programs.  They find that high q firms experience
significantly larger abnormal returns than low q firms, but the relation is weak in
the regression analysis.  Subsequent analysis shows that wealth gains are an
increasing function of q for low leverage firms, but not for high leverage firms.
This suggests that the market views high leverage as a potential impediment to a
successful acquisition program.  Their results are consistent with Myers (1977),
and Myers and Majluf (1984) who illustrate the problems of underinvestment
and information asymmetry about firm value - that high debt can lead to rejection
of profitable investments.12
Lang and Stulz (1994) examine the relationship between corporate
diversification and Tobin’s q.  Lang et al find that through the late 1970s and the
1980s, single-industry firms are valued more highly than diversified firms by the
                                                                                                                                                            
11 See for example, among others, Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Pilotte (1992), Denis, Denis
and Sarin (1994), Howe, He and Kao (1992), and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996).
12 See Whited (1992), Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996), and Hanka (1998) for supporting evidence
that leverage is negatively related to investment, future growth, and future employee numbers
respectively.
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equity markets.13  In addition, highly diversified firms have both a mean and a
median value of Tobin’s q below the sample average for each year between 1978
and 1990.
Lang et al also find that while industry effects reduce the magnitude of the
diversification discount, the diversification discount is still positive and
significant after controlling for industry effects.  In addition, they find that after
taking into account other confounding factors, Tobin’s q is still a dominant factor
in explaining the valuation differences between diversified firms and single-
segment firms.14  They conclude that firms that diversify are those which have
exhausted their internal growth opportunities, and hence, seek growth via
diversification.  This is a manifestation of agency problems because shareholders
could diversify their portfolio at a lower cost.15
While Tobin’s q has been used mainly as a proxy for the quality of firms’
internal growth opportunities, it has also been used as a proxy for managerial
efficiency [Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989)].  Lang et al (1989) argue that since
Tobin’s q is an increasing function of the quality of a firm’s current and
anticipated projects under existing managers, it is effectively a measure of
managerial performance.
                                                          
13 Lang and Stulz consider a firm as a diversified firm if it has more than five reported segments
in its annual report.
14 The confounding factors are firm size differences, R&D expenditure differences between
single-segment and diversified firms, and factors that prevent single-segment firms from
accessing capital markets.
15 See for instance, Brealey and Myers (1991, p. 824) who raise this issue: “It is obvious that
diversification reduces risk.  Isn’t that a gain from merging?  The trouble with this argument is
that diversification is easier and cheaper for the stockholder than for the corporation.  No one has
shown that investors pay a premium for diversified firms - in fact, discounts are common.”
Brealey and Myers further provide a case study concerning Kaiser Industries whose stock was
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Lang et al’s results are confirmed by Servaes (1991) who investigates the
relationship between takeover (including mergers and tender offers) gains, and
the q ratio.  Servaes reports that target, bidder and total takeover abnormal
returns are larger if the target’s q ratio is less than one (ie, poor performing target
firms), and the bidder’s q ratio is greater than one (ie, well performing bidders).
This finding indicates that better performing firms make better acquisitions, and
that more value can be created from taking over poorly performing firms.
2.3.2 Market to book ratio
While most “growth opportunities” related literature uses proxies for Tobin’s q
as a proxy for growth opportunities, market to book ratio has also become
important proxy in recent years, especially after Fama and French’s (1992, 1993,
1995, 1996) papers.16
Myers (1977) describes the firm as a combination of assets in place and future
investment options.  A distinguishing feature of investment (or growth) options is
that their value depends on further discretionary expenditures by managers, while
assets in place do not require such investment [Kole (1991)].  A classic example
                                                                                                                                                            
selling at a price reflecting a significant discount until the company revealed its plan to sell its
non-core assets.
16 Fama and French (1992) (hereafter FF92) and Reinganum (1988) showed that market to book
ratio is a powerful explanator of cross-sectional returns.  FF92 stratified firms into 10 groups
based on their market to book ratios and examined the average monthly rate of return for each of
the 10 groups for the period between July 1963 and December 1990.  The lowest market to book
subsample had an average monthly return of 1.65%, while the highest market to book ratio
subsample averaged only 0.72% per month.  This suggests either that low market to book ratio
firms are relatively underpriced, or that the market to book ratio serves as a proxy for a risk factor
that affects equilibrium expected returns.  In fact, FF92 find that after controlling for firm size
and market to book effect, beta does not have power to explain cross-sectional average security
returns.  Although FF92 receive support from Davis (1994), and Chan, Jegadeesh and
Lakonishok (1994), there are also inconsistent results reported by Kothari, Shanken and Sloan
(1995), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Daniel and Titman (1997) and Rau and
Vermaelen (1998).  See also Black (1993) for a criticism of FF92.
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of a growth option is the opportunity to explore for mineral deposits on a
particular site within a particular time frame [Kester (1986)].  However, virtually
any discretionary expenditure can be viewed as giving rise to growth options.
Thus, growth options include capacity expansion projects, new product
introductions, acquisitions of other firms, investments in brand name through
advertising, and maintenance and replacement of existing assets [Mason and
Merton (1985)].
Market to book ratios greater than one are indicative of growth firms, whereas
market to book ratios less than one indicate value firms.  This is because for
firms with favourable growth opportunities, the equity market will value their
shares by incorporating the future net cash flows associated with the growth
opportunities.  Since their assets-in-place are recorded at historical cost, this
results in a higher market to book ratio than would be observed for a firm with no
growth opportunities.  Hence, the higher the market to book ratio, the lower the
ratio of assets in place to firm value, and the higher the ratio of investment
opportunities to firm value [Smith and Watts (1992), and Kole (1991)].
The market to book ratio captures the notion of growth opportunities delineated
by Myers (1977) as the difference between firm value and existing assets.
However, Gaver and Gaver (1993) argue that this measure has its disadvantage
in that it relies on stock price, and the inverse relation between financial leverage
and stock price makes market to book ratio sensitive to the capital structure of
the firm.  Gaver and Gaver also argue that market to book ratio may cause
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spurious correlations if the investment opportunity set and other corporate policy
variables are all defined using a stock price measure.
2.3.3 Alternative measures of investment opportunity
Alternative measures of the investment opportunity set have been used to
alleviate the problems of market to book ratio.  For instance, Kole (1991),
Skinner (1993), and MacKie-Mason (1990) use research intensity to define
growth.  A disadvantage of this measure is that R&D is only one example of the
vast array of discretionary expenditures available to support growth options and
is not particularly relevant for firms in certain industries.
Another method used to gauge investment options is called “consensus
investment choices”, which is based on observing the trading decisions of
experts, such as the managers of growth-oriented mutual funds.  This is
advocated by Gaver and Gaver (1993).  Fund managers incur search costs to
gather information, with which they form private expectations about the future
price appreciation potential of the firm.  The consensus investment choices of
growth fund managers provides a different, and potentially richer, source of
information about investment opportunities than provided by stock price alone.
However, this definition of investment opportunities has drawbacks.  For
example, according to Gaver and Gaver fund managers are reluctant to include
small firms in their growth fund holding because the transaction costs associated
with investment in small firms excess the expected benefits.  Hence the
systematic discrimination in excluding small firms in their growth fund holding
introduces a bias toward larger firms.
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The investment opportunity set is inherently unobservable and is likely to be
imperfectly measured by any single empirical proxy.  For instance, while Smith
and Watts (1992), and Gaver and Gaver (1993) select market to book ratio as
their primary measure of growth opportunities, they also conduct sensitivity tests
using other proxies such as price-earnings ratio, R&D to assets ratio, the variance
of the rate of the return on the firm, and the consensus choices of growth-
oriented mutual funds.17  Both Smith and Watts, and Gaver and Gaver report that
their results are generally robust to alternate specifications of the investment
opportunity set.  This thesis therefore adopts the most commonly used method,
market to book ratio, to measure the growth opportunities of firms.
2.4 Free cash flow theory
As previously stated, the free cash flow theory and the growth opportunities
hypothesis are both possible explanations of the market reaction to capital
expenditure announcements.  This section provides a review on the agency
problems when firms have free cash flow.
2.4.1 Agency theory
It has been traditional in the finance literature to assume that the overriding goal
of management is to maximise the firm’s value.  In striving for this goal,
management is seen to be acting in the interest of the firm’s shareholders.
Implicit in this assumption is the notion that if a firm retains funds for investment
which could be more profitably invested elsewhere by the shareholders
                                                          
17 For an articulation of price earnings ratio, market to book ratio and an evaluation of growth,
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themselves, the firm’s value would increase.  While such investment by the firm
may increase the firm’s value in the short run, in the long run competitive forces
would see the firm’s profits suffer and along with it the firm’s share price and
management’s job security.  Hence the competitive market acts to discipline the
behaviour of management.18
While the strength of competitive forces may be questioned, the argument
developed that the presence of some monopoly power may entice management to
pursue their own utility maximising goals such as economic and political power,
bonuses and perquisites.  It can be argued that in the majority of cases,
maximisation of firm value is consistent with any other objectives management
might pursue, and so could be used as a proxy for all.
The possibility of managers behaving in ways inconsistent with the welfare of
their shareholders is developed further in agency theory.  Given that managers
are the agents of shareholders, there is a possibility that they might pursue their
own goals, and so it becomes incumbent on shareholders to devise contracts with
their managers to encourage the required behaviour.
2.4.2 Agency costs of discretionary cash flow
The theory of free cash flow was proposed by Jensen (1986a).  Cash flow is
‘free’ when the firm has cash in excess of that needed to fund all “identified”
projects promising positive NPV returns.  In early literature it is assumed that if
                                                                                                                                                            
see Penman (1996).
18 See for example, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Fama (1980).
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management acts in the interest of shareholders, this excess return would be
returned to the shareholders.  In Jensen’s paper, it is argued that the excess cash
might be retained by the firm for investment in projects offering negative NPV,
because these negative NPV projects may promise to increase the personal utility
of management.
The question of managers behaving in their own interests was examined by
Donaldson (1984).  Earlier studies by Baumol (1959), Penrose (1959),
Williamson (1964), and Marris (1964) had argued that management pursues
growth even at a cost to shareholders.  Donaldson concluded in his study of 12
large Fortune 500 firms that they were driven by the maximisation of “corporate
wealth” which he defines as “the aggregate purchasing power available to the
management for strategic purposes during any given planning period”.  This
may be because management perquisites are an increasing function of investment
even though they are value-destroying [Grossman and Hart (1982), and Stulz
(1990)].  Consequently, firms with free cash flow may undertake negative NPV
projects rather than return the funds to shareholders.
The existence of free cash flow is more likely when net cash flows are substantial
and profitable growth prospects are minimal.  Jensen (1986a, pp. 326-327) cites
two examples from the 1970s: the oil and cigarette industries where the
respective product prices increased substantially, while at the same time these
industries were down-sizing because of unfavourable growth prospects.
However, free cash flow can arise even when net cash flow is low and growth
opportunities are zero.  Free cash flow, and the potential for overinvestment, is
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independent of debt-related agency problems of asset substitution and excessive
dividend payouts [Jensen and Meckling (1976)], and underinvestment [Myers
(1977)], but clearly subsumes excessive perquisite consumption by managers.19
The notion of free cash flow is closely related to the entrenchment hypothesis
developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1989).20  Managers may overinvest in an area
where they have a comparative advantage.  This may represent underinvestment
for the firm because entrenched managers invest in projects in areas where they
have a comparative advantage.  Overinvesting generally requires free cash flow
if entrenched managers cannot raise debt or equity at prevalent market rates.
Capital raising may be possible in this case because entrenched managers are
efficient with respect to the restricted set of investments.  Therefore, it is possible
that overinvestment in an entrenched firm does not require free cash flow.
Hence, when a firm has free cash flow and investment decisions are made using
free cash flows, the equity market should react adversely to the announcements
of any investment decision.
                                                          
19 Asset substitution occurs when a firm borrows at a determined rate for a given project, but later
invests in a riskier project.  Shareholders gain because the value of equity is positively related to
the variability of a firm’s profitability, while debtholders lose because debt value is a negative
function of a firm’s profit variability.  Underinvestment is a cost to both creditors and
shareholders.  When managers act in shareholders’ interest, underinvestment is a cost to creditors
because managers reject positive net present value projects which are likely to increase the value
of the firm to a level not exceeding the face value of its debt since all the incremental gains
accrue to the creditors, leaving nothing for the shareholders.  This problem is more likely to occur
where a firm’s liquidated value falls below the face value of its debt, ie, when a firm is in
financial distress.  Similarly, excessive dividend payments are also a cost to creditors because it
weakens a firm’s ability in meeting debt obligations.
20 Management entrenchment refers to the investment strategies of self-interested managers
protecting themselves from potential replacements.  Entrenched managers invest in projects in
which they have a comparative advantage, even when the investments are ex ante non-value
maximising, as this raises their value (perceived by shareholders) over potential replacement
managers [Shleifer and Vishny (1989)].
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The following sections present additional evidence on the relationship between
free cash flow and the equity market reaction in tender offers and other contexts.
2.4.3 Empirical evidence
2.4.3.1 Tender offers
As noted above, free cash flow theory postulates that when a firm has free cash
flow, it may invest in non-positive NPV projects that do not add value to
shareholders’ wealth.  One way to test this proposition is to look at bidders’
abnormal returns in tender offers.  This hypothesis has been tested by Lang, Stulz
and Walkling (1991), Smith and Kim (1994), and Hanson (1992) using tender
offer announcements.  Lang et al use Tobin’s q, which is the ratio of the firm’s
market value to its replacement value, to distinguish firms whose investment
opportunity sets are favourable (q > 1) from those which are unfavourable (q <
1).  They examine whether bidders’ returns in a tender offer are negatively
related to cash flow for low q firms, and whether the relationship depends upon
the measure of cash flow.
Lang et al find support for the free cash flow theory in that significant negative
abnormal returns are associated with cash flow21 for low q firms, while returns
are unrelated to the cash flow of high q firms.  Free cash flow theory proved to
be a strong explanatory variable in their test because the negative relationship
between abnormal returns and cash flow for low q firms still persisted even after
                                                          
21 Cash flow used in Lang et al is accounting profit before extraordinary items adjusted for non
cash items, which is similar to the definition adopted in this thesis [see section 2.5.2].
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controlling for other variables which may have affected the abnormal returns.
These variables include the market value of the target relative to the market value
of the bidder, bidder management ownership, bidder’s debt-equity ratio, means
of payment, number of bidders, and bidder-target performance.
Bidders with free cash flow are likely to overpay for an acquisition.22  The
overpayment may simply cause a wealth distribution effect from bidder
shareholders to target shareholders, in which case the social net gain is zero.
Alternatively, free cash flow could lead bidders to make acquisitions that reduce
the value of the bidder by imposing costs on the organisation, or could lead to a
sub-optimal use of the target’s assets, in which case free cash flow not only
affects the allocation of assets but also reduces the combined wealth of target and
bidder shareholders.  Lang et al find that free cash flow reduces the combined
wealth of both target and bidder shareholders rather than merely redistributing
wealth.  This implies that takeover announcements by free cash flow firms (firms
with high cash flow and low q) destroy shareholder value because the price paid
for the target reflects synergies available only to competing bidders.
Alternatively, the takeover announcement signals negative information about the
bidders’ management or investment opportunities.
The findings of Lang et al are supported in both Hanson (1992), and Smith and
Kim (1994).  Smith and Kim examine the combined effect of free cash flow and
financial slack23 on bidder and target equity returns.  Their model stems from the
                                                          
22 Another commonly cited reason for an overpayment is known as the hubris factor as proposed
by Roll (1986).  The discussion of managerial hubris is deferred until section 2.4.3.2.1.
23 Financial slack is defined by Myers and Majluf (1984, p. 194) as cash, liquid assets or unused
borrowing power.
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cash flow signalling model developed by Myers and Majluf (1984).  The
resource misallocation in Myers and Majluf is such that firms that are slack-poor
may pass up valuable growth opportunities, known as the underinvestment
problem, whereas in Jensen’s free cash flow case, firms with free cash flow will
overinvest.  The optimal combination of takeover participants can resolve both
problems at the same time.  In particular, gains are expected to be largest when
slack-poor firms bid for free cash flow firms so that free cash flow can be used to
avoid underinvestment, and at the same time, reduce the agency costs of free
cash flow.  The same is true for free cash flow firms acquiring slack-poor firms.
Smith and Kim (1994) find evidence consistent with the predictions of free cash
flow and underinvestment theories. Consistent with the prediction of
underinvestment, they find higher combined returns for bids combining slack-
poor and free cash flow firms than for other permutations.  Further, consistent
with the prediction of free cash flow theory of overpayment and consistent with
the finding in Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), they find that bidders’ returns
are higher when slack-poor bidders acquire free cash flow firms than when free
cash flow bidders acquire slack-poor firms.  This suggests that free cash flow
firms overpay for acquisitions.
Servaes (1994) examines capital expenditures of 700 takeover targets and firms
that went private over the period 1972 to 1987, and does not find evidence
consistent with the free cash flow theory.  Takeover targets do not appear to
increase their capital expenditure over the four years prior to the acquisition and
do not appear to overinvest in capital expenditures relative to industry
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benchmarks.  Servaes concludes that generally his results are not consistent with
the notion that takeovers are motivated by the need to reduce excess investment
in capital expenditure in target firms.
Whilst Servaes finds no evidence that firms which are taken over, or went
private, overinvest in capital expenditures before the acquisition, he raises the
possibility that these firms might have overinvested in other forms of investment
such as inventories or employees.  Another form of overinvestment that could
have taken place before being taken over or going private is mergers and
takeovers.  For instance, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) find evidence that firms
which make poor takeover decisions are likely to become a takeover target
themselves.
Harford (1999) provides recent evidence supporting the free cash flow theory.
Harford reports evidence that firms with excess cash are more likely to undertake
acquisitions than other firms.  Acquisitions by excess cash firms are found to be
value-destroying as evidenced by negative abnormal returns around the
announcement period.  Consistent with the evidence provided by Jensen (1986a),
Harford also finds that firms with excess cash are prone to pursue diversification
strategies.  Harford also reveals that firms with excess cash suffer an abnormal
decline in operating performance after acquisitions, thereby further supporting
for the free cash flow theory.
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2.4.3.2 Tests of free cash flow in other contexts
In this section, additional evidence on free cash flow is provided in different
contexts.  This literature provides further support for the role of free cash flow in
the context of physical asset expenditure announcements.
2.4.3.2.1 Free cash flow theory vs the hubris hypothesis
There are at least two reasons why managers might overpay for an acquisition.
One is the free cash flow theory discussed earlier and the other is advanced by
Roll (1986), termed the hubris hypothesis or the ‘winner’s curse’.24  Managerial
hubris can be explained as follows.
In a contested bid, some bidders are expected to overestimate the value of the
target and others underestimate.  It is argued that the winning bidder is likely to
suffer hubris, that is likely to have the most optimistic, and possibly least realistic
view about their ability to manage the assets being acquired.  Therefore it is
likely that managers who do suffer from hubris actually pay a premium over and
above the intrinsic value gained.  If the hubris hypothesis holds, then a negative
price reaction is expected on the successful bidding firm’s shares.
Roll presents evidence supporting his hubris hypothesis.  He argues that the
finding in Asquith (1983) that in the pre-bid period, the bidding firms experience
a statistically significant positive return of 14.3%, and an insignificant return on
the announcement date, is consistent with the hubris hypothesis.  The abnormal
                                                          
24 In Roll’s hubris hypothesis, acquisition refers to takeovers or mergers.  As argued later, the
hubris hypothesis can equally applied in a context of physical asset expenditure.
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positive return during the pre-bid period indicates that bidding firms are
performing well, and therefore are endowed with cash and hubris.
Roll also cites the evidence of Eger (1983), Dodd (1980), and Malatesta (1983)
which shows a negative abnormal return by the bidding firms following the
original announcement of a merger/takeover that is ultimately successful.  Roll
interprets the results as consistent with the hubris hypothesis because a price
decline in the total value of the bidding firm is predicted as it becomes more
certain that the merger/takeover will succeed.
It is important to stress that while the free cash flow theory requires the existence
of divergence of interest between the manager and the shareholders, the hubris
hypothesis does not.  For instance, Roll states that:
“Several recent papers that have examined nontakeover corporate
control devices have concluded that the evidence is consistent with
conscious management actions against the best interests of
shareholders.25  But the hubris hypothesis does not rely on this result.  It
is sufficient that managers act, de facto, against shareholder interests by
issuing bids founded on mistaken estimates of target firm value.
Management intentions may be fully consistent with honourable
                                                          
25 See Bradley and Wakeman (1983), Dann and DeAngelo (1983), and DeAngelo and Rice
(1983).  Linn and McConnell (1983) disagree with the last paper.  The possibility that managers
do not act in the interest of stockholders has frequently been associated with the takeover
phenomenon.  For example, in a recent review, Lev (1983, p. 15) concludes by saying, “I think
we are justified in doubting…the argument that mergers are done to maximize stockholder
wealth.”  Foster (1983) seems to share this view or at least the view that bidders make big
mistakes.  Larcker (1983) presents interesting results that managers in large takeovers are more
likely to have short-term, accounting-based compensation contracts.  He finds that, the more
accounting-based the compensation, the more negative is the market price reaction to a bid.
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stewardship of corporate assets, but actions need not always turn out to
be right.”
Empirical studies have been conducted to ascertain the validity of the hubris
hypothesis.  For instance, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) examine the
relationship between prior performance of management and the valuation effect
around takeover announcements.  Morck et al distinguish good managers from
bad managers based on prior 3-year stock returns relative to the industry average,
and prior 3-year income growth relative to the industry average.  Good managers
are those that perform better than the respective industries, and vice versa for bad
managers.
Based on a multivariate regression analysis, Morck et al find that the quality of
management is positively related to bidders’ returns under both measures.  That
is firms with better quality management are also better bidders.  Therefore, the
result does not support Roll’s hubris hypothesis which predicts that bidders of
better performing firms experience a negative return on the announcement date
because they overestimate the targets’ value under their control.
Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989) also find evidence against the hubris
hypothesis.  Lang et al measure the quality of management based on Tobin’s q.
When their sample is divided into high q and low q sub-samples, they find that
bidders that have high (low) q ratios gain (lose) the most when a tender offer is
announced.  Since the partition of the sample into high and low q can be
identified from information available before the tender offer announcement, this
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result does not support the view that negative bidder abnormal returns occur
because bidders are overcome by hubris during the bidding.  Further since the
Lang et al result shows that bidders that lose the most when a tender offer is
announced have low q ratios, the evidence is consistent with the view that the
equity market discounts the share prices of low q firms in a tender offer because
of the bidder’s poor managerial skills.
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) provide evidence that synergy is created in
takeovers, and reject the alternate hypothesis of wealth distribution in takeovers,
since hubris hypothesis posits that the gains to target shareholders represent
wealth transfers from acquiring firms’ shareholders and not necessarily
synergistic gains.
Finally, the evidence presented in Seyhun (1990) also rejects the hubris
hypothesis.  Seyhun examines managerial stock trading patterns prior to the
takeover announcement, and argues that if managerial hubris is the primary
motive for takeovers, then one expects to see managers decrease their stock sales
prior to the takeover announcement.26  However the results show that in the sub-
sample of large negative abnormal returns, managers are not optimistic about the
takeover announcements, as there is generally an increase in stock sales prior to
the announcement.
Free cash flow theory posits that overpayment for acquisitions is caused by firms
having free cash in excess of the availability of positive NPV projects.  On the
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other hand, the hubris hypothesis posits that overpayment for an acquisition is a
result of manager over optimism about their ability to create synergies.
While both propositions have been tested in the context of tender offers and
mergers, there is little, if any, study conducted in the context of physical asset
expenditure.  It is therefore important to investigate to what extent free cash flow
theory dominates the hubris hypothesis in explaining negative returns consequent
on physical asset expenditure announcements.
If managers overestimate their ability to create synergistic-value, it is equally
likely that such managers overestimate their ability to generate value from
acquiring a physical asset, and hence overpaying.  In this case, the equity market
may react negatively to physical asset expenditure announcements made by well-
performing firms.
2.4.3.2.2 Cash flow signalling vs free cash flow hypothesis
One way in which the agency costs of free cash flow can be mitigated is through
paying the free cash to shareholders in the form of dividends or capital
distributions.  Hence, when firms announce an increase in dividend, ceteris
paribus, a positive market reaction is expected.  However, this positive market
reaction can also be explained by the dividend cash flow signalling theory
developed by Miller and Rock (1985) which posits that dividend announcements
convey information about a firm’s future cash flow in an information asymmetry
setting.  However, the empirical evidence concerning this theory is mixed.  For
                                                                                                                                                            
26 Even if managers perceive that active insider trading prior to takeover announcements is likely
subject to insider trading legislation, they can nevertheless reduce their stock sales below normal
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instance, while Pettit (1972), Ofer and Siegel (1987), and Fama and Babiak
(1968) find evidence consistent with Miller and Rock’s prediction, Watts (1973),
and Gonedes (1978) do not.  Nevertheless, the consensus view is that dividend
announcements do convey information about the future of firms and current cash
flow.  That is, if management has superior information about the firm’s future
cash flow, investors interpret the increase in dividend as a permanent increase in
cash flow position, and vice versa when firms announce a dividend reduction.27
Since both free cash flow and cash flow signalling theories predict a positive
market reaction to the announcement of dividend increases, it is important to
examine to what extent the positive market response associated with dividend
increase announcements are dominated by the information-signalling theory, and
to what extent free cash flow theory explains the positive market response.
This issue is examined in Lang and Litzenberger (1989).  They find that the
average return associated with announcements of large dividend increases is
significantly higher for firms with average q less than one than those with
average q greater than one.  However, Lang and Litzenberger acknowledge that
their research design does not allow them to distinguish whether the positive
                                                                                                                                                            
levels since they cannot be prosecuted for not trading.
27 The information content of dividend omissions is more controversial.  For empirical studies of
dividend omissions, see Healy and Palepu (1988), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992),
Jensen and Johnson (1995), Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995), Bessler and Nohel, and
Woolridge and Ghosh (1985).  Briefly, these studies document a significant negative price
reaction at the announcement of dividend omissions.  Both Woolridge and Ghosh, and Jensen and
Johnson find that the market reacts very negatively to dividend cut announcements, even when
they are accompanied by chairman statements citing the need to conserve cash to undertake
profitable investments opportunities.  While dividend signalling theory suggests that dividend
cuts indicate unfavourable future earnings, recent studies provide contrary evidence.  For
instance, Healy and Palepu, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, and Woolridge and Ghosh, all
find that firms increase earnings following a dividend reduction.  In addition, Jensen and Johnson
conclude that their results indicate that dividend cuts mark the end of a firm’s financial decline
and the beginning of firm restructuring.
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reaction to large dividend increases comes from the prediction of free cash flow
theory or cash flow signalling theory.  This is because in an efficient market, the
market reaction to an announcement of an increase in dividends is only observed
to the extent that the increase was not anticipated by the market.  They argue that
since the market expects high q firms to pay higher dividends, one would expect
the market to react more positively to announcements of dividend increases for
low q firms.
Alternatively, one can argue that since high q firms are likely to have more
growth opportunities than low q firms, the market expects high q firms to retain
profit for future investments rather than pay dividends.  Low q firms on the other
hand are generally more established and operating in a less favourable
investment environment.  Hence, the market expects low q firms to pay out their
profits as dividends.  This view is consistent with the findings reported by Pilotte
(1992), McCabe (1979), and Rozeff (1986), thereby reinforcing  the results of
Lang and Litzenberger.
Howe, He and Kao (1992), use related cash flow event announcements, and do
not find evidence consistent with free cash flow theory but do find evidence
consistent with the information-signalling model.  Howe et al examine whether
free cash flow theory can explain share repurchases and special dividends
activities.  They find that while the announcement of tender offer share buy-back
or special dividends is associated with significant positive abnormal returns,
when the sample firms are divided between high q and low q, there is no
difference between the two sub-samples.
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They argue that information-signalling dominates the free cash flow theory in
explaining share buy-backs and special dividends.  This is because it is in the
managers’ interests to signal to the market that the firms are undervalued and so
the signalling decision is independent of the firms’ q ratios.
Howe et al acknowledge opposite findings by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and
attempt to reconcile the differences based on management entrenchment
hypothesis.  If management entrenchment is likely to occur in low q firms as
suggested in Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Wruck (1989), then a buy-
back announcement by a low q firm sends a mixed message.  This is because
while the share buy-back signals good news concerning the future cash flow of
the firm, the fact that share buy-back reduces the voting power of shareholders
entrenches managers further, making it more difficult for shareholders to force
managers to undertake value-maximising investments [Stulz (1988)].
Perfect, Peterson, and Peterson (1995) suggest that Howe et al use a flawed
measure of the q ratio, viz, the average q ratio over the three years preceding the
repurchase.  Perfect et al demonstrate that low q firms in fact exhibit a stronger
stock market reaction to the stock repurchase announcements if q is measured in
the year immediately preceding the repurchase.  Hence, Perfect et al conclude
that the free cash flow hypothesis best explains the motivation behind stock
repurchases rather than information signalling hypothesis.
In a recent study, Nohel and Tarhan (1998) confirm the support for return of free
cash flow to shareholders over cash flow signalling as motivation to initiate stock
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repurchases.  Nohel and Tarhan argue that previous studies attempt to distinguish
between these two hypotheses by examining abnormal returns around the
announcements.  However, they contend that the announcement-period abnormal
returns may not contain sufficient information to differentiate between these two
hypotheses.
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) argue that by studying the operating performance of
repurchasing firms and the determinants of operating performance, as well as the
reaction of investors to repurchases, one can differentiate between cash flow
signalling and free cash flow theory.  In particular, they argue that if a firm’s
intention in announcing a stock repurchase is to signal to the market that the
firm’s prospects are improving, then an improvement in operating performance
following the stock repurchase should be observed irrespective of whether the
firms are high or low growth firms.  Conversely, if free cash flow is the main
motivation behind the stock repurchases, significant post-announcement
operating improvement should be observed in firms with low growth (ie, agency
costs of free cash flow is significant), and less pronounced improvement for high
growth firms.
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) find the 3-year median post-repurchase cumulative
operating performance for low q firms is significantly positive at 23.30%,
compared to an insignificant -1.94% for high q firms.  In addition, they also find
that the performance gains of low q firms are generated by a combination of
divestitures and a lack of growth in capital expenditures.  Divestitures are
positively correlated with post-repurchase performance, and the positive
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relationship is only centred around low q firms.  In light of this evidence, Nohel
and Tarhan conclude that the positive market reaction to share repurchases is best
explained by the free cash flow theory.
2.4.3.2.3 Equity issues
Mann and Sicherman (1991) investigate the market reaction associated with
equity issues in a free cash flow context.  They argue that to the extent to which
equity issues accentuate the agency costs of free cash flow, a negative market
reaction is expected.  However, they contend that not all equity issues are
associated with adverse market reactions.  Although shareholders cannot observe
free cash flow, they can nevertheless distinguish firms which are likely to use
equity issue proceeds to fund profitable investments as opposed to negative NPV
investments.  That is, equity proceeds are likely to be wasted in firms which have
a track record of investing in unrelated assets.  In contrast, firms with a track
record of investing in related assets are more likely to use equity proceeds
profitably.28
In a univariate analysis, Mann and Sicherman (1991) find that for the group of
firms which have a track record of only investing in unrelated acquisitions, a
significant negative abnormal return of -2.95% is observed.  In comparison the
group associated with related acquisitions only experiences a significantly
negative abnormal return of -1.05% over a two-day window.  The difference
                                                          
28 The argument here is also related to the diversification and corporate focus argument.  For
instance Jensen (1986a, p.327) points out that oil companies during the 1980s which were
endowed with excess cash, launched diversification programs, and these programs turned out to
be unsuccessful.  Other evidence, for instance, Berger and Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994),
Comment and Jarrell (1995), and John and Ofek (1995), also confirm that diversification reduces
firms value.
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between the two groups is statistically significant.  Mann and Sicherman’s
proposition is further supported in a multivariate analysis.
2.5 Capital market monitoring
There are at least two theories that have been put forward to explain the role of
cash flow in the capital market, namely the capital market monitoring theory
proposed by Donaldson (1984), Rozeff (1982), and Easterbrook (1984), and the
pecking order theory proposed by Donaldson (1961), Myers (1984), and Myers
and Majluf (1984).
The capital market monitoring hypothesis posits that the agency conflicts
between managers and shareholders can be alleviated through capital market
monitoring.  That is when a firm requires funds from the capital market, the firm
is required to supply its audited financial statements.  This gives the capital
market an opportunity to evaluate the performance of the firm.  In addition, when
securities are issued by the firm, the covenant attached to the securities forms a
relationship between the firm and the capital market such that it gives the capital
market a legal right to monitor the firm’s future performance on a continuous
basis for the life of the securities.
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the monitoring mechanism of the
capital market is efficient.  Jensen (1993, pp. 850-870) argues that capital market
monitoring is the most effective disciplinary mechanism we have to date.  Jensen
also provides examples and reasons as to why other disciplinary mechanisms
such as the product and factor markets, managerial labour market, and the
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internal control systems instituted by the board of directors, are not effective in
monitoring managers.
Firms lacking internally generated cash are more likely to depend on the capital
market for funds, than those with sufficient internally generated cash.  Cash flow
dependent firms are expected to make value-maximising investments decisions.
Failure to make value-maximising investment decisions will result in firms
paying a high ex ante monitoring cost, or high borrowing costs, or even cessation
of supply of funds from the capital market in extreme cases.  Firm with large
internally generated cash flow can dispense with visiting the capital market for
external funds, and hence avoid capital market monitoring.  A corollary is that
firms with low cash flow are more likely to make value-maximising investment
decisions compared to firms with high cash flow.
The majority of the research on the role of cash flow is tested in the free cash
flow theory context.29  This is due to the fact that both capital market monitoring
and free cash flow theory are grounded in agency theory.  Distinguishing
between the capital market monitoring hypothesis and the free cash flow theory
requires an additional factor, viz, growth opportunities.  That is to say, high cash
flow is a sufficient condition for non-value-maximising behaviour under the
capital market monitoring hypothesis.  However, cash flow alone is not a
sufficient condition for non-value-maximising investment behaviour under the
free cash flow argument.  Jensen (1986a) defines free cash flow as cash flow in
excess of growth opportunities.  Hence, by definition, free cash flow can only
                                                          
29 See for example, Chen and Ho (1997), Vogt (1997), Szewczyk, and Testeskos and Zantout
(1996).
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arise when firms have high cash flow but operate in an environment which lacks
growth opportunities.
The pecking order theory, which was first proposed by Donaldson (1961) and
subsequently by Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984), suggests that a
hierarchy exists with respect to funding sources such that internal cash flow is
the most preferred option, followed by debt, hybrids, and lastly equity.30  For
firms with limited cash flow but profitable investment opportunities, the use of
internally generated cash to finance investments is the least costly, and hence,
value-maximising.  This would be the case where the firm has positive NPV
projects available, and the use of internally generated cash is cheaper than raising
finance on the external market.  The pecking order theory argues that both these
conditions may apply to firms which, while profitable, suffer from information
asymmetry, causing the issue of securities on the external market to be
underpriced.  Following Myers (1984, p. 581), the pecking order theory can be
summarised as follows.
• managers prefer internal finance;
 
• managers adapt target dividend payout ratios to their firm’s investment
opportunities, but because dividends are ‘sticky’ the payout ratio is adjusted
only gradually to shifts in available investment opportunities;
 
                                                          
30 In some cases, companies will pass up a valuable growth opportunity when the cost of issuing
undervalued equity is larger than the NPV of the growth opportunity.
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• sticky dividend policies plus unpredictable changes in profitability and
investment opportunities mean that internally generated cash flows may be
inadequate to meet investment needs.  If this occurs, the company draws first
on its cash and marketable securities; and
 
• if external finance is required, companies issue the safest securities first.31
They start with debt, then hybrid securities, and finally equity as a last resort.
Myers and Majluf (1984) present a model in which managers are aware of the
value of the firm’s assets-in-place and its growth opportunities, but investors are
not.  They demonstrate that the presence of information asymmetry by market
participants may lead to persistent undervaluation of equity issues.  In this
framework, Myers and Majluf show that managers acting in shareholders’
interests will not sell securities when the firm’s stock is underpriced.  This leads
to an investment disincentive because the undervaluation of equity issued to fund
a project may outweigh the project’s worth.32  Therefore, if stocks are
undervalued, managers may not issue equity even if it means passing up a
valuable growth opportunity.  It follows that whenever a share issue is
forthcoming, investors will interpret the equity issue as a signal of overvaluation
of the current stock price.  Recognising managers’ incentives to issue shares
whenever they are overvalued, investors interpret the decision to issue securities
                                                          
31 The word “safest” refers to securities whose future value changes least when the manager’s
inside information is revealed to the market [Myers (1984, p. 584)].
32 Myers and Majluf (1984) note two exceptions to their conclusion that offerings signal bad
news.  The first exception occurs when the value of assets-in-place is known with certainty by
outsiders.  In this case, the decision to issue securities signals new investment.  The stock price
reaction to the security issues is non-negative, since negative NPV projects are rejected.  The
second exception occurs when growth opportunities are so valuable that the firm cannot afford to
pass them up in any state of nature.  In this case the decision to issue conveys no information, so
there should be no price reaction.
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as bad news about the firm’s ‘intrinsic’ value, so the stock price falls.  Debt is not
likely to be subject to such a degree of misvaluation because of the fixed interest
and repayment commitments imposed on the firm.  Hence the use of internal
cash, however limited, to fund investments is value-maximising.
Empirical evidence supporting the pecking order theory is substantial.  For
instance, Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) provide evidence that internally
generated cash flow is an important determinant of investment for US firms.
Fazzari et al’s results are subsequently endorsed by Baskin (1985, 1989) in
American firms, and Remolona (1990) who investigates the pecking order
hierarchy in America, Britain, Germany, and Japan.  In the context of equity
issues, Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), and Mikkelson
and Partch (1986) all report negative market responses associated with equity
issues in the US.  In Australia, Allen (1991a, 1991b), and Chiarella Pham, Sim
and Tam (1991) report evidence that debt is preferred over equity issues.33
Fama and French (1999) provide further evidence supporting the pecking order
theory. Fama and French test the dividend and leverage predictions of the
pecking order and tradeoff theories. Fama and French find several similar
predictions from both models, for instance, their results support the prediction
from both theories such that more profitable firms have higher dividend payouts
and firms with more investments have lower dividend payouts, holding constant
other variables. However, they document an important evidence which supports
the pecking order theory and rejects the tradeoff theory. That is, they report that
                                                          
33 Also see Allen (1993), Fazzari, Peterson (1993), Calomiris, Hubbard (1995), and Christie and
Nanda (1994) for evidence supporting the pecking order theory in different contexts.
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more profitable firms utilise less debt. This is an important contrast to the
tradeoff theoru which predicts that more profitable firms are more levered. On
the other hand, the pecking order theory predicts that more profitable firms are
less levered.
In the context of a firm’s capital structure, Shyam-Sunder (1988), Shyam-Sunder
and Myers (1992), and Allen and Clissold (1997), find evidence that the pecking
order theory explains the changes in firms’ capital structures more accurately
than simple target adjustment formulations.
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) examine the determinants of
corporate holdings of cash among listed US firms from 1971 to 1994, and
document how firms change their cash holdings over time.  They report that
firms with strong growth opportunities, firms with riskier activities, and small
firms hold more cash than other firms, whereas, firms that have the greatest
access to the capital market, such as large firms and those with credit ratings,
tend to hold less cash.  Their findings are consistent with Vogt (1994) who finds
evidence that cash flow dependent firms are usually characterised by small-sized
firms.34
                                                          
34 Jalilvand and Harris (1984) argue that small firms are more likely to suffer from cash
constraints than large firms because small firms have limited access to the capital market.  This is
because small firms are less visible and therefore less favoured by capital markets.  Because of
the less visibility, information asymmetry becomes a significant problem for small firms, and
consequently small firms have limited access to capital markets and face significantly higher
transaction costs of security issues.  Therefore, small firms tend to have untapped profitable
investment opportunities.  Given the reasoning above, small firms are likely to utilise internal
cash flow to fund physical asset expenditure, and any physical asset expenditure announcements
should be associated with a positive market reaction.
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A subsequent study by Vogt (1997) finds evidence that firms announcing capital
expenditure increases are associated with a significant positive abnormal return
of 0.45% over a two-day window.  However, subsequent analysis reveals that the
positive and statistically significant abnormal returns found in the sample of
firms announcing increases in capital expenditures is concentrated in the smallest
of the sample firms, and in firms with low cash flow.  In contrast, abnormal
returns for the largest firms in the sample are negative, though not significant.
Both Vogt’s (1997) and Opler et al’s (1999) results are consistent with the
pecking order theory postulated by Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984).
As noted earlier, small firms are most likely to face liquidity constraints, hence,
they are also the most likely to forgo profitable investment spending in the event
of cash flow shortages.  As cash flow increases, the ability to undertake
profitable capital investment projects also increases.  Consequently, capital
expenditure announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns.
Of note, Vogt’s (1997) findings do not reject the capital monitoring theory that
abnormal returns are negatively related to a large firm’s ability to finance capital
expenditures with cash flow.  Both high cash flow firms and large firms
experience lower abnormal returns than their low cash flow and small sized
counterparts.  This evidence indicates that the capital market does not react
favourably to firms which are subject to lower capital market monitoring that
make capital expenditure announcements.
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The testing of the pecking order hypothesis requires the identification of sources
of finance.  Due to lack of data with respect to sources of finance, the pecking
order hypothesis is not tested in this thesis, and the examination of the role of
cash flow in the capital market is conducted in the context of capital market
monitoring hypothesis.35
2.6 Other relevant variables
The above sections have reviewed the most commonly cited explanations for
market valuations associated with capital expenditure announcements.  However,
in the context of mergers, takeovers and tender offers, researchers have identified
alternative explanations for abnormal returns around the announcements of
mergers and acquisitions.
It is difficult to understand why these factors are commonly examined in mergers
and acquisitions but are not commonly examined in capital expenditure
announcements, given both mergers and acquisitions and capital expenditures
are, in substance, means of expansion.
2.6.1 Relative size of targets to bidders and the size of the transaction
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) argue that insignificant abnormal returns of
bidders are explained by the relative size of targets to bidders, and find that the
bidders’ cumulative abnormal returns are significantly greater when the target
firms is larger.  Evidence supporting the size argument can be found in Asquith
                                                          
35 This issue is further explored in Chapter 3.
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et al, Hayn (1989), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1990).  Applying Asquith et al’s argument in the context of physical asset
acquisition, the relevant variable is the relative size of the acquisition or
expenditure to the firm size, rather than the relative size of target to bidder.
2.6.2 Method of payment
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), Travlos (1987), Amihud, Lev and Travlos
(1990), Bellamy and Lewin (1992), and Martin (1996) all find that when bidders
finance their takeover by cash, the market reacts positively to the takeover
announcement.  On the other hand, when the acquisition is equity financed, the
market reacts negatively.  Since most tender offers are cash-financed, whereas
most takeovers and mergers are not, this hypothesis helps explain why tender
offers are associated with positive abnormal returns whereas mergers or
takeovers are associated with negative abnormal returns.
The method of payment hypothesis is closely related to the free cash flow
hypothesis.  Use of debt to finance a cash offer commits the firm to pay out
future free cash flows rather than reinvest it in internal growth projects which
may have negative NPVs.  Hence, a cash offer is viewed more positively by the
equity market than a share offer.
Alternatively, the positive market reaction to cash offers may also be explained
by the pecking order theory [Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984)], which is
an argument based on information asymmetry between management and the
equity market about firm value.  The pecking order hypothesis, presented earlier
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in section 2.5, suggests that firms raise capital for expansion (such as merger and
acquisition activities) from retained earnings and debt when management
believes that its firm is undervalued.  By extension of this argument, equity
offers are made when management believes that the firm is overvalued.  Raising
equity therefore signals management’s belief to the market and the equity offer
may be viewed negatively and the share price falls.  Conversely, a cash offer
signals good news about management’s view of the value of the firm and the
share price consequently rises.
A third possible explanation for the positive market reaction to cash offers is in
the argument presented by Galai and Masulis (1976).  Galai et al demonstrate
that a pure exchange conglomerate merger, in which there is no economic
synergy, can decrease the variance of the new firm returns, and therefore,
viewing equity as an option on the assets of the firm, reduce the market value of
equity.  The same action would increase the market value of debt.  Thus, this
argument suggests that takeovers financed by share swaps may have a negative
impact on the value of equity.
2.6.3 Bidders’ prior performance
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) find evidence that bidders’ abnormal returns
in an acquisition are associated with bidders’ prior performance.  Specifically,
good management is more likely to make better investment decisions than poorly
managed firms.  Hence positive abnormal returns may be associated with well-
managed firms, and negative abnormal returns may be associated with poorly
managed firms.
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Roll (1986) offers an opposite explanation concerning managerial hubris.36  For
brevity, Roll argues that managers of well-managed firms suffered from hubris,
and hence overpay for their investment.  Roll therefore predicts that firms with
good past performance are more likely to overpay for an acquisition, and hence,
the market discounts their share price when an acquisition is announced.
2.6.4 Managerial shareholdings
Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Leland and Pyle
(1977) argue that the problems of managers engaging in non-value-maximising
activities are a result of the agent-principal relationship.37  These problems can
be reduced by increasing the percentage of managerial shareholdings.  This is
because as managerial shareholdings increase, the proportion of the costs borne
by the managers from non-maximising behaviour starts to increase.  The positive
relationship between managerial shareholdings and the probability of managers
engaging in value-maximising activities is empirically supported by Lewellen,
Loderer and Rosenfeld (1985), Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Holderness and
Sheehan (1988), and Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995).
Alternatively, Demsetz (1983), and Fama and Jensen (1983) have pointed out
that the disciplinary mechanisms of the product market,38 managerial labour
                                                          
36 Managerial hubris was discussed earlier in section 2.4.3.2.1.
37 Leland and Pyle (1977) formulate their argument in an information asymmetry setting, such
that managerial share ownership aligns management and shareholder interests by serving as a
signalling device which reduces the information asymmetries between them.
38 See, for example, Hart (1983).
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market,39 and the market for corporate control40 force managers to maximise
shareholders’ value even when their shareholding is low.
Recent developments in this area are based on the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis.  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), and Stulz (1988) argue that
when managers have sufficiently large shareholdings, they are likely to entrench
and impair the proper monitoring mechanisms.41
Morck et al predict a non-monotonic relationship between managerial
shareholding and firm value.  They argue, Jensen and Meckling’s convergence-
of-interest hypothesis operates throughout the whole range, but in some middle
range, entrenchment is dominant, and so a positive relationship is expected at the
lower and upper ends of managerial shareholding, and a negative relation in the
middle range.42
Stulz argues that the fraction of managerial ownership, ∝, has two opposing
effects on firm value.  A higher ∝ leads to a higher probability that a hostile
takeover attempt will not be successful and hence reduce the value of the target,
and simultaneously, a higher ∝ leads to a higher premium being paid for the
                                                          
39 See, for example, Fama (1980).
40 See, for example, Jensen and Ruback (1983).
41 Implicit in the assumption is that entrenched managers consume excessive perquisites and
indulge in non-positive-value-maximising activities that are consistent with their utilities, but at
the expense of shareholders.
42 Morck et al (1988) do not mention why entrenchment is not dominant at the higher end of the
managerial shareholding.  Presumably, the reasons are contained in Shleifer and Vishny (1988b)
who discuss some legal and economic reasons why many executives own a small stake of shares
of the firms they manage, even when it is in the shareholders’ interest to give those equity stakes
for free.  The institutional reason is that by holding a small stake of shares, entrenched managers
can protect themselves from the “business judgment” rule that keeps the court from meddling in
their internal business affairs.  The economic reason is that because entrenchment is costly to
56
target.  However, the former effect is likely to happen only when ∝ is sufficiently
large, and so a positive relationship between managerial shareholding and firm
value is observed when ∝ is low, and as ∝ approaches 50% firm value begins to
fall.  Stulz also contends that as ∝ reaches 50%, the value of the firm reaches its
minimum because the probability of a successful bid reaches zero.  The non-
linear relationship between managerial shareholding and firm value is also
documented in Chang and Mayers (1992), and Keasey, Short and Watson (1994).
In contrast to Morck et al (1988) and Stulz (1990), Demsetz (1983) contends that
ownership is an endogenous outcome of a maximising process, and accordingly,
there is no relationship between ownership structure and profitability.
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999)
investigate the Stulz, Morck et al, and Demsetz aforementioned propositions, and
find a curvilinear relationship between insider ownership and firm value that is
generally consistent with Stulz, and Morck et al, but find no evidence supporting
Demsetz.
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that since there are several control
mechanisms by which a firm can maximise its value, greater use of one
mechanism need not be positively related to firm performance.  They contend
that if control mechanisms are chosen optimally by firms, there should be no
relationship between each mechanism and firm performance, and find results
consistent with their predictions.
                                                                                                                                                            
shareholders, and if entrenched managers hold substantial shares in the firm, they may end up
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Cho (1998) provides evidence supporting Kole’s (1994, 1996) findings that
corporate value affects ownership structure and not the reverse.  Cho questions
the methodology adopted by Morck et al, and McConnell and Servaes which
treats ownership structure exogenously.  In a recent study, Himmelberg, Hubbard
and Palia (1999) use a panel-data autoregression, they find support for Kole’s
and Cho’s reverse causality evidence.  However, Himmelberg et al offer a
different interpretation from Kole.  Himmelberg et al argue that their witness of
endogeneity evidence is caused by unobserved firm heterogeneity as opposed to
reverse causality.43  Himmelberg et al present evidence that a large fraction of
the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved
firm heterogeneity.  Hence supporting the argument that the ownership decision
is endogenous because of unobserved firm heterogeneity.
In summary, the empirical evidence concerning the relationship of managerial
shareholdings and firm value has been mixed.  Early studies conducted by
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no association between profitability and
managerial shareholdings, whereas subsequent studies conducted by Morck et al,
McConnell and Servaes, and Wruck (1989), find a curvilinear relationship.
However, different results are found in the most recent studies conducted by
Kole (1994, 1996), Cho (1998), and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999).
Despite the mixed results, the general consensus is that agency problems are
more serious in the lower end of managerial shareholding than the upper end.
                                                                                                                                                            
hiring a more efficient manager to manage the firm to increase their wealth as a shareholder.
43 The examples provided by Himmelberg et al regarding unobserved firm heterogeneity are (1)
the access to superior monitoring technology; (2) the level of intangible assets; and (3) the degree
of market power.  For instance, Himmelberg et al argue that if the proxy for the quality of the
monitoring technology is omitted from the specification, a regression of firm value on managerial
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2.6.5 Bidders’ leverage
Jensen (1986a, 1989), Hart and Moore (1990), Harris and Raviv (1990), and
Stulz (1990) propose that debt can be used as a monitoring device.  When the
debt level is low, managers can be entrenched more easily [see Shleifer and
Vishny (1989) for a discussion of entrenchment theory] and hence are more
likely to overinvest in areas where they have the comparative skill.  On the other
hand, when the level of debt is sufficiently large, managers are unlikely to make
wealth-destroying investment decisions.  This is because managers are under
legal obligations to service debt payments, and if they undertake negative NPV
projects, they subject themselves to the threat of bankruptcy, and hence losing
their jobs.  One of the personal objectives of self-interested managers is long-
term survival of the firm so as to ensure their job security [Shleifer and Vishny
(1989)].  In this case, the marginal benefits of ensuring continued employment
are likely to be greater than the marginal benefits of investing in non-positive
NPV projects.  In addition, by forcing firms to use debt, shareholders also force
managers to return to the capital market regularly.  The continual fund seeking
from capital markets allows the market to monitor the managers.  Hence, it is
expected that managers of highly levered firms are likely to be more efficient
than managers of low levered firms.44  Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell
(1993) find a positive relation between the leverage of the acquiring firm and the
                                                                                                                                                            
ownership will spuriously indicate a negative relationship because ownership is a negative proxy
for the quality of monitoring technology.
44 The issue of the substitutability of debt for dividends is examined in Agrawal and Jayaraman
(1994).  Agrawal and Jayaraman find that the dividend payout ratio is significantly higher for
“all-equity” firms (defined as firms with no long-term debt for a continuous period of five years,
but with short-term debt) than for a control group consisting of levered firms.  They interpret this
result as evidence consistent with the hypothesis that dividends can be a substitute for debt in
mitigating the agency problems of free cash flow.
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abnormal returns for the acquirer at merger announcements, and hence support
the hypothesis that debt improves managerial decision making.
Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) examine the substitutability of debt and
managerial shareholdings.  They present evidence supporting their argument that
if dividends and managerial shareholdings are substitutes for constraining
management behaviour, then a negative relationship should exist between
dividend payout and managerial shareholdings.  This relationship should be even
more profound in an “all-equity” firm given the absence of debt in monitoring
agency problems.45
Further evidence of substitutability between debt and managerial shareholdings
is also found in Lehn and Poulsen (1989).  Lehn and Poulsen find a positive
relationship between the premium paid on leverage buyouts and undistributed
cash flow, and the relationship is even stronger when the sample firms are
divided into higher than median managerial holdings and lower than median
managerial holdings.
In Australia, Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (1999) document a curvilinear
relationship between firm capital structure and managerial shareholdings.
Brailsford et al that argue the curvilinear relationship between firm leverage and
managerial shareholding is consistent with the convergence-of-interests [Jensen
                                                          
45 Agrawal and Jayaraman define “all-equity” firms as firms with no long-term debt for a
continuous period of five years, but with short-term debt.
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and Meckling (1976)], and debt-related entrenchment hypothesis.46  In particular,
Brailsford et al argue that at low levels of managerial shareholding, these
shareholdings are likely to align managers and shareholders interests, leading to
increased debt levels.47  At high levels of managerial shareholding at which
managers become entrenched, managers will seek to avoid using debt so as to
enhance their ability to entrench further.
Whether the greater use of managerial shareholding as a means of aligning
manager-shareholder interests in fact leads to lesser use of debt, is an empirical
question.  Furthermore, there is no reason why the greater use of one disciplinary
mechanism leads to a lesser use of another.  We do not deny the possibility of the
substitutability of debt and managerial shareholdings, but rather we emphasise
the importance of debt in helping align shareholder interests.
2.6.6 Prior capitalisation hypothesis
Firms will sometimes plan to launch a series of acquisitions over a period of
time.  These plans are usually announced followed by interim financial results.
Schipper and Thompson (1983), and Malatesta and Thompson (1985) argue that
on the announcement of an acquisition program, the market reacts to the
information transmitted by immediately capitalising the information which was
not previously reflected in the market value of the firms.  That is, when a firm
                                                          
46 Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) present evidence that entrenched managers seek to avoid
debt.  This may be because the scope for a manager to entrench is impaired to the extent debt
gives creditors power over firms’ investing and financing decisions [Shleifer and Vishny (1989)].
47 It should be noted that the assumption implicit in the arguments of Brailsford et al and Agrawal
and Jayaraman (1994) are different.  Brailsford et al assume that a firm may use several
monitoring devices to align managers and shareholders interests, whereas, Agrawal et al assume
that the greater use of one monitoring device leads to a lesser use of the other.
61
announces an acquisition plan which involves a series of acquisitions, the firm
signals to the market that future growth prospects of the firm are favourable.
Therefore, the market reacts positively (negatively) to the announcement if it
signals favourable (unfavourable) news.  However, in an efficient market, or at
least one conforming to the semi-strong form, the market should not react to the
subsequent related acquisitions unless they transmit new information about the
acquiring firms.  The new information may contain positive or negative news
relative to what the market has previously expected from the acquisition program
announcement.
Schipper and Thompson (1983) seek to explain observed market variations in
returns to bidders using the prior capitalisation hypothesis.  When a firm
announces a series of related acquisitions, the market reaction to each individual
acquisition announcement is not critical.  As argued by Schipper and Thompson,
it is more important to measure the wealth effect at the time of the announcement
of intention to undertake the acquisitions program, since in an efficient market,
such an announcement should result in the firm’s share price fully reflecting the
expected NPVs of the overall acquisition program.
Schipper and Thompson further contend that measuring the effect of the first
acquisition announcement also results in a more accurate wealth effect because
the first announcement contains information such as the initial costs (eg, the
administrative costs relating to the acquisitions program), whereas the
subsequent market responses only take into account the costs and benefits of
specific acquisitions.
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In an efficient market, the market impounds the sum of expected positive NPVs
from each individual acquisition.  Therefore, one does not expect any market
reaction to each specific acquisition announcement in the absence of
unanticipated change in the NPVs of an individual acquisition.  Even when there
are unanticipated changes in an individual acquisition announcement, Schipper
and Thompson point out that the unanticipated changes in the NPV of the
individual acquisition are likely to be small relative to the expected total NPV,
and therefore, any market reaction is likely to be small.
Finally, it is contended in Schipper and Thompson that shareholders are
concerned with whether an acquisition is size-maximisation motivated as
opposed to wealth-maximisation motivated.  Therefore, the market reaction to
the initial announcement of an acquisitions program better reflects the wealth
effect on shareholders than do the reactions to the individual acquisition
announcements.  This may be because it is easier to assess whether the overall
acquisition program is wealth-maximising than to assess whether a particular
acquisition is wealth-maximising.
In Australia, a study of the prior capitalisation hypothesis was conducted by
Bishop (1991) on substantial shareholder notices.  Bishop finds that the mean
abnormal return during one month prior to the announcement month is -1.3%,
but statistically insignificant.  Although a positive mean abnormal return occurs
in the announcement month, the result is not significant.  Therefore, it appears
that the market does not react to the lodgement of substantial shareholder notices
in Australia in any significant manner.
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Schipper and Thompson argue that market reaction to the announcement of an
acquisition program is a better assessment of whether a manager is behaving in a
manner consistent with maximising shareholders’ wealth.  This argument can be
rejected because even if a self-interested manager aims to undertake an
acquisition program that produces a positive NPV overall, the manager may still
undertake negative NPV acquisitions within the acquisition program.  Although,
such an action is anticipated by the market, the overall market reaction is still
positive if it is overall a positive NPV acquisition program.  In this case, the
positive market reaction to the announcement of an acquisition program which
suggests management is motivated by wealth maximisation may be a fallacy,
because the negative news related to an individual acquisition is outweighed by a
positive overall NPV.
Second, in a perfect capital market where both managers and shareholders have
equal access to information, the difference between the initial capitalised value
(which is the sum of expected positive NPV from each individual acquisition)
and the sum of the actual positive NPV from each acquisition, is likely to be
small.  But when the market is imperfect, that is when information asymmetry is
present, the initial capitalised value may not be an accurate measure of
shareholders’ wealth.  In this case, the announcement of an individual acquisition
can still result in a significant market reaction which may or may not be
consistent with the reaction to the initial program announcement.  This is because
investors revise their expectations each time there is new information, and new
information may be present at the time of the announcement of an individual
acquisition.
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This hypothesis may not be applicable in the context of physical asset
expenditure announcements made by Australian firms as there appears to be little
evidence of announcements of acquisition programs.48  Hence, given that it is not
traditional for Australian firms to announce acquisition programs, each physical
asset expenditure announcement is likely to contain information which has not
been impounded in the share price.
2.7 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the areas of the literature that are concerned with
market valuation of capital expenditure announcements.  Three main factors,
namely, growth opportunities, free cash flow, and cash flow have been reviewed
and are the most commonly cited explanatory variables used to explain the
market response to capital expenditure announcements.
Other possible explanation have also been identified and reviewed.  In closing,
factors that have been identified as possibly impacting on abnormal returns
associated with physical asset expenditure announcements are:
• Growth opportunities,
• Free cash flow,
• Capital market monitoring,
• Relative size of the transactions,
• Method of payment,
                                                          
48 As discussed in Chapter 5, in the sample of 3,133 announcements (in the case of intraday data),
and 814 (in the case of daily data), over the period July 1995 to December 1997 (for intraday
data), and over the period July 1989 to December 1997 (for daily data), there are only two cases
of acquisition program announcements.
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• Managers’ prior performance,
• Managerial shareholdings, and
• Bidders’ leverage.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
3 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the hypotheses are developed.  Specifically, three main
hypotheses are proposed relating to the most commonly cited explanations in the
literature.  These hypotheses concern growth opportunities, free cash flow, and
cash flow.  Several secondary hypotheses related to other potential determinants
of the market reaction to physical asset expenditure announcements are also
developed in this chapter.
3.1 Market reaction to physical asset expenditure announcements
In contrast to the evidence relating to mergers and takeovers which indicates
around zero abnormal returns or insignificant negative abnormal returns for
bidders, most empirical studies on capital expenditure report a significant
positive abnormal return.49
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are several motivations for investigating
physical asset expenditure announcements.  One of the contributions is to
provide evidence concerning the market reactions to physical asset expenditure
announcements since the position in Australia concerning the market reaction is
unclear.  Although no hypothesis is developed concerning the market reactions to
                                                          
49 For instance, both Chen and Ho (1997) and Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990) report a
significant positive cumulative abnormal return.  See Chapter 2 for details.
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physical asset expenditure announcements in Australia, the market reactions will
be examined as part of the thesis.
3.2 Growth opportunities
Several studies have investigated the valuation impact of capital expenditure
announcements using the growth opportunities hypothesis.  This includes
Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996), Chung, Wright and Charoenwong
(1998), and Chen and Ho (1997).  Because growth opportunities are not
observable, these studies along with other studies such as Smith and Watts
(1992), and Gaver and Gaver (1993), use either market to book ratio or q ratio as
a proxy for growth opportunities.  The discussion of growth opportunities was
noted in the previous chapter.  For brevity, Lang and Litzenberger (1989)
demonstrate that a q ratio greater than unity is a necessary condition for a firm to
be value-maximising.
Three studies which examine capital expenditure announcements, Szewczyk et
al, Chung et al, and Chen and Ho (1997), all report similar results that positive
abnormal returns around the announcements of increases in capital expenditure
are associated with firms with high q ratios (q ratio of greater than unity).  All
these studies attribute the positive market reaction to an increase in firm value
arising from the newly acquired growth opportunities.  However, the market
reactions to announcements of increases in capital expenditure by firms with low
q ratios are mixed.  While Chung et al report significant negative market
reactions for low q ratio firms that announce capital expenditure increases,
Szewczyk et al, and Chen and Ho report insignificant market responses to capital
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expenditure increases made by low q ratio firms.  However, all these studies
report that the difference in abnormal returns between the high and low market to
book groups is significant.
In the area of tender offers, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), and Servaes (1991)
argue that the q ratio reflects the perceived value of a firm’s investment
opportunities and hence is an increasing function of managerial quality.
Consistent with this argument, they find evidence that the abnormal returns to
bidding firm shareholders from tender offers and takeovers are an increasing
function of the q ratio.  Furthermore, Bhabra, Bhabra and Boyle (1999) find
evidence that the q ratio is an increasing function of market confidence in firm
management.50
The above evidence suggests that for capital expenditure announcements,
positive abnormal returns are associated with firms with high q ratios, and
insignificant and negative abnormal returns are associated with firms with low q
ratios.  The evidence is consistent with the definition of the q ratio (or market to
book ratio) which has been used in the existing literature as a proxy to
distinguish between firms which have positive NPV investment opportunities
under current management and those that do not.  Firms with high q ratios are
likely to have positive NPV projects.  Hence, these firms are expected to invest
their resources profitably.  For these firms, if the physical asset expenditure
announcements are unexpected, a positive market response is expected.  In
contrast, firms with low q ratio may not have positive NPV projects and for these
                                                          
50 The q ratio referred to in Bhabra, Bhabra and Boyle (1999) is the market to book ratio as
defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994).
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firms additional investments may not guarantee positive NPVs.  Hence, it is
hypothesised that:51
H1o There is no difference in abnormal returns associated with physical asset
expenditure announcements for either high or low market to book ratio firms.
H1a The abnormal returns associated with physical asset expenditure
announcements are greater for firms with high market to book ratios, compared
to firms with low market to book ratios.
Alternatively, one might argue that the positive abnormal returns around the
announcements of physical asset expenditure are the consequence of the equity
market systematically over-extrapolating the performance of high market to book
ratio firms, and vice versa for low market to book ratio firms.  This is
documented by Rau and Vermaelen (1998), who find evidence that the long-term
underperformance of acquiring firms in mergers is predominantly found in high
market to book ratio firms.  They argue that these results are consistent with the
performance extrapolation hypothesis.  That is, the equity market extrapolates
past performance too far into the future, and therefore overprices firms with high
growth opportunities and underprices firms with low growth opportunities.52
                                                          
51 In this thesis, firms with high (low) growth prospects are defined as those firms with a market
to book ratio greater than (less than) the sample median.  See section 5.3.1 in Chapter 5 for a
description of measurement of growth opportunities.
52 Fama and French (1995) find that firms with low market to book ratios tend to have low
profitability.  Conversely, firms with high market to book ratios are those with strong
profitability.  That is, the performance extrapolation hypothesis is inconsistent with Fama and
French’s (1995) findings.
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The extrapolation hypothesis posits that the market reaction to high and low
market to book firms is the result of performance extrapolation rather than due to
the investment opportunities hypothesis.  Hence, we examine the post
announcement performance of high market to book ratio and low market to book
ratio firms separately.  Specifically, if the performance extrapolation prevails,
one expects to see, for the high market to book ratio firms, a significant positive
abnormal return at the announcement day.  Over time as the market participants
realise their valuation errors on the announcement day, the market begins to
discount the high market to book ratio firms’ share prices resulting in negative
post-announcement drift.  In contrast, for the low market to book ratio firms, a
negative abnormal return is expected on the announcement day.  And as the
market realises its valuation error over time, positive post-announcement drift is
expected.
As a digression, the post-announcement drift is prima facie inconsistent with
market efficiency.53  The performance extrapolation hypothesis is consistent with
the fact that in the short-run, stock prices of glamour firms (represented by high
market to book ratio) increase more than stock prices of value firms (represented
by low market to book ratio) around the announcement of the acquisition [Lang,
Stulz and Walkling (1989), and Servaes (1991)].  It is also consistent with the
results of Hayward and Hambrick (1995), who report that takeover premiums are
positively correlated with proxies of past managerial performance such as recent
                                                          
53 In an event study, an instantaneous and unbiased price reaction would be observed immediately
following the event.  But thereafter, the cumulative abnormal return should have no pattern
because there should be no further abnormal returns associated with the event.  However, it
should be cautioned that post-announcement drift can also result from sampling error.
Explanation of post-announcement drift include shifts in risk following the announcement, which
results in biased abnormal return measures, misspecification of the returns model, transaction
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organisational success and media praise for the CEO.  The equity market
consistently fails to recognise that past performance is not necessarily a good
indicator of future performance, at least in the case of acquisitions.  This
phenomenon is also persistently observed in profit announcements in both the
USA and Australia.54
If the growth opportunities hypothesis prevails, no post-announcement drift is
expected.  Hence it is hypothesised in the null and alternative forms respectively
that:
H2o No post-announcement drift in abnormal returns is observed for either
high or low market to book ratio firms.
H2a Positive post-announcement drift in abnormal returns is observed for low
market to book ratio, and negative post-announcement drift is observed for high
market to book ratio firms.
3.3 Free cash flow
As discussed earlier, firms with free cash flow are most likely those with positive
cash flow but zero positive net present value projects.  Free cash flow is a
manifestation of agency problems because excess cash is not returned to
shareholders.  When firms have free cash, any acquisitions made by these firms
                                                                                                                                                            
costs and the influence of extreme observations.  However, Bernard and Thomas (1989) find that
none of these explanations are capable of fully accounting for the phenomenon.
54 See for instance, Rendleman, Jones and Latane (1982), and Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984)
for US evidence of post profit-announcement drift.  In Australia, see Easton and Sinclair (1989).
See also Brown (1994) for a survey of post-announcement drift in Australia.
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are by definition, negative net present value investments because they are facing
an investment opportunity set in which there are no favourable growth prospects.
It has been documented that firms which face unfavourable investment
opportunity sets would undertake a diversification strategy [Jensen (1986a), Lang
and Stulz (1994), and Harford (1999)].  Furthermore, it has been widely
documented that diversification is a value-destroying strategy in these
circumstances [Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), John and
Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994), and Servaes (1996)].  Given that firms with
free cash flow which undertake physical asset acquisitions are likely to be
investing in projects with negative NPVs, it is expected that the market will react
negatively to announcements of acquisitions by these firms.
In the context of physical asset expenditures, neither Chen and Ho (1997), nor
Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996) find evidence supporting the free cash
flow theory, but they do find evidence supporting the growth opportunities
hypothesis.  Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) report that the announcements of
tender offers by firms with free cash flows are associated with significant
negative abnormal returns, hence supporting the free cash flow theory.  Smith
and Kim (1994) present evidence that bidders’ abnormal returns are higher when
slack-poor bidders acquire free cash flow targets compared to cases where free
cash flow bidders acquire slack-poor targets.  In a recent study, Harford (1999)
provides additional evidence supporting the free cash flow theory.  Harford finds
evidence that free cash flow firms tend to make more value-destroying
acquisitions, and those acquisitions are usually unrelated to the firms’ core
activities.
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Evidence supporting the free cash flow theory can also be found in other
contexts.  For instance, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) find that the abnormal
return associated with the announcement of large dividend increases is
significantly higher for firms with unfavourable growth prospects than for those
firms with favourable growth prospects.  This evidence is consistent with the free
cash flow theory because for low growth firms, the agency costs of discretionary
free cash flows are significant.  The announcement of large dividend increases
suggests that managers are acting in shareholders’ interests by not wasting free
cash flows on non-positive NPV projects.  Further evidence is also provided by
Mann and Sicherman (1991) in the context of equity issues.  They argue that to
the extent that equity issues accentuate the agency costs of free cash flow, a
negative market reaction is expected when firms make an equity issue.  They find
that firms which have a track record of only investing in unrelated acquisitions
(most likely to have agency problems of discretionary cash flow) experience a
negative abnormal return at equity issue announcement which is larger and more
significant than the counterpart sample consisting of firms which have a track
record of only related acquisitions.  Thus, it is hypothesised that: 55
H3o When firms with free cash flow make physical asset acquisition
announcements, no abnormal returns are observed at the announcement date.
                                                          
55 The identification of free cash flow is discussed in section 5.3.2 in Chapter 5.  In brief, free
cash flow is identified by satisfying two conditions: (1) high cash flow; and (2) low growth
opportunities.  All other cash flow and growth combinations (eg, high cash flow-high growth,
low cash flow-low growth, and low cash flow-high growth) are considered as non-free cash flow
firms.  This is consistent with the definition provided by Jensen (1986a), free cash flow is cash
flow in excess of growth opportunities.  This approach is also adopted in Lang, Stulz and
Walkling (1991), Chen and Ho (1997), and Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996).
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H3a When firms with free cash flow make physical asset acquisition
announcements, negative abnormal returns are observed at the announcement
date.
3.4 Capital market monitoring
The role of cash flow in the capital market is examined in this section.  Two
theories have been proposed that have cash flow implications, namely, the capital
market monitoring theory [Donaldson (1984), Rozeff (1982), and Easterbrook
(1984)], and the pecking order theory [Donaldson (1961), Myers (1984), and
Myers and Majluf (1984)].
The capital market monitoring hypothesis argues that when managers visit the
capital market for external funds, the capital market has the opportunity to
evaluate managers.  The issuance of securities forms a relationship between the
firm and the capital market such that it allows the capital market to monitor the
firm’s future performance on a continuous basis.56  Implicit in this argument is
the assumption that the monitoring mechanism of the capital market is efficient.
Firms that lack internally generated cash, and hence are constantly dependent on
the capital market for funds are expected to make value-maximising investments
decisions.  Otherwise, these managers will be punished by the capital market
through higher borrowing costs or the cessation of supply of funds.
Alternatively, firms with high cash flow can escape capital market monitoring by
avoiding visiting the capital market.  Hence, one expects that firms with low cash
                                                          
56 The term “future” in this context means the number of years outstanding before the securities
mature.
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flow are more likely to make value-maximising investment decisions than firms
with high cash flow, holding constant other factors.
There are few empirical studies concerning the capital market monitoring
hypothesis.  The majority of research on the role of cash flow has been tested in
the context of free cash flow theory.  In part, this is due to the fact that both
capital market monitoring and free cash flow theory are grounded in agency
theory.  The discriminating feature between the capital market monitoring
argument and free cash flow theory is that high cash flow is a sufficient condition
for non-value-maximising behaviour under the capital market monitoring
hypothesis.  However, cash flow alone is not a sufficient condition for non-value-
maximising investment behaviour under the free cash flow argument.  This is
because by definition [Jensen (1986a)], free cash flow can only eventuate when
firms have high cash flow and operate in an environment which lacks growth
opportunities.
In relation to the pecking order theory, the implications of cash flow for the
market reaction to physical asset expenditure announcements is not straight
forward.  The pecking order theory suggests that companies display a hierarchy
with respect to funding sources such that internal cash flow is most preferred,
followed by debt, hybrids, and equity as a last resort.  For firms with limited cash
flow but profitable investment opportunities, the use of internally generated cash
to finance investments may be the least costly.  This would be the case where the
firm has positive NPV projects available, and the use of internally generated cash
is cheaper than raising finance on the external market.  The pecking order theory
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argues that both these conditions may apply to firms which, while profitable,
suffer from information asymmetry, causing issues of securities on the external
market to be underpriced.
Of note, in order to test the pecking order theory in the context of cash flow, it is
important to bring in a further assumption, viz, that debt finance is also costly.
There is no reason for a firm to prefer cash flow over debt unless the firm, for
various reasons, cannot access debt finance.  Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and
Williamson (1999), and Vogt (1994) find evidence that firms which depend on
internally generated cash flow are those which cannot access the debt market.
Both Opler et al, and Vogt report that these firms are often associated with strong
growth opportunities, with riskier activities, and are small in size.
The international empirical evidence supporting the pecking order theory is
substantial.  For instance, Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) find that
internally generated cash flow is an important determinant of investment for
American firms.  Fazzari et al’s results are supported by Baskin (1985, 1989),
and Remolona (1990).  In the context of equity issues, Asquith and Mullins
(1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) all find
that negative market responses are associated with equity issues in the US.
Similar results are reported by Allen (1991a, 1991b), and Chiarella Pham, Sim
and Tam (1991) in Australia.
It is therefore not sensible to test the pecking order theory unless one can identify
cash flow dependent firms as described by Opler et al, and Vogt.  That is, the
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appropriate way of testing the pecking order theory is to examine the source of
financing.  Mikkelson and Partch (1986), and Allen (1991a, 1991b) provide
examples of such studies.
By contrast, the capital market monitoring hypothesis requires less restrictive
assumptions.  As discussed above, the capital market monitoring hypothesis
assumes that the capital market is an efficient monitoring mechanism.  But there
are several other disciplinary mechanisms by which managers are forced to make
value-maximising decisions, namely, the product and factor markets,57
managerial labour market,58 and the internal control systems instituted by the
board of directors.59  However, Jensen (1993, p. 851) argues that the most
effective of these disciplinary mechanisms is the external capital market
“..capital markets provided one mechanism for accomplishing change before
losses in the products generate a crisis.” [emphasis added].
Due to the lack of disclosure by firms of specific sources of finance associated
with physical asset expenditure, the pecking order hypothesis cannot be tested in
this thesis and hence the role of cash flow in the capital market is examined
through the capital market monitoring hypothesis.  It is therefore hypothesised
that:60
                                                          
57 See for example, Hart (1983).
58 See for example, Fama (1980).
59 See Jensen (1993) for a discussion of the failure of internal control systems headed by the
board of directors.
60 A firm is considered as high (low) cash flow if its cash flow to total assets ratio is greater (less)
than the sample median.  See section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5 for further explanation.
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H4o There is no difference in abnormal returns associated with physical asset
expenditure announcements for either high or low cash flow firms.
H4a Firms with low cash flow are more likely to experience a higher abnormal
return on physical asset expenditure announcement than firms with high cash
flow.
3.5 Other relevant variables
Other potential variables could also influence abnormal returns around physical
asset expenditure announcements and were discussed earlier in Chapter 2.  These
variables include the relative size of the transaction [Asquith, Bruner and Mullins
(1983)], bidders’ management prior performance [Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1990), and Roll (1986)], level of managerial shareholding [Jensen and Meckling
(1976)], and bidders’ leverage [Jensen (1986a, 1989), Hart and Moore (1990),
and Stulz (1990)].
3.5.1 Relative size of physical asset expenditure transactions
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) argue that insignificant abnormal returns of
bidders may be explained by the relative size of targets to bidders, and find that
bidders’ cumulative abnormal returns are significantly higher when the target
firm is larger.  Consistent with this view, a positive relationship is expected
between the size of the physical asset expenditure (relative to firm size) and the
abnormal returns.  Hence it is hypothesised that:
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H5o The abnormal returns at physical asset expenditure announcement are not
related to the size of the physical asset expenditure relative to firm size.
H5a The abnormal returns at physical asset expenditure announcement are
positively related to the size of the physical asset expenditure relative to firm
size.
3.5.2 Managers’ prior performance
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) argue that managers whose past performance
record is better than others are more likely to make better investment decisions,
simply because good managers make better decisions than bad managers, on
average.
Conversely, Roll (1986) suggests that managers of well-managed firms suffer
from hubris, and overpay for their investments.  Roll conjectures that firms with
good past performance are more likely to overpay for an acquisition than poorly-
managed firms, and as a result the equity market discounts their share price when
an acquisition is announced.  But as noted earlier, the empirical work of Bradley,
Desai, and Kim (1988), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989), and Seyhun (1990)
does not support the hubris hypothesis.
It is hypothesised that:61
                                                          
61 Prior performance of the firm is measured by the risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns
over the three years before the announcement.
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H6o The abnormal returns at physical asset expenditure announcement are not
related to the prior performance of the firm.
H6a The abnormal returns at physical asset expenditure announcement are
positively related to the prior performance of the firm.
H6b The abnormal returns at physical asset expenditure announcement are
negatively related to the prior performance of the firm.
3.5.3 Managerial shareholdings
Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Leland and Pyle
(1977) argue that managerial shareholdings are likely to reduce agency conflicts
between management and shareholders due to the implicit bonding and signalling
roles of managerial shareholdings.  The convergence-of-interests hypothesis
proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that as managerial
shareholdings increase, the costs borne by managers for not making value-
maximising decisions also increase.  Hence the convergence-of-interests
hypothesis predicts that higher managerial shareholdings should be associated
with lower agency costs.
Alternatively, the entrenchment hypothesis suggests that managerial
shareholdings may entrench managers with a high level of shareholding and
impair the proper monitoring mechanisms.  Hence this leads to greater
opportunities for managers to pursue their own interests at the expense of
81
shareholders [Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)].  This hypothesis predicts
greater agency conflicts at high levels of managerial share ownership.
Although the results in this area are somewhat mixed, the general consensus is
that agency problems are more serious at the lower end of managerial
shareholding than the upper end.62  Hence it is hypothesised that:
H7o The abnormal returns at the physical asset expenditure announcements
are not related to the level of managerial shareholdings.
H7a The abnormal returns at the physical asset expenditure announcements
are positively related to the level of managerial shareholdings.
H7b The abnormal returns at the physical asset expenditure announcements
are negatively related to the level of managerial shareholdings.
3.5.4 Leverage
Jensen (1986a, 1989), Hart and Moore (1990), and Stulz (1990) argue that debt
can reduce inefficiency in managers.  When the level of debt is sufficiently large,
managers are unlikely to make wealth-destroying investment decisions.  This is
because managers are under legal obligations to service debt payments, and if
they undertake negative NPV projects, they subject their firm to the threat of
bankruptcy.  In the event of bankruptcy or near bankruptcy, managers’
                                                          
62 See for instance, Cho (1998), and Kole (1994) who questions the endogeneity issue in previous
research of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Muscarella (1985).
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reputations are adversely affected, and they are more likely to lose their jobs.
Since long-term continued employment is generally one of managers’ objectives
[Shleifer and Vishny (1989)], when the debt level is sufficiently high, managers
are reluctant to make non-value maximising investment decisions.  Hence, it is
expected that managers of highly levered firms are more likely to use funds for
positive NPV projects than managers of low leverage firms, and it is
hypothesised that:
H8o The abnormal returns associated with physical asset expenditure
announcements are not related to firm leverage.
H8a The abnormal returns associated with physical asset expenditure
announcements are greater for firms with high leverage ratios compared to firms
with low leverage ratios.
3.6 Summary
This chapter has provided detail on the development of the hypotheses.  The
three main hypotheses developed are in relation to (1) growth opportunities; (2)
free cash flow; and (3) capital market monitoring.  An alternative hypothesis to
the growth opportunities hypothesis is also developed, namely, the extrapolation
hypothesis.
Other hypotheses are developed to explain the market variations that arise from
mergers and takeovers.  These hypotheses relate to (1) the relative size of
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physical asset expenditure transactions; (2) managers’ prior performance; (3)
managerial shareholdings; and (4) leverage.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
4 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the methods used to calculate abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal returns on both daily and intraday samples.  Before
pursuing the main theme of this chapter, a brief introduction to event study
method is first presented.
Event studies refer to the study of an event, such as the announcement of
physical asset expenditure, and how share prices react to the announcement of
the event.  In an efficient market, there is no expectation of significant price
movements unless there is an announcement of unexpected news as expected
information has already been impounded into share prices.
Event studies involve examining whether there is a significant market movement,
and to what extent this market reaction cannot be explained by fundamentals
[Fama (1970a)].
In this thesis both intraday and daily data are used to examine the abnormal
returns associated with the announcement of physical asset expenditure.  Intraday
data present opportunities to examine the market valuation effects over a short
period of time assuming that the announcement time can be accurately identified.
However, data limitations restrict the length of time series analysis that can be
85
undertaken.  Hence daily data are also employed to examine the effects of
physical asset expenditure announcements over a longer time period.
4.1 Overview of event study method
Event study method is one of the most common methodological approaches to
market based empirical research in finance [Ball and Brown (1968), and Fama,
Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) (hereafter FFJR69)].  Ball and Brown’s study can
be classified as an “information content event study”, since it is a study analysing
security price behaviour up to and concurrent with the event.  FFJR69’s study
can be classified as a “test of market efficiency event study” because it involves
the analysis of security price behaviour subsequent to the event.  Both
information content and market efficiency tests generally involve four steps.  The
paragraphs below discuss the four steps and at the same time identify the issues
involved in each step.  The steps are as follows:63
1. Establishment of a security price reaction (expectation) model.
2. Calculation of abnormal returns.
3. Organisation and classification of sample firms.
4. Analysis of results.
4.1.1 Establishment of a security price reaction (expectation) model
This step generally involves developing an expectations model conditional upon
an event, based on some directional hypotheses.  In some cases, a researcher may
                                                          
63 See Strong (1992) for a review of event study methodology.
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not be willing to predict the direction of the security price reaction, but expects
all of the firms being studied to be affected in the same direction, whatever that
direction might be.
But, in most studies, the direction of the security price reaction to the event is
expected to differ across firms conditional upon information in or relevant to the
event.  Thus, a model is developed to partition the firms into expected positive
and negative security price reactions.  For instance, in this thesis, it is
hypothesised firms with high market to book ratios that announce physical asset
expenditure will experience a higher abnormal return than firms with low market
to book ratios.
4.1.2 Calculation of abnormal returns
Once an expectation model is developed, abnormal returns can then be
calculated.  The calculation of abnormal returns involves the calculation of actual
returns and expected returns.  Actual returns, or observed returns, for any time
period are calculated by taking the difference in prices between the end and
beginning of the period, adjusted for dividends and other factors that may have
affected the shareholding such as share splits and rights issues.
There are two ways of calculating the share price return, the discrete method, and
the continuously compounding method.  The discrete method can be expressed
by:
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where,
1+itR : observed return at the end of period t,
Pit : market price of a share i, at the end of period t,
Pit+1 : market price of a share i, at the end of period t+1, and
Dit+1 : dividends paid on share i during the period t.
The continuous compounded returns can be expressed by:
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Fama (1976) provides US evidence that daily and monthly returns are not
normally distributed, and therefore do not conform to the assumption of standard
statistical tests.64  Praetz and Wilson (1978), Beedles (1986), and Alles and
Spowart (1995) present similar findings for Australia with monthly data.
Similarly, Brown and Warner (1985) find that daily returns (in addition to daily
abnormal returns) are highly non-normal for both discrete and continuously
compounded returns.  Using continuously compounded returns rather than
discrete returns infinitely increases the number of time intervals.  In addition,
continuously compounded returns reduce the impact of outliers.  For these
                                                          
64 Fama (1976) concludes that daily returns results in a leptokurtic distribution, and monthly data
result in the distribution positively skewed.  Brown and Warner (1985) find that non-normality is
less pronounced for cross-sectional data than for individual data, and that normality of cross-
sectional returns improves as the number of sample securities increases.  Dyckman, Philbrick and
Stephen (1984) finds that non-normality of daily returns has no obvious impact upon the choice
of event study methodologies.
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reasons, this thesis uses the continuous compounded returns rather than discrete
returns.
The abnormal return or excess return can be defined as an observed return in
excess of the expected (or ‘normal’) return predicted by an pricing model, for a
given level of risk.  Thompson (1985, p. 152) expresses it as “difference between
expected returns conditional on the existence of an event and expected returns
conditional on the absence of an event”.  Therefore, it is necessary to specify a
model generating a ‘normal’ return before an abnormal return can be measured.
There are many estimation methods available.  Those which are commonly
considered can be classified into two groups: (1) unadjusted and mean adjusted
returns; and (2) risk adjusted returns and risk controlled portfolio returns.65
4.1.2.1 Unadjusted and mean adjusted returns
Both unadjusted and mean adjusted returns were commonly employed in
research before the presence of the risk adjusted asset pricing model known as
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), and
Lintner (1965).  The unadjusted procedure defines the realised returns as the
abnormal return, thus assuming zero expected return.  The expected return on
security i is represented by:
E(Ri) = 0 ……..[4.3]
where, E denotes that the value in the brackets in an expected value.
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The mean adjusted procedure defines the expected return as the mean of past
security returns, defined over an arbitrary period. This model presumes that ex
ante expected returns for a security are equal to a constant k, assuming that the
security’s risk is constant over time.  Different securities with different risks will
have different constant values.  The expected return for security i in period t is
represented by:
E(Ri) = ki for all t ……..[4.4]
where, ki is an average return.
Both models are referred to as naïve models since market-wide factors and risk
are not specifically accounted for.  These models may be criticised on the
grounds that they do not consider risk.  However, Brown and Warner (1980) find
evidence that the mean adjusted returns measure is reasonably robust and
performs as well as, or better than, the more sophisticated methods under some
conditions.
Finally it should be noted that simulation studies conducted by Brown and
Warner (1980, 1985), Dyckman, Philbrick, and Stephen (1984), and Shevlin
(1981) generally conclude that there is no evidence that more complicated
models perform better than a simple, single factor models.  In fact under a variety
of conditions, the Mean Adjusted Returns Model performed as well as the more
sophisticated models except under conditions of event date clustering where it
                                                                                                                                                            
65 Brown and Warner (1980) do not examine unadjusted returns in their study.  Further, Brown
and Warner’s category of market adjusted returns is equivalent to a risk adjusted return where the
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was found to perform comparatively poorly due to autocorrelation [Brown and
Warner (1980)].66
4.1.2.2 Other risk adjusted returns
The second group of estimation techniques covers range of risk adjustment
methodologies, most of which have been developed from the market model.67  In
the market model the systematic risk parameter (or beta factor) is estimated by
conducting in a time series regression of individual firms returns against the
return on a market index.  There are various methods recently developed to
control for serial correlation and non-synchronous trading such as those of
Scholes and Williams (1977), and Dimson (1979).  There are many empirical
situations, where it is desirable to expand the expectations model to control for
other factors, most commonly industry wide effects. 68,69
This section would be incomplete without referring to the recent controversial
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995) three factor model.  The three-factor model
                                                                                                                                                            
beta factor for all firms is equal to one.
66 However, Chandra, Moriarity and Willinger (1990) indicate that the strong performance of the
Mean-Adjusted Returns Model may be attributed to the superior performance of the t-test
employed by Brown and Warner (1980) rather than the model itself.
67 The market model is defined and discussed further in section 4.2.1. The market model is
represented as follows:
ARit = Rit - Rmt
where,
ARit : abnormal returns of ith stock at period t,
Rit : observed returns of ith stock at period t, and
Rmt : market returns at period t.
68 See Bishop, Crapp, Faff and Twite (1993, pp. 160-180) for a discussion of a variety of asset
pricing models, which include the three-moment CAPM [Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), the
intertemporal CAPM [Fama (1970b), Fama and MacBeth (1974), and Stapleton and
Subrahmanyam (1978)], multifactor CAPM [Merton (1973)], the arbitrage pricing model [Ross
(1976) and Roll (1977)], and the multifactor arbitrage asset pricing models [Chen, Roll and Ross
(1986)].  All suggest multifactor models rather than relying on the market portfolio alone in
expectation formation.
69 The issue of thin trading is discussed in more detailed in section 4.7.1.2.
91
is applied by regressing the post-event monthly excess returns for firm i on a
market factor, a size factor and a market to book factor:70
Rit - Rft = αi+ βi(Rmt - Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit ……..[4.5]
where,
Rit : simple return on the common stock of firm i,
Rft : return on a risk free proxy,
Rmt : return on a market index,
SMBt : return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of
big stocks, and
HMLt : return on a portfolio of low book to market stocks minus the return on a
portfolio of a low book to market stocks.
4.1.2.3 Thin trading and non-synchronisation
A potential problem of daily returns is thin trading.71  Thin trading refers to the
trading of securities which does not occur on a continuous and synchronous
                                                          
70 The explanations to the Fama and French results can be broadly classified into three categories:
(1) For evidence of survivorship bias, see Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995), and Chan,
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995); (2) for an argument related to data mining, see Black (1993);
and (3) for an argument concerning market irrationality, see Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny
(1995).  For other empirical evidence which does not support the Fama and French model, see
Daniel and Titman (1997), and for evidence which suggests that there is a positive relation
between book to market ratios and security returns, see Davis (1994), Barber and Lyon (1996),
and Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993).
71 A further problem associated with daily data is the day of the week effect.  Cross (1973),
French (1980), and Gibbons and Hess (1981) present evidence showing that equity returns in the
USA on Mondays tend to be significantly negative while return returns at the end of the week
tend to be significantly positive.  In Australia, Ball and Bowers (1988), and Finn, Lynch and
Moore (1991) present evidence that the large negative return occurs on Tuesdays rather than on
Mondays.  It is possible that the negative Tuesday effect in Australia and Asia [see Jaffe and
Westerfield (1985), Kato (1990), Condoyanni, O’Hanlon and Ward (1987), and Wong, Hui and
Chan (1992)] may be due to all equity markets around the world reacting to common
international information.  The effect is observed on Tuesdays in Australia and the Asian markets
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basis.  When this occurs, the assumption that is employed by most asset pricing
models, ie, shares are traded on a continuous basis is violated, and the violation
of this assumption causes the ‘observed’ returns dissimilar to the ‘true’ returns.
A problem associated with thin trading identified by Scholes and Williams
(1977) is the problem of non-synchronous trading which may lead to
econometric problems when using the Market Model.  To ensure a meaningful
estimate of beta using the ordinary least square (OLS) regression technique, the
firm and market index return should be measured contemporaneously.  Because,
some shares are not traded on a continuous basis (eg, especially small firms),72
for any given measurement interval, observed security returns will not be
synchronised with each other.
Scholes and Williams demonstrate that securities that trade infrequently have an
OLS estimator that is biased upward for alphas and downward for betas, whilst
those securities trading frequently are biased in the opposite direction.73
Daily data will be employed in this study as well as intraday data.  This is
because researchers appear to prefer daily data to monthly data in detecting
abnormal returns in event studies [Brown and Warner (1985), and Dyckman,
Philbrick and Stephen (1984)].  Daily data generally result in more powerful tests
                                                                                                                                                            
because of time-zone differences.  For example, the European and North American markets
generally trade over the Australian night.
72 Dimson (1979), and Fisher (1966) acknowledge the problem of thin trading, for instance,
Fisher (1966, p. 198) notes that for a relatively inactive stock, the closing price listed in the stock
exchange refers to the last transaction of a particular stock which may have occurred at any time
during the trading day.
73 See section 4.7.1.2 for the Scholes-Williams method for estimating beta which allows for thin
trading.
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than for monthly data.  For instance, Brown and Warner (1985, p. 25) conclude
that the use of daily data in event studies is ‘straightforward’.
4.1.3 Organisation and classification of sample firms
Once abnormal returns have been calculated, cumulative abnormal returns can be
calculated for the whole sample.  However, sometimes organisation of sample is
desired.  It is usually conducted by way of segregating sample firms into
portfolios according to the expected security price reaction outlined in section
4.1.1.  For instance, in this thesis, sample firms are grouped into high and low
market to book ratio samples, high and low cash flow ratio samples, and also
applied the Foster, Olsen and Shevlin method, ie,  sample firms were grouped
into sample which contains positive abnormal returns at announcement date and
sample which contains negative abnormal returns at announcement date.
There are two commonly used techniques for calculating cumulative abnormal
returns, one was pioneered by FFJR69, called the cumulative average residual,
and the other called the abnormal performance index (API) was pioneered by
Ball and Brown (1968).  The CAR approach is represented as follows:

=
=
T
t
ptT ARCAR
1
……..[4.6]
where,
ARpt : average portfolio abnormal returns for period t, and
n : number if time periods being aggregated.
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The CAR technique adds average residuals over time for T periods, eg, 20 days
before the physical asset expenditure announcements (t = -20) to 20 days after
the announcement (t = +20).  Each period’s average residual consists of
individual security residuals at a particular point in event time, beginning with t =
-20 relative to the actual announcement date (t = 0) and ending with t = +20.
This method allows the researcher to examine whether a particular
announcement is perceived to be unfavourable or favourable by the market.  In a
strict sense (ie, no prior anticipation of the event or no information leakage), one
expects to see a relatively flat CAR curve (ie, the average daily abnormal returns
should not differ systematically from zero) from t = -20 to the day before the
announcement and day after the announcement date to t = +20.  On the day of the
announcement, a jump in price is expected.  A positive (negative) jump in CAR
is seen to be evidence that the market is impounding some favourable
(unfavourable) information into the share prices.
The API approach is represented as follows:
API ARt pt
t
T
= +
=
∏ ( )1
1
……..[4.7]
The path of the API also provides evidence of the timing of release of
information.  If physical asset expenditure is related to share prices, then, one
expects that API will have a non-zero value.  If there is no relationship between
share prices and physical asset expenditure, then API should have a value close
to zero.
95
There are several modifications to both the cumulative average residual and API.
Beaver and Dukes (1972) modified the API measure by making the
compounding of excess returns continuous instead of discrete.  However,
Bowman (1983) argues that it is unlikely to provide significant changes unless
the time period used is months and excess returns are cumulated over a long
period.  Patell (1976) developed normalised cumulative prediction error.  The
measure is analogous to the cumulative average residual but is designed to
accommodate a parametric testing procedure.
The cumulative average residual methodology is the most commonly used
approach, despite the development of the more sophisticated and intuitively more
appealing methods.  Finally, Brown and Warner (1980, footnote 28) report that
“…the abnormal performance measure of Ball, Brown, Pettit, and Beaver-Dukes
were also examined.  The properties of the confidence bands traced out by such
alternative metrics were similar to those discussed for the CARs”.
Regardless of the more sophisticated and intuitively more appealing methods,74
the FFJR69 CAR methodology has been widely accepted as the most commonly
used approach.  It is also endorsed by Brown and Warner (1980, footnote 28) that
“the properties of the confidence bands traced out by such alternative metrics
were similar to those discussed for the CARs”.  Hence, for this reason, this thesis
adopts the FFJR69 CAR approach.
                                                          
74 See for instance, Roll (1983), Blume and Stambaugh (1983), and Dimson and Marsh (1986)
discuss the possible bias introduced by the FFJP69 CAR.  See also Beaver and Dukes (1972),
Pettit (1972), and Patell (1976) for a discussion of modified forms of API and CAR.
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4.1.4 Analysis of results
The final step in an event study is to analyse and interpret the abnormal returns.
The objective is to use a test statistic to indicate whether abnormal returns are
statistically different from zero.  In some situations it may be sufficient or even
necessary to confine this step to use of descriptive statistics.  For example,
FFJR69 conducted no statistical tests in their pioneering study.  Similarly,
Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) provide only descriptive
statistics due to their small sample.  But in most cases, tests of statistical
significance are required to confirm or reject the hypotheses.  Tests of statistical
significance can generally be classified into parametric and non-parametric.
4.1.4.1 Parametric tests
Parametric tests have three discriminating characteristics:
• data measurement are of an interval or ratio scale,
• they involve the testing of specified parameters, and
• they require very stringent assumptions to be met, eg, both populations are
normally distributed with equal variances.
A parametric test that is typically employed in event studies to analyse abnormal
returns is the student t-test, which relies upon some very restrictive assumptions,
and when the assumptions are violated, may lead to invalid inferences.  As noted
in Chapter 4, section 4.1.2, evidence suggests that the distribution of daily returns
are non-normal and the same holds true for distributions of abnormal returns.
Also, abnormal returns are typically not identically distributed across securities
in a sample and correlation frequently exists between individual security
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abnormal returns, such as in cases of event date or industry clustering, leading to
a breach of the independence assumption.75
Despite the strong distributional assumptions required for parametric testing, and
the evidence indicating the underlying assumptions are violated in the data,
Brown and Warner (1980) found that t-test was consistently a better
approximation of the theoretical distribution than non-parametric tests.
4.1.4.2 Non-parametric tests
Non-parametric tests are designed to be used in circumstances where parametric
tests may not be suitable.  The following are situations where non-parametric
tests are preferred to parametric tests:
• data measurement is ordinal or nominal,76
• assumptions underlying the use of parametric tests are violated, and
• the situation requires a study of such features as goodness-of-fit.
Non-parametric tests require less restrictive assumptions, and are generally
considered less powerful than parametric tests.  Whenever there is a possibility
of the violation of the assumptions inherently in the parametric tests, non-
parametric tests will be used.  In particular, non-parametric tests are generally
used for small sample sizes, since small sample sizes are likely to violate the
properties of the normal distribution.
                                                          
75 See Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974), and Watts (1978) for methods dealing with the
violation of the assumption that the abnormal returns are not identically distributed across in a
sample.
76 The level of measurement is nominal when the data generated are simply labels used to identify
times, such as “high” or “low”.  The level of measurement is ordinal if the data generated permit
the items to be rank-ordered.
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The non-parametric tests used in this thesis include the binomial test, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov sample test, and the Mann-Whitney U test.  The binomial
test is used to test whether the percentage of positive abnormal return cases is
statistically greater than 50% of the sample.  To test for whether the mean ARs
and CARs of a sample is statistically greater than zero, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test is used.  The Mann-Whitney U test is to test whether the difference in mean
ARs and CARs between two samples is statistically significant.
4.1.4.3 Multivariate cross-sectional analysis
Both parametric and non-parametric tests discussed in sections 4.1.4.1 and
4.1.4.2 are for univariate analysis. In Chapters 8 and 10, multivariate analysis in
presented. The two multivariate regressions used in this thesis are as follows:
SIZEFCFDCFMBCAR 4321 ββββα ++++=
LEVMSPASTPERF 765 β+β+β+ + ε ……..[4.8]
where,
CAR : cumulative abnormal returns for a given window,
MB : market to book ratio,
CF : cash flow ratio,
FCFD : free cash flow dummy, where 1 is free cash flow and 0 otherwise,
SIZE : size of the physical asset expenditure transaction,
PASTPERF : managerial past performance,
MS : managerial shareholding,
LEV : leverage ratio, and
ε : error terms.
99
)CFDMBD(CFDCFDMBDMBDCAR HL5L4H3L2H1 ×β+β+β+β+β+α=
LEVMSPASTPERFSIZE 9876 β+β+β+β+ + ε ……..[4.9]
where,
MBDH   : MB dummy variable taking the value 1 for the highest
    MB quartile, and 0 otherwise,
MBDL   : MB dummy variable taking the value 1 for the lowest
    MB quartile, and 0 otherwise,
CFDH   : CF dummy variable taking the value 1 for the highest
    CF quartile, and 0 otherwise,
CFDL   : CF dummy variable taking the value 1 for the lowest
    CF quartile, and 0 otherwise,
HL CFDMBD ×  : interactive term, where 1 is free cash flow, and 0 otherwise,
4.2. Intraday samples
This section presents the asset pricing models used to calculate intraday
abnormal returns.
4.2.1 Calculating abnormal returns: The market model
The initial abnormal returns are calculated based on the constrained (0,1) market
model.  Abnormal returns are defined as follows:
ARit = Rit - Rmt ……..[4.10]
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where,
ARit : abnormal returns of ith stock at period t,
Rit : observed returns of ith stock at period t, and
Rmt : market returns at period t.
The market return is constructed using the Accumulation All Ordinaries Index on
a minute-by-minute basis.  Abnormal returns calculated using intraday data are
not adjusted for risk in the form of incorporating beta factors because calculation
of risk-adjusted return (eg, beta factors) for intraday returns is likely to distort the
abnormal return calculations.  This is because intraday returns are likely to be
affected by substantial noise, and if beta is calculated using intraday information,
beta is likely to be sensitive to this noise.  The work of Kim, Lockwood and
McInish (1998) reveals that beta is very unstable through the trading day.  Kim et
al question the previous research which treats betas of individual firms as
constant over the trading day [see for example, McInish and Wood (1984, 1986),
and Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1983)].  Further, any
adjustment is likely to be very inconsequential.
4.2.2 Calculating abnormal returns: The control portfolio model
As an alternative to the abnormal returns calculated using (0,1) model, a control
portfolio approach is also be used.  The control portfolio approach is designed to
remove effects of abnormal information flow surrounding the announcements.
The control portfolios are formed by calculating abnormal returns for each
company announcement exactly one year prior to the announcement date (to
101
nearest trading day) to get an equivalent ‘news-free’ period.  In order to ensure a
clean control period, if the one year pre-announcement control period contains an
announcement of any type, the period is moved backward until a clean period is
found.  For instance, assume Company X makes an announcement on Friday, 25
July 1997, and cumulative abnormal returns for a [-5,+5] day window covers the
period 18 July 1997 to 1 August 1997.  The control portfolio consists of
abnormal returns over the window 18 July 1996 and 1 August 1996.  If there was
an announcement made on Tuesday, 23 July 1996, then the window would be
moved back to Monday, 8 July 1996 to 22 July 1996, assuming there were no
announcements during that period.
The control portfolio is used as a benchmark since it comprises prices in periods
that are not subject to any known announcements.  The abnormal return for the
control portfolio is as follows:
ARi,T-1 = Ri,T-1 - Rm,T-1 ……..[4.11]
where,
ARi,T-1 : abnormal returns of ith stock at period T-1year,
Ri,T-1 : observed returns of ith stock at period T-1year, and
Rm,T-1 : market returns at period T-1year.
A control set of ‘abnormal’ returns can then be estimated, being the difference
between the return on the announcement date and the return calculated over the
control period, ie:
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AR'it = Rit - Ri,T-1 ……..[4.12]
Further, an additional control set of ‘abnormal returns’ can be estimated as the
difference between the abnormal return calculated around the announcement date
and the abnormal return calculated over the control period, ie:
AR''it = ARit - ARi,T-1 …..[4.13]
4.2.2.1 Illustration of calculation of abnormal returns: intraday case
Intraday returns are calculated as time weighted returns over a 15-minute
interval.  The time weighted returns method adopted here is similar to the
approach used in McInish and Wood (1992).  Returns are calculated by
interpolating observed prices at two points in time, viz:

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11 ….[4.14]
where Ri = observed share price return for ith company at time t.
Example
Assuming an announcement was made at 11:45am, and the trades around the
announcement were as follows:
Time Share prices
10:25am $16.50
10:44am $16.53
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10:59am $16.52
11:14 am $16.52
15 minute intervals are created as of 11:45am, spanning 5 days before and after
the announcement at 11:45am, viz, 10:00am, 10:15am, 10:30am, 10:45am,
11:00am, 11:15am and so on.
$16.50 $16.53 R10:45 $16.52 R11:00 $16.52
10:25am 10:30am 10:44am 10:45am 10:59am 11:00am 11:14am
The returns for the 10:45am and the 11:00am intervals are calculated as follows:
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= -0.00056
In the case where there is no share price in any 15 minute interval, such as the
one portrayed below:
$5.10 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 $5.20 R7 $5.30
10:00 10:15 10:30 10:45 11:00 11:15 11:30 11:33 11:45 11:50
the interval returns are calculated as follows:
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It is noted in Chapter 6, section 6.3.6, the time weighting approach is likely to
give rise to a biased return estimation when shares are thinly traded.  This issue is
discussed further in Chapter 6.
4.3 Daily sample
In this section, a description of the market model used to calculate abnormal
returns for the daily sample is provided.
4.3.1 Calculating abnormal returns
The most common method of calculating abnormal returns for daily data is the
market model.
4.3.1.1 Market model
This model assumes that a security’s expected return is a function of the
security’s risk.  The security’s risk has two components: (1) systematic risk - risk
that cannot be eliminated by diversification; and (2) unsystematic risk - risk that
is independent of the market (alternatively, risk that is associated with random
events, and can be minimised by diversifying).  The systematic component is
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measured by the risk parameter beta, which is equal to the slope coefficient in a
time series regression of an individual firm’s return on the return on a market
index.  The market model is a single index model and makes no explicit
statement about how equilibrium security prices are established.  The parameters
of the market model are estimated from the following equation by OLS
regression:
Rit = αi + βi Rmt + eit …....[4.15]
where,
Rit : observed return on asset i for period t,
αi : intercept for asset i,
βi : sensitivity measure of return on asset i to market returns,
Rmt : observed return on the market index for period t, and
eit : residual term for asset i in period t.
Expected security returns in the market model are represented as:
mtiimtiiit RRRE βαβα +=),,/( ……[4.16]
where,
ii ,βα : are determined from OLS regression equation.
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In this thesis, the market model is used to estimate betas and to estimate expected
returns.77
4.4 Calculating cumulative abnormal returns
Once abnormal returns are estimated, average abnormal returns for the portfolio,
ARpt  can then be calculated for the sample for time period t as follows:

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1AR …....[4.17]
where N is the number of securities in the sample.
Returns reflect the theoretical returns required by an investor for a given level of
risk.  Ex post observed returns should resemble expected returns at least in an
efficient market if the expectations model is an accurate representation of
investor expectations.  In the absence of any unanticipated announcement, the
average difference between the expected and observed returns should be close to
zero.
Abnormal returns can be cumulated.  A shorter cumulating period is used when a
researcher is confident that the event has been accurately identified.  If a
researcher is not confident with the accuracy of identifying the event date, a
longer cumulating period or window may be used.  For example, FFJR69
cumulate abnormal returns from twenty nine months before and thirty months
                                                          
77 See section 4.7 for estimation of betas using the market model.
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after the event month under examination.  Cumulated abnormal returns (CARs)
also have the advantage of portraying the behaviour of market responses.
CARs are generally expected to exhibit little systematic behaviour except on the
announcement date where prices react to information.  This is consistent with
semi-strong form market efficiency, and indicated that the market anticipates
announcements in advance and that the market reacts instantaneously to the
unanticipated components of an announcement.
This thesis adopts the most commonly used techniques for calculating
cumulative abnormal returns pioneered by FFJR69 discussed in 4.1.3.  This
approach is re-stated here as:

=
=
T
t
ptT ARCAR
1
In the case of intraday (daily) returns, the CAR technique aggregates average
abnormal returns over time for T periods, eg, 1800 minutes (20 days) before the
physical asset expenditure announcements, abbreviated as t-1800, to 1800
minutes after the announcement, t+1800.  Each period’s average abnormal
returns consists of individual security abnormal returns at various points
beginning with t-1800 relative to the actual announcement date t0 (for both
intraday and daily returns) and ending with t+1800.
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4.5 Choice of estimation and test period
Two distinct periods, namely, the choice of the estimation and the test period,
need to be specified in an event study.  The estimation period may span either
side of the test period but should not coincide with the event under question so
that parameters, such as beta estimates can be determined during a period when
there are no persistent abnormal returns.  The length of the estimation period
must be long enough to ensure sufficient observations but not so extended as to
include periods when the value of the parameters may have shifted.  Since, as
noted earlier, in this thesis, betas are only estimated for daily data, and hence,
this issue only concerns daily data.  Typically, the estimation period includes at
least 48 to 60 observations.78
The test period is the period over which abnormal returns are expected to occur
in response to the event under study.  The length of the test period may vary with
the researcher’s confidence of correctly specifying the event date.  For example,
if the researcher is confident that he or she has identified the event date
accurately, then a short test period may be appropriate, whereas a longer test
period may be desirable if the researcher is not confident that the event date has
been correctly identified.  The test period enables the researcher to analyse
portfolio abnormal returns for individual time periods to determine whether they
differ systematically from zero.  Time series aggregation such as the CAR is also
commonly used to identify abnormal returns over more than one period.
                                                          
78 For instance, the Australian Graduate School of Management estimates betas based upon 48
months of data.
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As noted in section 4.6 below, 48-monthly observations are used.  The estimation
period is estimated one month prior to the test periods.  For intraday data, the test
periods span 1890 minutes before and after the announcement minute.  For daily
data, the test periods span 20 before and after the announcement date.
4.6 Beta estimation
As noted previously the market model is used to estimate betas and expected
returns.  The market model, which was discussed earlier, is simply an expression
of statistical relationship between observed returns and observed returns on a
market index, represented by:
Rit = αi + βi Rmt + eit
The market model is commonly estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression.79  Since the market model is merely a statistical relationship between
an asset’s observed returns and the market returns, the model itself is not subject
to any theoretical assumptions about investor behaviour or the formation of the
market portfolio that are required under CAPM.
                                                          
79 The OLS method of estimating betas requires the assumption of constant and independent error
terms.
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4.6.1 Issues related to beta estimation
There are many issues arising with the estimation of beta.  Some of the more
significant issues in beta estimation for the market model are briefly noted
below.80
4.6.1.1 Market index
The estimation of beta requires a proxy for the market portfolio.  There are many
market indices available in Australia, each with differing characteristics such as
Australian Accumulation All Ordinaries Index, ASX100 , 50 Leaders, 20
Leaders, and Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) World index.
The Australian Accumulation All Ordinaries Index was selected because it
represents a large portion of the Australian equity market.81  This index is likely
to present thin trading problems as this index is constructed using many small
and thinly traded firms.  The use of this index is justified by the broad sample of
firms in the thesis.  Furthermore, the thin trading problem may be adjusted for
using the methods presented by Dimson (1979), and Scholes and Williams
(1977), which are discussed below.
4.6.1.2 Thin trading and non-synchronisation problems
Dimson (1979) argues that beta may exhibit downward bias where shares are
thinly traded, and upward bias where shares are frequently traded.  Other
methods are also proposed by Dimson (1979), Fowler and Rorke (1983), Marsh
(1979), and Cohen, Hawawini, Mayer, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1983).  Fowler
                                                          
80 For a detailed discussion of betas estimation, see Brailsford, Faff, and Oliver (1997).
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et al demonstrate that the Scholes-Williams (1977) adjustment yield a consistent
estimator, while the Dimson (1979) method does not.  That is, Dimson’s beta is
only correctly specified if the market returns are serially uncorrelated. Fowler et
al argue that the problem with Dimson’s method lies in the equal weighting of
the beta estimates, and Fowler et al argue that the aggregation of beta estimates
should be on an unequal weighted basis.  When thinly traded firms are identified,
the Scholes-Williams (1977) adjustment is used,82,83 which is estimated by:
m
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where,
)SW(iβ

: Scholes and Williams beta estimate,
−
iβ

: slope estimate in the simple regression of Rit (share returns in
period t) on Rmt-1 (market returns lagged one period),
iβ

: slope estimate in the simple regression of Rit on Rmt, the OLS
beta in the standard model,
+
iβ

: slope estimate in the simple regression of Rit on Rmt+1 (market
returns led one period), and
mρ
 : first order serial correlation coefficient for the market returns.
                                                                                                                                                            
81 By end of 1998, there were 254 companies included in the calculation of the AOI representing
93% of market capitalisation, and 94% of ASX equity turnover [ASX Fact Book (1999)].
82 See also Heinkel and Kraus (1988) for a discussion of thin trading issues.
83 For instance, Brailsford, Faff and Oliver (1997) report that News Corporation Ltd’s beta
increases by 0.5981 from 2.2959 to 2.8940 when the effects of thin trading are adjusted for using
the Scholes-Williams method.
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4.6.1.3 Length of estimation period
The beta for each companies is calculated over 48 monthly observations.
Brailsford and Heaney (1998, p. 229) suggest an estimation period of between 50
and 60 monthly observations, while Bishop, Crapp, Faff and Twite (1993, p.
190) suggest using 48 monthly observations.  In this thesis 48 monthly
observations are used.84
4.7 Tests of significance
To test whether the average abnormal returns, ARpt , on day t, is significantly
different from zero, the student t-statistic is computed as follows:85
N/
AR
statistict
pt
pt
σ
=− …....[4.19]
where,
ptAR : average portfolio abnormal return for time period t,
σpt : cross-sectional standard deviation for time period t, and
N : number of time periods aggregated.
In order to test the effect of market to book and cash flow, the sample is
subdivided into high and low, and also into quartiles.  To test whether the mean
                                                          
84 Hawawini (1983) presents a model which offers an explanation for the direction and size of
changes in beta resulting from changes in the sampling interval. Beta is sensitive to the return
interval because the covariance of asset returns with market index returns does not change
proportionately as the return interval is varied. As the return interval is lengthened, betas of thinly
traded stocks increase, while betas of frequently traded stocks decrease.
85 This t-test is similar to the t-test used by Ritter (1991) in the context of testing abnormal returns
for initial public offerings.
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abnormal returns of the high market to book ratio sample is greater than the mean
abnormal returns of the low market to book ratio sample (or whether the mean
CAR of the highest market to book ratio quartile is significant different from the
mean of the lowest market to book ratio quartile), the following t-test is used.86
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where,
µ : mean abnormal returns for portfolios i and j,
σ2 : variance for portfolios i and j, and
n : number of observations for portfolios i and j.
To test whether the cumulative abnormal sample return from t until T, TCAR , is
significantly different from zero, the t-statistic is computed as follows:
TT
T
n/csd
CARstatistict =− …....[4.21]
where,
nT : number of observation for the period t,
csdT : cov])t([var)t( ×−×+× 12 ,
var : average (over the window months) cross-sectional variance, and
cov : first-order autocovariance of the ARt series.
                                                          
86 This t-test for the difference in mean between two samples is similar to the t-test used by
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4.8 Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of event study method, and has outlined
the steps involved in an event study.  Issues associated with event study were
briefly discussed.  Methodologies with respect to generating expected returns,
significance testing procedures, and beta estimation were also outlined.
                                                                                                                                                            
Cohen, Ness, Okuda, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1976).
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CHAPTER 5
DATA SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION
5 DATA
Section 5.1 describes the definition of physical asset expenditure in detail.  The
discussion of the sample description and selection is contained in section 5.2.
Section 5.3 describes the variables used in the analysis.
5.1 Definition
Physical asset expenditure includes expenditures on plant, machinery, property,
equipment and other forms of physical asset expenditures including construction
of new plant, installation of new plant, and upgrading of existing plant but
excludes assets acquired through mergers and takeovers.
5.1.1 Mergers and takeovers
There are many empirical studies conducted on mergers and takeovers.
Researchers have a good understanding of the market variations associated with
mergers and takeovers.  However this is not the case for physical asset
expenditure announcements.  While it may be argued that the market variation of
physical asset expenditure announcements should resemble those of takeovers
and mergers, this conclusion is premature, and requires future research.
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As noted in the literature review chapter, empirical studies on capital expenditure
outside the USA and Singapore are limited.  This study excludes mergers and
takeovers to allow for a clear focus on only physical asset expenditures.
Other reasons for excluding mergers and takeovers were discussed in Chapter 2,
section 2.1.  Briefly, the exclusion of mergers and takeovers reduces the
valuation problems caused by information leakage, the presence of multiple
bidders, and substantial shareholder notices.  Hence, by focusing on only
physical asset expenditure, it avoids any confounding effects caused by mergers
and takeovers.
5.1.2 Acquisition of business and division of a business
Physical asset expenditure does not include expenditure associated with
acquiring businesses and divisions of a business.  This is because the substance
of these transactions is very similar to mergers and takeovers, and hence they are
most likely lead to confounding implications for this research.
5.1.3 Properties and land
Expenditures on properties and land fall into the definition of physical asset
expenditure as they are physical in nature.  Examples of expenditures on
properties and land are the acquisition of shopping malls, office buildings, retail
outlets, hotels, hospitals, land, and vineyards.
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5.1.4 Upgrades vs maintenance
Expenditures on upgrades specifically exclude maintenance.  Expenditures on
upgrading existing plant are different from maintenance expenditure in that
expenditures on upgrading are often associated with an increase in production
capacity and employment, whereas maintenance is more of an operating item.
Further, maintenance is often already anticipated by the equity market, and hence
it is already incorporated into share prices.  Upgrades are often material and are
capitalised rather than being expensed periodically.  The classification of
upgrading, construction and installation sometimes overlap because some
upgrades involve construction and installation of new facilities.  Some examples
of this type of expenditure are listed below:
“AGL was now proceeding with planned upgrade of the Roma to Brisbane
natural gas pipeline system. The upgrade is expected to cost up to $100M by the
time the project is complete. AGL plans to double the capacity of the Roma to
Brisbane natural gas pipeline.”
“CSR has announced that it will upgrade its Hannan South treatment to 600,000
tonnes per annum capacity. Capital costs are $1.8M. The company aims to lift
gold production to 36,000 ounces in 1994/95 and to 42,000 ounces in 1995/96.”
“Contracts have been signed with Thiess Contractors to facilitate the expansion
of the Burton Coal Mine.  The capital cost of the upgrade will be less than
A$60M and will employ 130 people on an ongoing basis.”
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5.1.5 Research and development
The definition of physical asset expenditure does not include research and
development expenditure (R&D) because:
(1) most R&D expenditures are not physical, and
(2) where capitalised, R&D that satisfies the accounting requirement that future
benefits are likely to be eventuated beyond reasonable doubt are rare.
Though rare, this type of R&D might be announced separately if the sum
involved is relatively large.87
5.1.6 Joint ventures
Some construction and acquisitions of new plant are undertaken via a joint
venture.  Joint ventures facilitate sharing of technology, management expertise
and resources.  Physical asset expenditures undertaken via joint ventures are
included in the analysis.  For example, some of the excerpts are provided below:
“The cinema joint venture between Village Roadshow, Greater Union and
Warner Bros announced plans to construct a total of seven new multiplexes in
Westfield Shopping towns around Australia for $200M.” [announcement made
by Village Roadshow]
“Warner Bros/Greater Union/Village Roadshow joint venture, announced plans
to double the size of their Australia wide chain of cinemas, spearheaded by the
                                                          
87 In a random sample of 30 large firms over the period 1995 to 1997, twenty-eight of the thirty
capitalised R&Ds are announced concurrently with the year end announcement relating to current
year events and future prospects.  Only two of the thirty capitalised R&Ds are announced
separately.  Hence, it would be difficult to disentangle the actual market response from year end
announcement and from R&D announcements.
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development of 18 massive 20 to 25 screen MEGAPLEX Entertainment
Centres.” [announcement made by Village Roadshow]
“Amcor announced that it will have an 83% interest in a $16M folding carton JV
with the Chinese Government in Beijing. Amcor will invest $13M and the
balance of the capital will be contributed by the China National Tobacco
Corporation.”
“BHP Minerals will proceed with the development of the Hartley Platinum
Project in Zimbabwe in a joint venture with Delta Gold. BHP Minerals will
spend $310 million over three years to develop a platinum mine and processing
facility.”
5.2 Data description and selection
5.2.1. Announcement data - intraday data set
The announcement data for intraday analysis are provided by the Securities
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  The initial data set provided
by SIRCA contains 3,133 announcements made by 816 public listed firms
between 1 July 1995 and 31 December 1997, classified under sub-code 07 as
follows:88
                                                          
88 Company announcements are classified into 18 categories.  The 18 sub-codes respectively are:
takeover announcements, shareholder details, periodic reports, quarterly activities report,
quarterly cash flow report, issued capital, asset acquisition and disposal, notice of meeting, stock
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Sub Code Primary Code Meaning
07 000 Asset acquisition and disposal
001 Asset acquisition (if substantial)
002 Asset disposal (if substantial)
003 Other
Several filters were applied.  First, related announcements were identified and
the earliest date of the related announcement was assigned a dummy “0” and
subsequent related announcements were assignment a dummy of “1”.89  Data
were then sorted by announcement time so that exclusion could be made for
announcements before and after the official ASX trading period between 10:00
am and 4:00 pm.  These steps resulted in 1,334 and 304 exclusions respectively.
Further exclusions were made for concurrent announcements. Concurrent
announcements included those physical asset expenditure announcements made
concurrently with chairman addresses, and unrelated announcements such as
announcements related to option agreements, asset swaps, and court decisions
over a particular acquisition, completion of acquisition announcements, asset
sales and divestitures announcements, acquisition of shares, business, merger and
takeover announcements, and profit and loss and dividend announcements. This
category resulted in a further 914 exclusions.
Announcements of permit, right, distribution and acquisitions of interest in
projects by mining companies were also excluded since they do not represent
physical asset expenditures. This group resulted in 288 eliminations.
                                                                                                                                                            
exchange announcement, dividend announcement, progress report, company administration,
notice of call, CAP test, chairman’s address, letter to shareholders, ASX query, and warrants.
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There were also 65 announcements of contracts being awarded.  Because the
nature of the announcement and the possibility that the contracts involved
physical asset expenditure were ambiguous, these were also discarded.
Examples are detailed below.
“Listed contracting group, Macmahon Holdings Limited, has won a joint bid for
the $63 million contract to upgrade the Royal Australian Air Force's Learmonth
base at Exmouth on the central coast of Western Australia.  The contract, won by
a joint venture between Macmahon Contractors (WA) Pty Ltd and Transfield
Construction, will result in a major operational upgrading of the Learmonth base,
36 kilometres south of Exmouth.” [announcement made by Macmahon Holdings
Limited]
“Fleetwood Corporation Limited has been awarded by BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd a
contract to supply and install a further 25 manufactured homes in Port Hedland
for BHP'S Capacity Expansion Project associated with the HBI Development.
The contract value is $3,000,000 with completion due in June 1997.”
[announcement made by Fleetwood Corporation Limited]
A final 58 exclusions related to those announcements which did not have
information related to the consideration of the physical asset expenditure
transactions, accounting information, and intraday share prices.
                                                                                                                                                            
89 Related announcements refer to the announcements of the same new physical asset
expenditure. The purpose of assigning dummy variables is to pick up the earliest announcement
date and ignore subsequent announcements related to the same new physical capital expenditure.
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The total number of exclusions was 2963 (being 1638 from related
announcements and announcements made outside trading time, and 1325 for
non-physical in nature), leaving a sample size of 170.  The 170 observations
were categorised into (1) acquisitions of plant, facility and equipment; (2)
acquisitions of shopping complexes, retail outlets, hotels and vineyards; (3)
acquisitions of industrial property and land; and (4) plant expansion, upgrade and
construction of new plants.  The steps in deriving the sample are outlined in
Table 5.1 below.
5.2.2 Share prices and accumulation index data
Share prices for the 170 announcement dates and the All Ordinaries Index (AOI)
data were also provided by SIRCA.  Share prices included all trades.  The AOI is
measured on a minute basis.  Traded share prices are obtained for event period
spanning 5 days before and after the announcement date.
5.2.3 Announcement data - daily data set
A sample of 300 listed companies were randomly selected from companies listed
in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), for the purpose of collating the
announcement dates of their physical asset expenditure announcements.  Random
selection is used to enhance the generalisation of results from the sample to the
population of physical asset expenditure announcements.
The random selection is performed as follows:  First, a database consisting 1959
companies appearing in the ASX Datadisc was downloaded, and then each
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company was assigned a number from 1 to 1959.  Second, 300 random numbers
were then constructed in order to match the numbers assigned to the 1959
companies.  Third, the random numbers were matched with the numbers
assigned to each company.
Table 5.1: Derivation of the sample for the intraday data set
Number of observations
Initial sample size 3133
Less: Announcements made outside trading time 304
Less: Related announcements 1334 1638
Subtotal 1495
Less: Non-Physical Asset Expenditure Announcements
Non-physical asset expenditure related announcements 314
Concurrent announcements 21
Completion of acquisition announcements 41
Asset sales and divestitures announcements 65
Acquisition of shares, mergers and takeovers 328
Acquisition of business or divisions 145 914
Less: Acquisitions of Permits, Rights, Distributions, and Interest
Acquisition of deposit/gas fields/mines/tenements 277
Acquisition of interest in projects 11 288
Less: Contract Awarded
Contract Awarded which has ambiguous physical asset expenditure
implications 65 65
Less:
Announcements without information of consideration 14
Announcements without share price information 28
Announcements without accounting information 16 58
Subtotal for exclusion 1325
Sample size for analysis 170
Consisting of the following categories
Acquisition of plant/facility/equipment 58
Acquisition of shopping complexes/retail
outlets/hotels/vineyards/hospitals 44
Acquisition of industrial property and land 50
Plant expansion/upgrade/construction of new plant 18 170
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The announcement dates of physical asset expenditure were collected from the
ASX Datadisc,90 by scrolling from the earliest announcement dates to the latest
announcement dates for the 300 companies.  For most companies, the earliest
announcement dates available on the Datadisc began in July 1989, and the latest
announcement dates were up until December 1997.
Of these 300 companies, 594 announcements relating to physical asset
expenditure were obtained between 1 July 1989 and 31 December 1997.  A
second source of the daily data comes from the 170 intraday observations shown
in Table 5.1.  Finally, a further 50 announcements were obtained from intraday
data set which was previously excluded because the announcements were made
outside the official trading period.  The three sources of data aggregated to 814
announcements.
Of the original 594 physical asset expenditure announcements, several filters
were applied.  First, 51 announcements were discarded because there was no
information about the size of the physical asset expenditure transactions.  A
further 120 announcements were discarded because there was insufficient share
price information to calculate a beta for the firm (see Chapter 4 for a description
of beta estimation, a 48-month period is required for beta estimation).  Finally,
75 announcements were discarded due to a lack of accounting information.91
                                                          
90 Version 3.31, March 1998 edition.
91 Majority of the exclusions attributed to the lack of managerial shareholding information.
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Table 5.2: Derivation of the sample for the daily data set
Number of observations
Initial sample size consisting of:
Datadisc - 31 July 1989 to 31 December 1997 594
Intraday Data - see Table 5.1 170
Intraday Data - excluded in Table 5.1 outside trading period 50 814
Less:
Announcements without information of consideration 51
Announcements without share price information 120
Announcements without accounting information 75 236
Final sample for analysis 578
Consisting of the following categories
Acquisition of plant/facility/equipment 221
Acquisition of shopping complexes/retail
outlets/hotels/vineyards/hospitals 153
Acquisition of industrial property and land 111
Plant expansion/upgrade/construction of new plant 93 578
5.3 Accounting proxies
The examination of the hypotheses requires accounting information to construct
proxies for the variables.  Accounting information is collected from several
sources.  The primary source was the Connect 4 - Annual Reports Services
available at the Australian National University.  However, this database only
contains annual reports from 1994 to 1998 for 500 companies.92  Furthermore,
not all 500 companies have the full 5-year annual reports.  Hence, the ASX
Datadisc was used concurrently.  When both the Connect 4 and Datadisc could
not provide the information required, annual reports stored on microfiche at the
National Library of Australia were used.
                                                          
92 Connect 4 Manual, 1998.
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5.3.1 Measurement of growth opportunities
Hypothesis 1 pertains to growth opportunities.  Because growth opportunities are
unobservable, most free cash flow literature uses a proxy for Tobin’s q.93
Tobin’s q is typically defined as the ratio of the firm’s market value to its
replacement cost value.  The difficulties in the use of Tobin’s q are noted in
Chung and Pruitt (1994).94
Growth opportunities in this thesis are measured by the market to book (M/B)
ratio as follows:95
BVE
MVE
B
M
= ……[5.1]
where,
MVE : market value of equity, and
BVE : book value of equity.
                                                          
93 See for example Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994), Lang, Stulz and
Walkling (1989, 1991), and Howe, He and Kao (1992).
94 Chung and Pruitt (1994) develop a simple approximation for Tobin’s q, which they term the
approximate q, to reduce the costs of data requirements and computational effort.  The
approximate q is defined as follows:
Approximate q = (MVE + PS +DEBT)/TA
where,
MVE : market value of ordinary shares,
PS : market value of the firm’s outstanding preference shares,
DEBT : book value of debt, and
TA : book value of total assets.
Chung and Pruitt find, based on a simple linear regression between the two sets of data consisting
of 1,201 observations, that 96.6% of the variability of Tobin’s q can be explained by their
approximate q.
95 It shoud be noted that all values from accounting variables and market value of equity are
determined on the same date, ie, as at the company's financial year.
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This measure of growth opportunities was popularised by Fama and French
(1992), and is the proxy used in this thesis.96  A firm is considered to be a high
growth firm if its market to book ratio is greater than the sample median, and it is
considered to be a low growth firm if its market to book ratio is less than the
sample median.
5.3.2 Identification of free cash flow
Hypothesis 2 relates to free cash flow theory.  Free cash flow was defined in
section 2.2.2 as cash flow minus financing required for planned growth from
positive NPV projects.  This thesis does not attempt to identify free cash flow
firms according to the strict definition, but rather uses a proxy.  A common proxy
for free cash flow firms is the existence of high cash flow in a low growth
environment.  High cash flow is not a sufficient condition on its own for free
cash flow to be present as a high cash flow firm may have enough positive NPV
projects to absorb all its free cash flow.  Hence the low growth environment is
also necessary.  Table 5.3 classifies firms into four distinct categories based on
the level of cash flow and growth opportunities.
Table 5.3: The interaction between cash flow and the value of growth opportunities
Growth opportunities
Cash flow Low High
High (A) (B)
Low (C) (D)
                                                          
96 See also Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996, 1998), Kothari, Shaken and Sloan (1995),
Kothari and Shaken (1997), Kim (1997), Knez and Ready (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997),
Daniel and Titman (1997), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Pontiff and Schall
(1998).
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Free cash flow is likely to occur in cell (A), and not in other cells.  It is important
to emphasise here that the existence of free cash flow in cell (A) is not
conclusive.  Of course the combinations of cash flow and growth opportunities in
Cells (B), (C) and (D) do not preclude the possibility of the existence of free cash
flow, as long as these cells satisfy the following general condition:
Cash flow > Financing required for planned growth from positive NPV projects.
Given the above discussion, it is necessary to measure cash flow and growth
opportunities as follows:
CF = EBIT + DEP - TAX - DIV - INT ……[5.2]
where,
EBIT : earnings before interest and tax and extra-ordinary items,
DEP : depreciation expense,
TAX : tax paid,
DIV : dividend paid on ordinary and preferred shares, and
INT : interest expense on short and long term debt.
This definition is widely used in the literature.97  Smith and Kim (1994) argue
that this CF equation does not measure sustainable cash flow from operations,
rather it measures immediate liquidity provided from operations.  Smith and Kim
modify the equation by not adding back depreciation, and not subtracting
                                                          
97 See for example, Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), Bugeja and
Walter (1995), and Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994).
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interest, dividends and taxes.  Smith and Kim substantiate the exclusion of
depreciation based on the argument that in a steady state depreciation expenses
and capital expenditures are offsetting, and the exclusion of financial claims are
justified by claiming that these items are avoidable (or at least deferrable)
expenses since they can be altered materially by the structure of the acquisition.
There are also other alternatives in constructing operating cash flow.98  Lang,
Stulz and Walkling (1991) compare their original results with ten different cash
flow measures including the measure used in Smith and Kim, and operating cash
flow supported by Bowen et al, and Percy et al.  Lang et al find that different
measures of cash flow do not alter their conclusions.  This thesis therefore adopts
the original cash flow measure as defined by Lang et al, and defined in equation
5.2.
In order to classify a firm as a free cash flow firm in a specific year, it must
satisfy two conditions:
1. High cash flow, and
2. Low market to book ratio.
The use of high and low is a relative concept.  A firm in a particular year is
classified as a high cash flow firm if its cash flow in that particular year is greater
                                                          
98 For instance,
OCF = DEP + AMO + WC-ADJ, where,
OCF : cash flow from operations,
DEP : depreciation expense,
AMO : amortisation expense, and
WC-ADJ: working capital adjustments.
This approach has received support by Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1986), and Percy and
Stokes (1992), both of whom find that this approach of estimating cash flow is the best predictor
of future cash flow from operations.
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than the median cash flow for the whole sample, and vice versa.  A firm is
considered as a high growth firm if its market to book ratio in a particular year is
greater than the median market to book ratio for the whole sample, and vice
versa.  This classification is consistent with Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991),
Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996), and Chen and Ho (1997).
5.3.3 Managerial shareholding
Managerial shareholding is defined as the fraction of common shares, not
including options, held by officers and directors of the board.  This definition is
consistent with most existing literature including, Cho (1998), Agrawal and
Knoeber (1996), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994), McConnell and Servaes (1990),
and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988).
Both the Connect 4 and the Datadisc have a section which provides the details of
the board of directors and the common shares owned by them.  Managerial
shareholding is the sum of all the common stocks owned by the directors and
officers divided by the number of shares outstanding in that year, expressed as a
percentage.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, the definition of physical asset expenditure is discussed.  A
description of the data.  In particular, the sources of data for both intraday and
daily data sets, is provided.  The data selection process for both intraday and
daily data sets is also described in detail.  This chapter concludes with a
discussion of the accounting proxies used empirical tests.
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CHAPTER 6
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – INTRADAY ANALYSIS
6 INTRODUCTION
This section presents descriptive statistics of physical asset expenditure
announcements for the period between 1 July 1995 and 31 December 1997.
6.1 Firm characteristics
Table 6.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the intraday sample, and
subsamples grouped by high and low market to book ratio.  Variables include the
size of firms (represented by total assets, net assets, and market capitalisation),
capital structure (represented by leverage ratio), earnings before tax and extra-
ordinary items normalised by total assets, market to book ratio, cash flow to total
assets ratio, and managerial shareholding percentage.
Table 6.1 reveals that the sample consists of some very small firms with total
assets of only $875,000 (Red River Limited, as at June 1996), and total market
capitalisation of $2,092,000, and some very large firms, with total assets and
market capitalisation of over $148 billion (National Australia Bank Limited, as at
September 1998).
Panels B and C of Table 6.1 present characteristics for the low market to book
ratio sample (market to book ratio less than median) and high market to book
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ratio sample (market to book ratio greater than median) respectively.99  The
frequency distribution of market to book ratio is presented in Figure 6.1.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics summary for the full sample, and for samples segregated by high and
low market to book ratio.  Univariate comparison of mean measures of firm characteristics for the
period between July 1995 and December 1997.  Characteristics examined are total assets (TA), total
liabilities (TB), net assets (NA), leverage ratio (TL/TA), market capitalisation (MC), earnings before
tax to total assets ratio (EBT/TA), market to book ratio (M/B), cash flow to total asset ratio (CF/TA),
and managerial shareholding (MS).  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
TA
$’m
TL
$’m
TL/TA NA
$’m
MC
$’m
EBT/TA M/B CF/TA MS
Panel A: Full sample
N 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Mean 3,823 2,759 0.383 1,063 1,806 0.040 1.280 0.055 0.123
Median 254 52 0.375 152 164 0.060 1.102 0.068 0.001
Max 148,123 136,245 3.275 15,746 34,568 0.283 4.574 0.301 0.713
Min 0.875 0.090 0.09 -31 2.092 -0.581 -3.546 -0.297 0.000
Stdev 16,846 14,946 0.378 2,918 5,967 0.103 0.861 0.094 0.203
Panel B: Low market to book ratio (market to book ratio less than median)
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Mean 2,902 2,365 0.344 537 399 0.041 0.654 0.055 0.148
Median 226 37 0.214 140 126 0.062 0.810 0.068 0.001
Max 109,285 99,164 3.275 10,121 5,180 0.198 0.983 0.301 0.689
Min 5.144 0.090 0.009 -31 2.765 -0.422 -3.546 -0.297 0.000
Stdev 16,126 14,755 0.503 1,469 873 0.094 0.755 0.094 0.217
Panel C: High market to book ratio (market to book ratio greater than median)
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Mean 4,744 3,153 0.422 1,590 3,212 0.039 1.833 0.051 0.099
Median 294 143 0.448 151 250 0.058 1.675 0.071 0.001
Max 148,123 136,245 0.920 15,746 34,568 0.283 4.574 0.224 0.713
Min 0.875 0.143 0.030 0.732 2.092 -0.581 1.103 -0.338 0.000
Stdev 17,583 15,212 0.177 3,796 8,177 0.112 0.621 0.095 0.185
Panel D: Mean difference between low and high market to book ratio firms
Diff -1,842 -788 -0.078 -1,504 -2,813 0.002 -1.180 0.004 0.049
t-statistic -0.713 -0.343 -1.263 -1.96*3 -3.38**3 --0.13113 -10.83**3 0.253 1.543
Panel D in Table 6.1 presents the mean difference between the low and high
market to book ratio firms with respect to each of the variables.  The mean net
assets and market capitalisation of the high market to book ratio firms are
significantly higher than the mean net assets and market capitalisation of the low
market to book ratio firms.  There is little difference in the size of liabilities
                                                          
99 There are two observations with negative market to book ratio, both from Centaur Mining &
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between the two types of firms.  As would be expected, the mean difference in
market to book ratio between the two samples is significant since the two
samples are segregated by market to book ratio.  It is should be noted that, to the
extent that the market to book ratio measures managerial performance, one
would expect that the earnings ratio would be significantly higher for the high
market to book ratio firms than the low market to book ratio firms.  However,
this not the case, as shown in Table 6.1.  There is also no statistically significant
difference in the cash flow ratio, and managerial shareholding percentage
between the two samples.
Figure 6.1: Frequency distribution of market to book ratio.
Frequency Distribution by Market to Book Ratio
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6.2 Size and range of physical asset expenditure
The size of the physical asset expenditure transactions in the intraday sample
ranges from $2.55 million to $1.5 billion, as reported in Table 6.2.  The mean
and median transaction size is $58.8 million and $33.65 million respectively.
Although there is no comparative mean and median transaction size for mergers
                                                                                                                                                            
exploration Limited which made announcements on 25th Oct 1995 and 3rd Jun 1996.
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and takeovers, the mean and median physical asset expenditure transactions
reported here would be well below those of full takeovers and mergers.
Table 6.2: Summary statistics of physical asset expenditure.
Size of expenditure
$’000
N 170
Mean 58,797
Median 33,650
Min 2,550
Max 1,500,000
Stdev 134,374
Table 6.3 shows that more than 90% of the physical asset expenditure
transactions are below $100 million, nine transactions fall into the $100 million
and $250 million range, and only three transactions are valued more than $250
million.
Table 6.3: Physical asset expenditure range.
Range ($’000) Number of observations Percentage Cumulative Percentage
2,550 - 10,000 25 15% 15%
10,001 - 20,000 28 16% 31%
20,001 - 30,000 27 16% 47%
30,001 - 40,000 17 10% 57%
40,001 - 50,000 14 8% 65%
50,001 - 60,000 13 8% 73%
60,001 - 70,000 8 5% 78%
70,001 - 80,000 13 8% 85%
80,001 - 90,000 7 4% 89%
90,001 - 100,000 6 4% 93%
100,001 - 250,000 9 5% 98%
250,001 - 500,000 1 1% 99%
500,001 - 750,000 1 1% 99%
750,001 - 1,000,000 0 0% 99%
> 1,000,000 1 1% 100%
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6.3 Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements
6.3.1 Frequency distribution by industry
Physical asset expenditure transactions do not appear to be clustered in any
particular industries (Table 6.4).  Seven of the sixteen industries (namely
diversified resources, developers and contractors, alcohol and tobacco, food and
household, retail, property trust, and tourism and leisure) comprise of 67% the
physical asset expenditure transactions.
Table 6.4: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by industry.
ASIC Code Industry Number of Announcements Percentage
012 Mining 2 1%
032 Diversified resources 12 7%
061-065 Developers and contractors 20 12%
071-072 Building materials 8 5%
081-082 Alcohol and tobacco 15 9%
091-093 Food and household 15 9%
111-115 Engineering 7 4%
131-134 Retail 12 7%
143-144 Transport 7 4%
153 Media 1 1%
161 Banks and finance 3 2%
192-194 Investment and financial services 9 5%
201-202 Property trust 27 15%
214-217 Miscellaneous services 10 6%
221-225 Miscellaneous industrials 8 5%
231 Diversified industrial 2 1%
242-243 Tourism and leisure 14 8%
6.3.2 Frequency distribution by time of the day
Table 6.5 reports the time of the day on which the physical asset expenditure
announcements were made.  Table 6.5 shows that directors have a tendency to
announce physical asset expenditure transactions during the first hour and the
last hour of the trading day.  This is consistent with the US findings of Wood,
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McInish and Ord (1985), and McInish and Wood (1990), and the Australian
evidence presented by Aitken, Brown and Walter (1994), and Brailsford (1995),
all of whom find evidence that the variance of the intraday returns tends to be
greater at the start and end of the trading day, such that a general U-curve is
observed.  It should be noted that the table is constructed using announcements
made during the ASX trading hours, hence, announcements made outside the
trading hours were excluded.
Table 6.5: Frequency distribution of time of the day.
Distribution by time
Time of the Day Number of announcements Percentage
10:00 - 11:00 36 21%
11:01 - 12:00 22 13%
12:01 - 13:00 28 16%
13:01 - 14:00 25 15%
14:01 - 15:00 18 11%
15:01 - 16:00 41 24%
6.3.3 Frequency distribution by day of the week
The intraday physical asset expenditure announcements occur evenly on
Monday, Wednesday and Thursday, and slightly less on Tuesday and Friday as
shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by day of the
week.
Frequency distribution by week
Day of the Week Number of announcements Percentage
Monday 41 24%
Tuesday 25 15%
Wednesday 36 21%
Thursday 42 25%
Friday 26 15%
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6.3.4 Frequency distribution by month
Table 6.7 shows the frequency distribution by month of intraday physical asset
expenditure announcements, and these results suggest some seasonality.  Most
physical asset expenditure announcements occurring during the second half of
the year, viz, 67% occurs between July and December, and 33% of the
announcements occurs between January and June.
Table 6.7: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by month.
Frequency distribution by month
Month of the Year Number of announcements Percentage
January 2 1%
February 8 5%
March 12 7%
April 10 6%
May 11 6%
June 14 8%
July 13 8%
August 19 11%
September 15 9%
October 24 14%
November 16 9%
December 26 15%
6.3.5 Frequency distribution by year
Table 6.8 shows that 46% of the sample physical asset expenditure
announcements occurs in 1997, while 36% in 1996, and 18% in 1995.
Table 6.8: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by year.
Frequency distribution by year
Year Number of announcements Percentage
1995 30 18%
1996 61 36%
1997 79 46%
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6.3.6 Frequency distribution of announcements with minutes of the next
trade by 15 minute intervals
As shown in the methodology chapter, the intraday returns are calculated using
time weighting by interpolating two share prices traded at different points in
time.  When a firm’s share is frequently traded, the returns calculated using this
method would reasonably accurately reflect the true return.  In contrast when a
share is thinly traded, this approach of calculating abnormal returns would be
biased, since when the announcement is made, subsequent trading after the
physical asset expenditure announcement may take place several hours to several
days after the announcement.
In order to examine the potential impact of thin trading, it is necessary to know to
what extent the sample announcements were followed by share trading.  Table
6.9 presents the frequency distribution of announcements which were made in a
15 minute interval (subsequent to the announcement) during which the
company’s shares were traded.  As indicated in Table 6.9, 51.8% of the
announcements occurred in the 15 minute interval during which the shares of
those companies were traded.  More than 85% of the announcements occurred
within the hour interval for which the shares of the companies were traded.
Given, more than 85% of the announcements fell within the first hour of the
trading, thin trading is therefore not generally a problem, and time-weighted
returns using interpolation is therefore justified.
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6.4 Summary
This chapter provides summary statistics for the intraday data set.  First, the firm
characteristics for the sample were described.  Firms were then divided into high
and low market to book ratio samples, and their characteristics are examined.
The average size of the physical asset expenditures is approximately $60 million,
with 90% of the transactions below the $100 million threshold.  Sixty-seven
percent of the physical asset expenditure transactions occurred in diversified
resources, developers and contractors, alcohol and tobacco, food and household,
retail, property trust, and tourism and leisure.  Industries with least physical asset
expenditure transactions include mining, media, and diversified industrial.
Table 6.9: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by 15 minute
intervals during which there were shares traded.
Minuteth Number of Announcements Percentage Cumulative Percentage
15 88 51.8% 51.8%
30 31 18.2% 70.0%
45 18 10.6% 80.6%
60 9 5.3% 85.9%
75 4 2.4% 88.2%
90 3 1.8% 90.0%
105 3 1.8% 91.8%
120 1 0.6% 92.4%
135 1 0.6% 92.9%
150 0 0.0% 92.9%
165 1 0.6% 93.5%
180 1 0.6% 94.1%
195 1 0.6% 94.7%
210 1 0.6% 95.3%
225 2 1.2% 96.5%
240 2 1.2% 97.6%
255 0 0.0% 97.6%
270 1 0.6% 98.2%
285 0 0.0% 98.2%
300 0 0.0% 98.2%
315 1 0.6% 98.8%
330 1 0.6% 99.4%
345 0 0.0% 99.4%
360 0 0.0% 99.4%
375 0 0.0% 99.4%
390 0 0.0% 99.4%
405 0 0.0% 99.4%
420 1 0.6% 100.0%
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Forty-five percent of the transactions occurred in the first and last hours of the
official trading time.  There is no apparent seasonality with respect to day of the
week.  However, most of the physical asset expenditure announcements (67%)
occurred in the second half of the calender year.  Finally, fifty-one percent of the
announcements was made in the fifteen minute interval in which trading was
observed, and ninety percent of the announcements was made in the sixty minute
interval in which trading occurred.
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CHAPTER 7
INTRADAY RESULTS – UNIVARIATE
7 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the univariate results of the tests of the hypotheses
developed in Chapter 3.  Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
analyses are contained in section 7.1.  Section 7.2 examines the market to book
and cash flow effects.  Further examination of the free cash flow theory is
contained in section 7.3, and section 7.4 summarises the results.
7.1 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
This section examines the abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) for the 170 intraday physical asset expenditure announcements.
As noted in Chapter 2, most capital expenditure studies in the area use daily data.
In this chapter, intraday data are used to examine the announcement effects of
physical asset expenditures.  Unlike most existing studies in this area which
examine the market valuation of capital expenditure announcements based on a
dichotomous classification of high and low market to book ratios, this thesis
provides a more detailed analysis by segregating the sample into quartiles.  The
examination of both the market to book and cash flow effects is further analysed
using the randomisation technique, similar to the approach used by Fama and
French (1992).  The Foster, Olsen and Shevlin approach is also used as a
comparison of the market valuation with the market to book and cash flow
methods of segregating the observations.
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7.1.1 Full sample
Figure 7.1 presents the CARs for the 170 announcements over a [-1890,+1890]
minute window (it is approximately equivalent to a [-5,+5] day window), in
fifteen minute intervals, using the control portfolio method (see the Methodology
chapter in Chapter 4, equation [4.13] for a description of the control portfolio
method).100
Figure 7.1: Mean CARs for the full intraday sample over a [-1890,1890] minute window.
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The CARs in Figure 7.1 show some positive market reaction around the
announcement period (the vertical line between t-90 and t+90 is t0 at which the
announcement was made), but there is no clear evidence that the announcements
of physical asset expenditure are associated with significant positive abnormal
returns.  The CAR commences at t-1890 with 0%, and begins to fall until t-1035
when it reaches -0.647%, and thereafter positive abnormal returns cumulate until
around t-300 where the CAR levels off at 0.2% throughout the announcement
                                                          
100 In this chapter the results are based on the control portfolio method, and in Chapter 9,
sensitivity analysis is performed using the alternative method, viz, the constrained (0,1) market
model, which defines abnormal returns as the difference between observed returns and market
returns, viz, ARit = Rit - Rmt.
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period.  A small positive post-announcement drift is evident between t+195 and
t+630, and thereafter a slight negative drift is observed.
Figure 7.2 presents the ARs of the 170 physical asset expenditure
announcements.  The figure shows that there is little market reaction around the
announcement time.
Figure 7.2: Mean ARs for the full intraday sample over a [-1890,+1890] minute window.
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Table 7.1 presents the mean ARs and CARs and the t-statistics for the full
intraday sample over the [-360,+360] minute window.  The lack of statistical
significance around the announcement period is confirmed in Table 7.1.
Table 7.2 summarises the CARs and t-statistics for selected windows.  In all 6
windows, the mean CARs are insignificant, confirming zero abnormal return
around announcement for physical asset expenditure for the full sample.
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Table 7.1: Mean ARs and CARs for the full intraday sample (N=170).  The column, AR > 0 (%), is the
percentage of positive abnormal returns for each 15-minute interval, and it is tested for statistical
difference from 50% using a non-parametric binomial test.  Mean CARs are calculated by first summing
up ARs across time in order to get the desired window, and then summing up each CAR cross-sectionally
to get the CAR for the full sample.  Finally the CAR for the full sample is divided by number of
observations.  See Chapter 4 for a description of the methodology.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1%
levels of significance.
Time AR (%) t-stat AR>0 (%) CAR (%) t-stat
t-360 -0.017 -0.45 49.1** 0.158 0.42
t-345 -0.022 -0.72 52.4** 0.180 0.48
t-330 -0.017 -0.52 51.8** 0.163 0.43
t-315 -0.010 -0.30 55.3** 0.172 0.45
t-300 -0.026 -0.71 58.2** 0.198 0.51
t-285 -0.058 -0.88 55.9** 0.256 0.69
t-270 -0.035 -0.68 52.1** 0.221 0.59
t-255 -0.010 -0.34 52.9** 0.211 0.55
t-240 -0.012 -0.52 56.5** 0.223 0.57
t-225 -0.026 -1.06 48.2** 0.198 0.50
t-210 -0.028 -1.25 58.2** 0.226 0.56
t-195 -0.046 -1.78 53.5** 0.272 0.66
t-180 -0.025 -0.93 48.8** 0.297 0.71
t-165 -0.001 -0.05 48.8** 0.295 0.69
t-150 -0.035 -1.13 47.1** 0.261 0.60
t-135 -0.041 -1.57 45.3** 0.220 0.51
t-120 -0.005 -0.21 45.9** 0.215 0.49
t-105 -0.014 -0.47 51.2** 0.201 0.46
t-90 -0.009 -0.37 48.2** 0.211 0.49
t-75 -0.032 1.05 51.8** 0.243 0.56
t-60 -0.023 -0.86 53.5** 0.220 0.51
t-45 -0.004 -0.12 49.7** 0.223 0.51
t-30 -0.018 -0.63 52.1** 0.241 0.55
t-15 -0.010 -0.31 49.7** 0.251 0.56
t-0 -0.033 -0.84 48.8** 0.284 0.64
t+15 -0.016 -0.41 53.8** 0.268 0.59
t+30 -0.028 -0.67 47.3** 0.239 0.52
t+45 -0.020 -0.54 47.9** 0.219 0.48
t+60 -0.037 -0.99 52.1** 0.256 0.55
t+75 -0.048 -0.83 53.8** 0.208 0.45
t+90 -0.043 -1.04 46.4** 0.166 0.36
t+105 -0.020 -0.75 46.4** 0.145 0.31
t+120 -0.015 -0.55 53.5** 0.160 0.34
t+135 -0.011 -0.41 55.0** 0.171 0.36
t+150 -0.061 -1.53 54.4** 0.232 0.49
t+165 -0.007 -0.20 50.6** 0.239 0.50
t+180 -0.001 -0.03 52.9** 0.240 0.49
t+195 -0.029 -0.81 49.7** 0.211 0.43
t+210 -0.040 -0.86 52.9** 0.251 0.52
t+225 -0.002 -0.07 52.4** 0.253 0.52
t+240 -0.055 -1.57 50.3** 0.308 0.63
t+255 -0.038 -1.18 50.3** 0.346 0.70
t+270 -0.007 -0.25 48.5** 0.338 0.68
t+285 -0.043 -0.67 54.8** 0.295 0.56
t+300 -0.037 -1.26 53.5** 0.332 0.62
t+315 -0.017 -0.39 52.4** 0.315 0.58
t+330 -0.010 -0.24 50.0** 0.305 0.55
t+345 -0.014 -0.38 49.4** 0.319 0.56
t+360 -0.028 -0.78 48.8** 0.291 0.50
145
Table 7.2: Summary of mean CARs for the full sample.
Minute windows Daily windows
Windows [-120,+120] [-60,+60] [0,+360] [-5,+5] [-2,+2] [-1+1]
Mean CAR (%) -0.060 0.013 0.039 0.448 0.921 0.150
t-statistic -0.47 0.52 0.11 0.67 1.12 0.69
The results presented above are inconsistent with prior findings.  McConnell and
Muscarella (1985) find that the announcement of increases in capital expenditure
results in a significant positive AR of 1.21% (t-stat: 6.89) for industrial firms
over a two-day window.  Chen and Ho (1997) report an abnormal return 0.65%
(t-stat: 1.94) and 0.86% (t-stat: 2.77) for product strategies and capital
expenditures announcements, and 0.75% (t-stat: 3.26) for the combined sample
over a two-day window.  A significant positive abnormal return is also
documented by Woolridge (1988) for strategic investment announcements.
Although Chung, Wright and Charoenwong (1998) do not report the abnormal
returns for capital expenditure increase announcements, the abnormal returns can
be inferred by calculating the weighted abnormal returns for both high and low
market to book ratio samples.  The capital expenditure increases announcements
appear to be associated with small negative abnormal returns of 0.007% over a [-
1,0] day window.
The insignificant abnormal returns on physical asset expenditure announcements
resemble bidder returns in merger announcements.  For instance, Dodd (1983)
reports an insignificant negative CAR of -0.16% over a two-day window,
Asquith (1983) reports an insignificant abnormal return of 0.2% over the same
window.  Eckbo (1983), Eger (1983), and Dennis and McConnell (1986), present
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evidence of insignificant abnormal returns around merger announcements.  In
Australia, insignificant abnormal returns are also observed by Walter (1984).
However, the lack of significant abnormal returns around the physical asset
expenditure announcement does not of itself lead to the generalisation that the
market does not react to physical asset expenditure announcements.  The
insignificant market response may be due to the comingling of growth and value
firms.  This possibility is explored in section 7.1.2.
7.1.2 Market to book effect
In this section, the market to book effect is examined.  Figure 7.3 shows the
CARs for the high market to book ratio (higher than the median ratio) sample
and low market to book ratio (lower than the median ratio) sample.  Figure 7.3
provides evidence that the equity market reacts positively to announcements of
physical asset expenditure announcements made by firms with growth
opportunities (high market to book ratio), and negatively to firms which lack
growth opportunities (low market to book ratio).  The CARs for the high market
to book ratio sample exhibit some positive ARs 870 minutes before the
announcement minute, and the ARs keep accumulating 915 minutes after the
announcement minute, and thereafter, it remains flat.  For the low market to book
ratio sample, negative ARs are observed from the inception of the window, and
become flat around the -1125th minute.  Negative ARs start to accumulate around
the -90th minute.  Negative post-announcement drift is also observed for the low
market to book ratio sample.
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Figure 7.3: Mean CARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window segregated into high and low
market to book ratio samples.
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Figures 7.4 and 7.5 present the mean ARs for the lower than median and higher
than median market to book ratio firms respectively.  Both figures show that
there are some more pronounced share price reactions around the announcement
period.
Figure 7.4: Mean ARs for the low market to book ratio sample over a [-1890,+1890]
minute window.
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Figure 7.5: Mean ARs for the high market to book ratio sample over a [-1890,+1890]
minute window.
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Figure 7.6 shows that the difference in CARs between high and low market to
book ratio firms are accentuated when a finer partition of the sample is made by
dividing the sample into quartiles.  Consistent with Figure 7.3, for the highest
market to book ratio quartile, positive ARs begin to accumulate in the -870th
minute, and, a small positive post announcement drift occurs toward the end of
the window.  For the lowest market to book ratio quartile, negative abnormal
returns start to accumulate in minute -360th, and again, a slight negative post-
announcement drift is observed toward the end of the window.  It is interesting to
note that the CARs for both middle market to book ratio quartiles are fairly flat
across the window.  The insignificant CARs for the two middle groups suggest
that the market is not able to distinguish between the marginal growth and
marginal value firms.
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Figure 7.6: Mean CARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window segregated into market to book
ratio quartiles respectively, lowest (Q1), second lowest (Q2), second highest (Q3), and
highest (Q4).
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Table 7.3 provides further evidence to support the growth opportunities
hypothesis, viz, the equity market reacts negatively to low market to book ratio
firms, and positively to high market to book ratio firms at physical asset
expenditure announcements, and the difference between the two groups is
statistically significant.  Of the six different windows, the mean CAR for the high
market to book ratio sample are all significant at the 1% level, though the
magnitude of mean CAR drops as the window narrows.  For the low market to
book ratio sample, negative mean CARs are observed in all windows, however,
the negative mean CARs are only significant at the [-120,+120] and [-60,+60]
minute windows, and the [-5,+5] day window.  The mean difference in CARs
between the high and low market to book ratio groups is significant at the 1%
level across all windows.  Hence, the growth opportunities hypothesis is
supported.
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These results are now consistent with the extant capital expenditure studies of
Chung, Wright and Charoenwong (1998), Chen and Ho (1997), and Szewczyk,
Testeskos and Zantout (1996).
Table 7.3: Summary of mean CARs and mean difference in CARs for the high and low market to book
ratio firms.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
High market to book
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] * [-60,+60] * [0,+360] * [-5,+5] * [-2,+2] * [-1+1] *
N 85** 85** 85** 85** 85** 85**
Mean CAR (%) 0.603** 0.582** 0.724** 2.806** 2.344** 1.434**
Stdev 0.027** 0.017** 0.030** 0.075** 0.055** 0.042**
t-statistic 2.08** 3.14** 2.26** 3.44** 3.91** 3.14**
Low market to book
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] * [-60,+60] * [0,+360] * [-5,+5] * [-2,+2] * [-1+1] *
N 85** 85** 85** 85** 85** 85**
Mean CAR (%) -0.724** -0.555** -0.645** -1.190** -0.503** -1.133**
Stdev -0.035** -0.024** -0.039** -0.092** -0.076** -0.073**
t-statistic -1.90** -2.10*** -1.53** -1.90** -0.61** -1.43**
Test for mean CAR difference between high market to book and low market to book firms
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] * [-60,+60] * [0,+360] * [-5,+5] * [-2,+2] * [-1+1] *
CARhigh-CARlow 1.327** 1.137** 1.369** 3.996** 2.847** 2.567**
t-statistic 2.77** 3.56** 2.55** 3.10** 2.80** 2.81**
Table 7.4 shows that when the sample is divided into quartiles, the market to
book effect is accentuated for the highest and lowest market to book ratio
quartiles.  For the highest market to book ratio quartile, the size of CARs for
daily windows is about 2% greater than the previous CARs reported in Table 7.3,
and are about 0.3% greater for minute windows.  The CARs across all windows
for the highest market to book ratio quartile are significant at the 1% level.  For
the lowest market to book ratio quartile, significant negative CARs occur in all
but the two daily windows, ie, [-2,+2] and [-1,+1].  The mean difference in CARs
between the highest and lowest market to book ratio quartiles is statistically
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significant across all windows.  However, for the middle groups, ie, the second
highest and second lowest market to book ratio quartiles, the mean CARs are not
significant, and the mean difference in CARs between the two quartiles is also
insignificant.  This finding that the market does not respond in any significant
manner to the middle market to book ratio quartiles is a valuable finding in itself
since prior research fails to separate these samples into quartiles.
The results should be interpreted with care, since it can be argued that the
difference in CARs between the two types of firms (high and low market to book
ratio firms) might have eventuated in the absence of the physical asset
expenditure announcement.
If this assertion is correct, then the difference in the ARs between the two types
of firms should be evident over the whole window, and not just observed around
the announcement time.  If significant ARs are only observed around the
announcement period, it follows that the ARs are driven by the announcement,
and not the Fama and French (1992) market to book effect.  Hence by examining
the ARs around the announcement period, one can reasonably conclude whether
the difference in CARs between the two types of firms is the result of physical
asset expenditure announcements, or the result of the equity market persistently
discriminating between the two groups of firms.101
                                                          
101 A further complicating issue raised by Dolan (1997) should also be noted. Dolan finds that
whether 'value' stocks dominate 'growth' stocks in terms of abnormal returns, or vice versa, is in
fact a cyclical one rather than a persistent one. For instance, he reports that that using Australia
data, for the periods from 1982-1992 and 1975-1982, the overall return from both value and
growth stocks are about the same. Further, from the periods 1975-1980 and 1986-1990, growth
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Table 7.4: Summary of mean CARs and mean difference in CARs for the market to book ratio
quartiles.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Panel A
Highest market to book
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] * [-60,+60] * [0,+360] * [-5,+5] * [-2,+2] * [-1+1] *
N 44** 44** 44** 44** 44** 44**
Mean CAR (%) 0.985** 0.921** 1.089** 5.484** 4.074** 2.594**
Stdev 0.031* 0.020** 0.035** 0.076** 0.056** 0.048**
t-statistic 2.10** 3.01** 2.08** 4.80** 4.80** 3.55**
Second highest market to book
N 42** 42** 42** 42** 42** 42**
Mean CAR (%) 0.182** 0.190** 0.267** -0.140** 0.447** 0.161**
Stdev 0.020** 0.012** 0.023** -0.063** 0.048** 0.030**
t-statistic 0.58** 1.03** 0.76** -0.14** 0.61** 0.35**
Second lowest market to book
N 42** 42** 42** 42** 42** 42**
Mean CAR (%) 0.097** 0.138** 0.222** 0.376** 1.019** -0.087**
Stdev 0.028** 0.023** 0.029** 0.086** 0.061** 0.042**
t-statistic 0.22** 0.39** 0.50** 0.28** 1.08** -0.13**
Lowest market to book
N 42** 42** 42** 42** 42** 42**
Mean CAR (%) -1.556** -1.239** -1.470** -4.167** -2.008** -2.184**
Stdev -0.040** -0.024** -0.039** -0.095** -0.088** -0.095**
t-statistic -2.54** -3.33** -2.44** -2.89** -1.49** -1.49**
PANEL B: TEST FOR MEAN DIFFERENCE IN CARs
Mean difference in CARs between the highest and lowest market to book ratio firms
CARhighest - CARlowest 2.541** 2.160** 2.559** 9.651** 6.082** 4.778**
t-statistic 3.28** 4.52** 3.21** 5.19** 3.80** 2.92**
Mean difference in CARs between the 2nd highest and 2nd lowest market to book ratio firms
CARhigh-CARlow 0.085** 0.052**** 0.044** -0.516** -0.572** 0.248**
t-statistic 0.03** 0.13**** 0.08** -0.31** -0.48** 0.31**
This issue is examined by investigating whether the abnormal returns around the
announcement period are statistically significant.  Table 7.5 below shows that for
the subsample of low market to book ratio firms, significant negative abnormal
returns occur in -195th minute, -60th minute and +30th minute, and the CARs
begin to become significant from the announcement minute onward.  The
                                                                                                                                                            
stocks has performed better than value stocks, though the outperformance by growth over value is
not as significant as that of value over growth (ie, from the periods 1981-1985 and 1991-1996).
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abnormal returns to the high growth sample are somewhat different.  The ARs
are significant between -90th minute and the announcement minute.  There is
some post-announcement significant ARs in +30th, +150th and +300th minutes.
The CARs begin to become significant in -345th minute, which might indicate
some possibility of trading on pre-release information.
Table 7.5 also presents evidence that over the [-360,+360] minute window, the
difference in ARs between the two samples is only significant around the
announcement period.  This rejects the notion that the difference in CARs
between the two types of firms might have eventuated in the absence of any
event study.
Table 7.6 further examines the same issue, but dividing the sample into four
subsamples.  For the lowest market to book ratio quartile, two unexpected
significant positive ARs in -300th and -195th minutes are observed.  Other than
the two outliers, significant negative ARs are observed in -150th, -120th, -90th, -
60th, -15th, 0th, +15th, +30th, and +180th minutes.  CARs become significant in
minute -15th.  For the highest market to book ratio quartile, statistical significant
ARs occur in mainly one hour before and thirty minutes after the announcement
minute, while the CARs are significant throughout the whole [-360, +360]
minute window.  Both Tables 7.5 and 7.6 provide support for the hypothesis that
the market reaction to physical asset expenditure announcements is dependent
upon the firm’s growth prospects as measured by market to book ratio.
Specifically, when firms with low growth prospects make physical asset
expenditure announcements the market discounts their share price, and when
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firms with growth prospects make physical asset expenditure announcements the
market reacts positively.
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Table 7.5: Mean ARs and CARs for the low and high market to book ratio samples.  Each sample contains
85 observations.  The column, AR > 0 (%), is the percentage of positive abnormal returns for each 15-
minute interval, and it is tested for statistical difference from 50% using a non-parametric binomial test.
The last two columns ARlow-ARhigh, refer to the mean difference in abnormal returns between the two
samples for each 15-minute interval.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Low M/B ratio subsample High M/B ratio subsample ARlow-ARhigh
Time AR
(%)
t-stat AR >0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR >0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff
(%)
t-stat
t-360 -0.005 -0.11** 44.7** -0.508 -0.93* -0.040 -0.61** 53.6** 0.824 1.59** -0.044 -0.57**
t-345 -0.004 -0.13** 51.8** -0.513 -0.94* -0.049 -0.96** 52.9** 0.873 1.69** -0.053 -0.86**
t-330 -0.006 -0.17** 47.1** -0.518 -0.94* -0.029 -0.50** 56.5** 0.844 1.63** -0.023 -0.35**
t-315 -0.006 -0.10** 57.6** -0.524 -0.94* -0.025 -0.67** 52.9** 0.869 1.67** -0.030 -0.47**
t-300 -0.005 -0.09** 55.3** -0.519 -0.91* -0.046 -1.08** 61.2** 0.915 1.76** -0.041 -0.57**
t-285 -0.060 -0.50** 61.2** -0.459 -0.88* -0.055 -1.09** 50.6** 0.970 1.86** -0.005 -0.04**
t-270 -0.104 -1.07** 53.6** -0.563 -1.07* -0.035 -1.17** 50.6** 1.005 1.90** -0.139 -1.36**
t-255 -0.026 -0.51** 56.5** -0.588 -1.08* -0.006 -0.21** 49.4** 1.011 1.90** -0.032 -0.54**
t-240 -0.018 -0.50** 56.5** -0.607 -1.09* -0.043 -1.41** 56.5** 1.053 1.95** -0.061 -1.28**
t-225 -0.017 -0.48** 48.2** -0.624 -1.10* -0.034 -1.05** 48.2** 1.019 1.85** -0.017 -0.36**
t-210 -0.037 -1.30** 60.0** -0.587 -1.02* -0.020 -0.55** 56.5** 1.039 1.84** -0.017 -0.38**
t-195 -0.065 -1.91** 56.5** -0.522 -0.91* -0.027 -0.70** 50.6** 1.066 1.84** -0.037 -0.72**
t-180 -0.053 -1.48** 48.2** -0.470 -0.88* -0.003 -0.08** 49.4** 1.063 1.79** -0.056 -1.04**
t-165 -0.012 -0.32** 50.6** -0.457 -0.78* -0.015 -0.40** 47.1** 1.048 1.72** -0.027 -0.58**
t-150 -0.058 -1.58** 43.5** -0.516 -0.87* -0.011 -0.22** 50.6** 1.037 1.66** -0.048 -0.78**
t-135 -0.034 -1.03** 48.2** -0.550 -0.91* -0.047 -1.18** 42.4** 0.991 1.59** -0.013 -0.24**
t-120 -0.056 -1.43** 41.2** -0.606 -1.01* -0.046 -1.56** 50.6** 1.037 1.67** -0.102 -2.07**
t-105 -0.023 -0.65** 49.4** -0.630 -1.05* -0.005 -0.10** 52.9** 1.032 1.66** -0.018 -0.31**
t-90 -0.049 -1.36** 40.0** -0.678 -1.13* -0.068 -1.87** 56.5** 1.100 1.79** -0.117 -2.29**
t-75 -0.008 -0.14** 41.2** -0.686 -1.15* -0.073 -2.86** 62.4** 1.172 1.90** -0.080 -1.30**
t-60 -0.113 -2.53** 43.5** -0.799 -1.34* -0.067 -2.45** 63.5** 1.239 1.20** -0.179 -3.44**
t-45 -0.074 -1.60** 42.4** -0.873 -1.45* -0.081 -2.16** 57.1** 1.319 2.13** -0.154 -2.60**
t-30 -0.061 -1.66** 37.6** -0.933 -1.55* -0.096 -2.36** 66.7** 1.415 2.27** -0.157 -2.86**
t-15 -0.058 -1.08** 47.1** -0.991 -1.63* -0.078 -2.07** 52.4** 1.494 2.37** -0.136 -2.08**
t-0 -0.029 -0.47** 41.7** -1.020 -1.69* -0.094 -1.99** 56.0** 1.588 2.51** -0.123 -1.59**
t+15 -0.082 -1.14** 54.1** -1.102 -1.79* -0.049 -1.36** 53.6** 1.637 2.58** -0.131 -1.63**
t+30 -0.131 -1.78** 36.5** -1.233 -1.20* -0.075 -1.99** 58.3** 1.712 2.68** -0.206 -2.49**
t+45 -0.025 -0.43** 47.1** -1.257 -2.03* -0.015 -0.33** 48.8** 1.696 2.62** -0.009 -0.12**
t+60 -0.016 -0.29** 48.2** -1.241 -1.97* -0.057 -1.13** 56.0** 1.754 2.70** -0.041 -0.55**
t+75 -0.042 -0.83** 52.9** -1.283 -2.01* -0.054 -0.52** 54.8** 1.700 2.70** -0.012 -0.10**
t+90 -0.006 -0.15** 45.9** -1.277 -1.97* -0.091 -1.26** 47.0** 1.609 2.55** -0.097 -1.19**
t+105 -0.027 -0.70** 47.6** -1.304 -1.97* -0.014 -0.36** 45.2** 1.595 2.54** -0.012 -0.23**
t+120 -0.030 -0.71** 51.8** -1.274 -1.90* -0.001 -0.02** 55.3** 1.594 2.54** -0.031 -0.57**
t+135 -0.038 -1.20** 54.1** -1.236 -1.83* -0.017 -0.42** 56.0** 1.577 2.51** -0.054 -1.07**
t+150 -0.001 -0.03** 49.4** -1.235 -1.81* -0.121 -1.69** 59.5** 1.699 2.76** -0.120 -1.51**
t+165 -0.035 -1.20** 45.9** -1.270 -1.84* -0.049 -0.80** 55.3** 1.748 2.78** -0.084 -1.24**
t+180 -0.052 -1.27** 49.4** -1.322 -1.88* -0.054 -1.52** 56.5** 1.801 2.85** -0.106 -1.95**
t+195 -0.064 -1.18** 45.9** -1.386 -1.95* -0.006 -0.14** 53.6** 1.808 2.88** -0.070 -0.99**
t+210 -0.039 -0.46** 47.1** -1.347 -1.91* -0.041 -1.03** 58.8** 1.849 2.98** -0.002 -0.02**
t+225 -0.016 -0.39** 48.2** -1.363 -1.93* -0.020 -0.51** 56.5** 1.869 2.97** -0.036 -0.63**
t+240 -0.058 -1.06** 51.8** -1.305 -1.85* -0.051 -1.20** 48.8** 1.920 2.99** -0.008 -0.11**
t+255 -0.008 -0.21** 43.5** -1.296 -1.83* -0.068 -1.35** 57.1** 1.988 3.01** -0.059 -0.92**
t+270 -0.038 -0.90** 44.7** -1.334 -1.87* -0.024 -0.57** 52.4** 2.011 3.08** -0.062 -1.04**
t+285 -0.117 -0.93** 46.4** -1.452 -1.86* -0.030 -1.04** 63.1** 2.042 3.12** -0.148 -1.14**
t+300 -0.001 -0.04** 49.4** -1.453 -1.85* -0.075 -1.72** 57.6** 2.117 3.18** -0.076 -1.30**
t+315 -0.070 -1.01** 50.6** -1.523 -1.87* -0.036 -0.72** 54.1** 2.153 3.24** -0.106 -1.20**
t+330 -0.091 -1.43** 48.2** -1.614 -1.91* -0.071 -1.37** 51.8** 2.224 3.31** -0.163 -1.98**
t+345 -0.048 -0.86** 54.1** -1.567 -1.80* -0.020 -0.40** 44.7** 2.205 3.26** -0.067 -0.91**
t+360 -0.070 -1.20** 48.2** -1.636 -1.83* -0.013 -0.31** 49.4** 2.218 3.25** -0.083 -1.14**
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Table 7.6: Mean ARs and CARs for the lowest and highest market to book ratio quartiles, containing 42
and 44 respectively.  The column, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage of positive abnormal returns for each 15-
minute interval, and it is tested for statistical difference from 50% using a non-parametric binomial test.
The last two columns ARlow-ARhigh, refer to the mean difference in abnormal returns between the two
samples.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Lowest M/B ratio Quartile Highest M/B ratio Quartile ARlow-ARhigh
Time AR (%) t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR (%) t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff t-stat
t-360 -0.041 -0.77** 40.5* -0.890 -1.33* -0.136 -1.14** 54.5* 1.761 2.48** -0.177 -1.35**
t-345 -0.044 -0.86** 54.8* -0.845 -1.26* -0.067 -0.76** 54.5* 1.828 2.62** -0.023 -0.23**
t-330 -0.025 -0.44** 47.6* -0.870 -1.27* -0.080 -1.12** 61.4* 1.908 2.74** -0.105 -1.16**
t-315 -0.067 -0.90** 52.4* -0.937 -1.35* -0.037 -0.81** 54.5* 1.945 2.78** -0.104 -1.19**
t-300 -0.097 -1.92** 59.5* -0.839 -1.19* -0.058 -1.16** 65.9* 2.003 2.88** -0.039 -0.55**
t-285 -0.056 -1.21** 59.5* -0.783 -1.10* -0.192 -2.81** 63.6* 2.195 3.21** -0.136 -1.65**
t-270 -0.039 -0.40** 46.3* -0.823 -1.10* -0.063 -1.46** 56.8* 2.258 3.24** -0.102 -0.96**
t-255 -0.001 -0.01** 66.7* -0.823 -1.04* -0.022 -0.56** 52.3* 2.280 3.23** -0.023 -0.23**
t-240 -0.024 -0.53** 57.1* -0.800 -0.98* -0.084 -1.95** 56.8* 2.364 3.31** -0.060 -0.97**
t-225 -0.006 -0.11** 47.6* -0.794 -0.94* -0.005 -0.12** 56.8* 2.359 3.27** -0.011 -0.16**
t-210 -0.024 -0.49** 59.5* -0.770 -0.89* -0.052 -1.40** 63.6* 2.411 3.29** -0.028 -0.46**
t-195 -0.096 -1.82** 61.9* -0.674 -0.79* -0.009 -0.20** 47.7* 2.401 3.18** -0.106 -1.49**
t-180 -0.065 -1.53** 47.6* -0.609 -0.71* -0.049 -0.74** 56.8* 2.451 3.12** -0.015 -0.19**
t-165 -0.001 -0.06** 47.6* -0.610 -0.70* -0.054 -1.31** 59.1* 2.505 3.16** -0.056 -1.19**
t-150 -0.117 -2.01** 38.1* -0.728 -0.83* -0.017 -0.29** 52.3* 2.488 3.15** -0.100 -1.22**
t-135 -0.004 -0.10** 45.2* -0.724 -0.81* -0.105 -1.69** 36.4* 2.383 3.08** -0.109 -1.50**
t-120 -0.126 -2.47** 38.1* -0.850 -0.95* -0.082 -1.96** 56.8* 2.465 3.21** -0.209 -3.15**
t-105 -0.012 -0.26** 47.6* -0.862 -0.96* -0.021 -0.26** 59.1* 2.486 3.22** -0.033 -0.35**
t-90 -0.083 -1.71** 31.0* -0.946 -1.05* -0.097 -1.96** 56.8* 2.583 3.35** -0.180 -2.60**
t-75 -0.073 -1.17** 40.5* -1.019 -1.11* -0.079 -2.02** 56.8* 2.661 3.44** -0.152 -2.05**
t-60 -0.181 -2.30** 38.1* -1.200 -1.32* -0.093 -2.12** 65.9* 2.754 3.54** -0.274 -3.04**
t-45 -0.066 -1.18** 42.9* -1.266 -1.38* -0.121 -2.12** 60.5* 2.875 3.71** -0.187 -2.33**
t-30 -0.083 -1.54** 42.9* -1.349 -1.48* -0.129 -1.90** 65.1* 3.004 3.78** -0.212 -2.45**
t-15 -0.213 -2.90** 31.0* -1.563 -1.71* -0.126 -1.97** 53.5* 3.130 3.91** -0.339 -3.48**
t-0 -0.171 -2.63** 36.6* -1.734 -1.87* -0.183 -2.24** 58.1* 3.313 4.21** -0.354 -3.39**
t+15 -0.227 -1.82** 47.6* -1.961 -2.07* -0.106 -1.93** 60.5* 3.419 4.35** -0.333 -2.44**
t+30 -0.251 -1.84** 33.3* -2.212 -2.34* -0.126 -2.14** 65.1* 3.544 4.44** -0.377 -2.54**
t+45 -0.069 -0.66** 52.4* -2.281 -2.39* -0.023 -0.34** 48.8* 3.521 4.32** -0.046 -0.37**
t+60 -0.023 -0.32** 52.4* -2.258 -2.31* -0.061 -0.69** 51.2* 3.583 4.41** -0.039 -0.34**
t+75 -0.027 -0.37** 54.8* -2.285 -2.26* -0.130 -0.67** 51.2* 3.453 4.51** -0.103 -0.50**
t+90 -0.025 -0.38** 45.2* -2.310 -2.22* -0.066 -0.64** 48.8* 3.387 4.47** -0.041 -0.33**
t+105 -0.019 -0.28** 51.2* -2.329 -2.17* -0.007 -0.15** 41.9* 3.394 4.48** -0.026 -0.32**
t+120 -0.050 -0.74** 59.5* -2.279 -2.07* -0.026 -0.50** 50.0* 3.368 4.47** -0.075 -0.89**
t+135 -0.059 -1.18** 57.1* -2.221 -1.98* -0.008 -0.21** 56.8* 3.376 4.47** -0.051 -0.82**
t+150 -0.004 -0.08** 45.2* -2.225 -1.97* -0.053 -0.94** 56.8* 3.429 4.50** -0.058 -0.72**
t+165 -0.021 -0.53** 47.6* -2.246 -1.95* -0.065 -0.61** 56.8* 3.494 4.47** -0.086 -0.76**
t+180 -0.097 -1.78** 40.5* -2.342 -2.01* -0.073 -1.73** 52.3* 3.567 4.57** -0.170 -2.46**
t+195 -0.128 -1.64** 33.3* -2.470 -2.10* -0.002 -0.03** 54.5* 3.569 4.70** -0.130 -1.14**
t+210 -0.087 -0.54** 42.9* -2.383 -2.07* -0.004 -0.08** 54.5* 3.573 4.72** -0.084 -0.49**
t+225 -0.007 -0.10** 50.0* -2.376 -2.06* -0.026 -0.41** 54.5* 3.599 4.59** -0.019 -0.20**
t+240 -0.086 -0.88** 42.9* -2.289 -1.99* -0.058 -0.91** 50.0* 3.657 4.53** -0.028 -0.24**
t+255 -0.045 -1.22** 38.1* -2.335 -2.03* -0.155 -1.77** 59.1* 3.812 4.49** -0.201 -2.11**
t+270 -0.033 -0.55** 45.2* -2.368 -2.06* -0.038 -0.80** 59.1* 3.774 4.43** -0.005 -0.07**
t+285 -0.223 -0.96** 48.8* -2.590 -2.00* -0.029 -0.77** 68.2* 3.803 4.42** -0.252 -1.07**
t+300 -0.021 -0.39** 42.9* -2.611 -1.99* -0.129 -1.79** 61.4* 3.933 4.44** -0.150 -1.67**
t+315 -0.126 -1.23** 40.5* -2.738 -2.00* -0.066 -0.84** 56.8* 3.998 4.51** -0.192 -1.49**
t+330 -0.138 -1.30** 45.2* -2.876 -2.01* -0.134 -1.52** 61.4* 4.133 4.56** -0.272 -1.97**
t+345 -0.020 -0.20** 45.2* -2.896 -1.94* -0.047 -0.57** 47.7* 4.180 4.56** -0.067 -0.51**
t+360 -0.137 -1.61** 40.5* -3.033 -1.97* -0.039 -0.60** 52.3* 4.219 4.53** -0.176 -1.64**
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7.1.3 Cash flow effect
In this section, the relationship between cash flow and market valuation at
physical asset expenditure announcement is examined.  It was argued earlier in
the hypothesis section that when firms make physical asset expenditure
announcements, the equity market should react such that firms with a low cash
flow ratio will experience a significantly higher AR than high cash flow ratio
firms at the announcement of physical asset expenditure.
Figure 7.7 presents the CARs sorted by cash flow to total assets ratio.  No clear
pattern exists when the sample is sorted by cash flow ratio, which might suggest
that the role of cash flow in the capital market is limited.  The results in Figure
7.7 also seem to suggest that the market reacts negatively to the physical asset
expenditure announcements by the lowest cash flow ratio firms, and positively to
the other three samples.  Hence, these results appear contradictory to the capital
market monitoring hypothesis which argues that firms with the lowest cash flow
are those subject to constant capital market monitoring, hence, better investment
decisions are more likely to be made.
Table 7.7 confirms the graphical result presented in Figure 7.7, that is, there is a
mixture of both positive and negative abnormal returns sporadically over the [-
360,+360] minute window, for both the lowest and highest cash flow ratio
quartiles, and a general lack of significant market response around the
announcement period.  Furthermore, Table 7.7 also shows that the difference in
AR between the two samples varies inconsistently over the [-360,+360] minute
window.
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Generally, the results in this section do not support the capital market monitoring
argument.  Further analysis of cash flow effect is contained in sections 7.2 and
7.3.
Figure 7.7: Mean CARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window segregated into cash flow
ratio quartiles respectively, lowest (Q1), second lowest (Q2), second highest (Q3), and
highest (Q4).
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Table 7.7: Mean ARs and CARs for the lowest and highest cash flow ratio quartiles, containing 42 and 44
observations respectively.  The column, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage of positive abnormal returns for each
15-minute interval, and it is tested for statistical difference from 50% using a non-parametric binomial test.
The last two columns ARlow-ARhigh, refer to the mean difference in abnormal returns between the lowset
and highest cash flow ratio firms.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Lowest CF/TA ratio quartile Highest CF/TA ratio quartile ARlow-ARhigh
Time AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff t-stat
t-360 -0.102 -1.81* 53.8* -0.984 -1.51 -0.048 -1.75** 48.8** 0.773 1.43* -0.149 -2.39**
t-345 -0.079 -1.21* 66.7* -0.904 -1.42 -0.003 -0.09** 47.5** 0.761 1.39* -0.082 -1.12**
t-330 -0.058 -0.62* 59.5* -0.846 -1.33 -0.013 -0.36** 52.5** 0.763 1.39* -0.045 -0.45**
t-315 -0.030 -0.30* 59.5* -0.816 -1.24 -0.012 -0.37** 50.0** 0.742 1.36* -0.042 -0.41**
t-300 -0.161 -1.38* 42.9* -0.978 -1.40 -0.059 -1.69** 57.1** 0.794 1.44* -0.221 -1.81**
t-285 -0.198 -0.92* 54.8* -0.780 -1.21 -0.005 -0.16** 58.5** 0.798 1.44* -0.193 -0.89**
t-270 -0.114 -0.86* 58.5* -0.894 -1.32 -0.038 -1.25** 62.5** 0.834 1.50* -0.152 -1.12**
t-255 -0.011 -0.13* 59.5* -0.883 -1.31 -0.016 -0.83** 58.5** 0.850 1.51* -0.005 -0.05**
t-240 -0.106 -1.78* 46.3* -0.989 -1.45 -0.032 -1.15** 60.0** 0.881 1.56* -0.139 -2.10**
t-225 -0.031 -0.64* 52.4* -1.020 -1.50 0.013 -0.36** 51.2** 0.898 1.59* -0.044 -0.73**
t-210 -0.074 -1.93* 58.5* -0.946 -1.38 0.060 -3.55** 67.5** 0.968 1.71* -0.014 -0.33**
t-195 -0.101 -2.20* 52.4* -0.845 -1.22 0.028 -1.33** 61.0** 1.004 1.76* -0.074 -1.46**
t-180 -0.027 -0.40* 52.4* -0.871 -1.23 0.063 -1.68** 57.5** 1.075 1.89* -0.090 -1.17**
t-165 -0.012 -0.22* 35.7* -0.883 -1.23 0.049 -1.26** 57.1** 1.125 1.97* -0.061 -0.94**
t-150 -0.055 -1.25* 41.5* -0.938 -1.28 -0.001 -0.02** 51.2** 1.123 1.96* -0.054 -1.08**
t-135 -0.044 -0.92* 60.0* -0.982 -1.30 -0.085 -1.24** 51.2** 1.038 1.81* -0.041 -0.48**
t-120 -0.095 -1.76* 57.1* -0.887 -1.19 -0.056 -1.35** 53.7** 1.010 1.77* -0.151 -2.22**
t-105 -0.057 -1.29* 51.2* -0.831 -1.12 -0.041 -0.80** 50.0** 0.984 1.73* -0.097 -1.45**
t-90 --0.026 -0.77* 48.8* -0.805 -1.11 -0.004 -0.13** 54.8** 0.990 1.76* -0.031 -0.64**
t-75 --0.050 -0.53* 47.6* -0.754 -1.09 -0.009 -0.29** 56.1** 1.004 1.80* -0.060 -0.60**
t-60 -0.039 -0.74* 53.7* -0.793 -1.13 -0.071 -1.42** 70.0** 1.075 1.93* -0.110 -1.52**
t-45 --0.026 -0.40* 48.8* -0.767 -1.09 -0.081 -1.14** 50.0** 1.004 1.78* -0.107 -1.11**
t-30 --0.074 -1.12* 64.3* -0.693 -0.98 -0.042 -1.10** 43.6** 0.960 1.66* -0.116 -1.52**
t-15 -0.018 -0.27* 42.9* -0.711 -1.02 -0.029 -0.64** 56.4** 0.926 1.54* -0.011 -0.13**
t-0 -0.003 -0.03* 48.8* -0.708 -1.02 -0.007 -0.16** 62.2** 0.916 1.50* -0.010 -0.10**
t+15 -0.049 -0.54* 57.1* -0.757 -1.09 -0.043 -1.01** 53.8** 0.872 1.40* -0.006 -0.06**
t+30 -0.020 -0.25* 47.6* -0.737 -1.06 -0.014 -0.29** 52.5** 0.900 1.41* -0.006 -0.06**
t+45 -0.070 -0.92* 40.5* -0.667 -0.98 -0.020 -0.88** 60.5** 0.899 1.41* -0.089 -1.13**
t+60 -0.236 -2.09* 63.4* -0.431 -0.62 -0.021 -0.83** 47.4** 0.875 1.39* -0.258 -2.22**
t+75 -0.077 -0.84* 52.4* -0.508 -0.71 -0.028 -1.14** 48.7** 0.845 1.35* -0.049 -0.51**
t+90 -0.183 -1.73* 35.7* -0.691 -0.95 -0.029 -1.38** 44.7** 0.814 1.30* -0.154 -1.43**
t+105 -0.039 -0.81* 42.9* -0.730 -1.01 -0.018 -0.71** 52.5** 0.794 1.28* -0.021 -0.38**
t+120 -0.034 -0.62* 52.5* -0.763 -1.08 -0.039 -0.95** 58.5** 0.828 1.33* -0.072 -1.07**
t+135 -0.044 -0.79* 58.5* -0.807 -1.16 -0.001 -0.02** 42.9** 0.824 1.32* -0.043 -0.67**
t+150 -0.201 -1.36* 64.3* -0.605 -0.87 -0.009 -0.25** 47.6** 0.813 1.29* -0.210 -1.38**
t+165 -0.120 -2.08* 42.9* -0.726 -1.04 -0.106 1.05** 53.7** 0.913 1.38* -0.226 -1.95**
t+180 -0.044 -1.14* 45.2* -0.770 -1.09 -0.070 -1.92** 55.0** 0.994 1.49* -0.114 -2.15**
t+195 -0.020 -0.27* 65.9* -0.790 -1.10 -0.010 -0.23** 54.8** 1.017 1.56* -0.010 -0.12**
t+210 -0.182 -1.13* 57.1* -0.608 -0.84 -0.003 -0.09** 57.1** 1.018 1.57* -0.178 -1.09**
t+225 -0.027 -0.49* 51.2* -0.580 -0.80 -0.020 -0.33** 47.5** 1.030 1.59* -0.008 -0.09**
t+240 -0.004 -0.13* 46.3* -0.576 -0.79 -0.074 -1.34** 58.5** 1.046 1.61* -0.070 -1.09**
t+255 -0.000 -0.01* 48.8* -0.577 -0.80 -0.116 -1.13** 48.7** 1.153 1.77* -0.116 -1.08**
t+270 -0.002 -0.05* 53.8* -0.578 -0.80 -0.066 -1.60** 35.7** 1.106 1.69* -0.064 -1.23**
t+285 -0.049 -1.55* 62.5* -0.529 -0.73 -0.022 -0.40** 55.0** 1.128 1.69* -0.027 -0.43**
t+300 -0.104 -1.81* 51.2* -0.425 -0.59 -0.090 -1.69** 31.0** 1.048 1.55* -0.195 -2.48**
t+315 -0.043 -0.93* 52.4* -0.467 -0.65 -0.009 -0.15** 47.6** 1.054 1.59* -0.034 -0.45**
t+330 -0.058 -1.09* 50.0* -0.525 -0.73 -0.042 -1.10** 45.0** 1.022 1.56* -0.016 -0.24**
t+345 -0.069 -1.06* 45.2* -0.456 -0.64 -0.070 -1.53** 38.1** 0.961 1.46* -0.139 -1.74**
t+360 -0.040 -0.77* 61.9* -0.416 -0.58 -0.016 -0.48** 35.7** 0.946 1.43* -0.057 -0.91**
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7.1.4 Foster, Olsen and Shevlin’s (1984) method
In this section, the Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) ex post-method of
examining the CARs is used, viz, sorting the abnormal returns at the
announcement minute, t0, and then dividing the sample into two subsamples
consisting of the positive abnormal returns at t0, and negative abnormal returns at
t0.102  Because this method sorts the sample by ARs on announcement, it
provides a basis for which one can form a minimum expectation of how prices
have reacted to the announcement when split into “good news” and “bad news”
groups.  That is, assuming the equity market is perfectly capable of assessing the
net present value of physical asset expenditure transaction on announcement, and
if market to book ratio is a good proxy for assessing the value of growth
opportunities of firms, the CARs based on the Foster et al ex post-method should
give a close proximity to the CARs based on market to book ratio ex ante
method.
As shown in Figure 7.8, the CARs resemble the CARs sorted on market to book
ratio except that the magnitude of the CARs using the Foster et al method is
smaller.  Over the [-1890,+1890] minute window, the CARs for the sample with
positive ARs at t0 and the sample with negative ARs at t0 are 1.603% and -
0.521% respectively, compared to 2.806% and -1.910% for the high and low
market to book ratio samples.
                                                          
102 The Foster et al approach is an ex post analysis since the sample is segregated by the market
reaction sign after the knowledge of the reaction.
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Figure 7.8: Mean CARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window segregated into two unequal
subsamples consisting of sample with ARs at t0 greater than or equal to zero [denoted by
CAR (ARt0>0)], and sample with ARs at t0 less than zero [denoted by CAR (ARt0<0)].
The number of observations for CAR (ARt0>0) and CAR (ARt0<0) are 80 and 90
respectively.
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The ARs for both the negative and positive groups are presented in Figures 7.9
and 7.10 respectively.  As expected, both Figures 7.9 and 7.10 show that a large
negative and positive AR spike on physical asset expenditure announcement, but
other than that, there are no clear significant abnormal returns for any other
periods.
Figure 7.11 separates the sample into four subsamples sorted by the ARs at t0.
Interestingly, the CARs for the two middle quartiles, Q2 and Q3, behave rather
similarly to the two middle quartiles sorted by market to book ratio in Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.9: Mean ARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window sample with ARs at t0 less than zero.
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Figure 7.10: Mean ARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window sample with ARs at t0
greater than zero.
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Figure 7.11:  Mean CARs sorted by ARs at t0 over a [-1890,+1890] minute window.
Lowest ARs at t0 sample is denoted by Q1, and highest ARs at t0 sample is denoted by Q4.
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Table 7.8 provides the CARs and ARs and the respective t-statistics for the two
samples for which the abnormal returns at t0 are the positive and negative
respectively.  For the negative sample, the ARs are significant in minutes -120th,
-90th, -45th, 0 and +195th, whereas the CARs remained insignificant over the
minute window [-360,+360].  There is also a positive spike in minute -195.  For
the positive sample, the ARs are significant only in minutes 0 and +210, however
the CARs become significant from minute 0 to +360.
Table 7.9 presents the ARs and CARs for the quartile with the lowest negative
ARs at t0, and the quartile with the highest positive ARs at t0.  For the lowest
negative ARt0 sample, significant negative ARs are observed in minutes -150
th,
120th, -60th, -45th, 0 and +30th.  Most but not all of the CARs in minutes 75th
onward are significant.  For the highest positive ARt0 sample, the ARs are only
significant in minutes 0, +180th, +195th and 210th, and the CARs are significant
from t0 onward.
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In both Tables 7.8 and 7.9, the difference in AR between the two samples is
clustered around the announcement period.
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Table 7.8: Mean ARs and CARs for the negative ARs at t0, and positive ARs at t0 samples, containing 90
and 80 observations respectively.  The column, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage of positive abnormal returns
for each 15-minute interval, and it is for statistical difference from 50% using a non-parametric binomial
test.  The last two columns ARlow-ARhigh, refer to the mean difference in abnormal returns between the two
samples.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Negative AR at t0 sample Positive AR at t0 sample ARlow-ARhigh
Time AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff t-stat
t-360 -0.028 -0.84** 50.0** -0.051 -0.10 -0.057 -0.81** 48.2** 0.659 1.24* -0.085 -1.09**
t-345 -0.020 -0.54** 60.0** -0.032 -0.06 -0.026 -0.51** 45.9** 0.685 1.27* -0.006 -0.10**
t-330 -0.021 -0.66** 60.0** -0.011 -0.02 -0.046 -0.78** 44.7** 0.639 1.18* -0.067 -1.00**
t-315 -0.033 -0.86** 63.5** -0.021 -0.04 -0.013 -0.23** 48.2** 0.626 1.14* -0.045 -0.69**
t-300 -0.034 -0.89** 55.3** -0.056 -0.10 -0.018 -0.28** 61.2** 0.644 1.14* -0.016 -0.22**
t-285 -0.037 -0.97** 54.1** -0.093 -0.18 -0.089 -0.68** 57.6** 0.733 1.40* -0.052 -0.38**
t-270 -0.031 -0.58** 45.9** -0.061 -0.11 -0.040 -0.45** 58.3** 0.693 1.34* -0.008 -0.08**
t-255 -0.050 -0.95** 55.3** -0.012 -0.02 -0.023 -0.90** 49.4** 0.716 1.37* -0.073 -1.25**
t-240 -0.017 -0.51** 49.4** -0.005 -0.01 -0.062 -1.42** 64.7** 0.779 1.46* -0.079 -1.44**
t-225 -0.024 -0.65** 45.9** -0.029 -0.05 -0.049 -1.37** 49.4** 0.729 1.35* -0.026 -0.50**
t-210 -0.024 -0.74** 60.0** -0.005 -0.00 -0.032 -1.00** 56.5** 0.762 1.39* -0.009 -0.19**
t-195 -0.075 -1.81** 52.9** -0.070 -0.11 -0.019 -0.61** 55.3** 0.781 1.40* -0.056 -1.08**
t-180 -0.044 -1.36** 48.2** -0.114 -0.19 -0.006 -0.14** 49.4** 0.787 1.39* -0.038 -0.71**
t-165 -0.045 -1.63** 51.8** -0.159 -0.26 -0.045 -1.00** 47.1** 0.741 1.28* -0.090 -1.70**
t-150 -0.052 -1.43** 43.5** -0.106 -0.17 -0.018 -0.36** 50.6** 0.723 1.21* -0.034 -0.55**
t-135 -0.058 -1.55** 40.0** -0.048 -0.08 -0.024 -0.67** 50.6** 0.699 1.15* -0.035 -0.66**
t-120 -0.068 -2.09** 38.8** -0.020 -0.03 -0.051 -1.40** 51.8** 0.750 1.23* -0.119 -2.44**
t-105 -0.027 -0.66** 44.7** -0.047 -0.07 -0.009 -0.19** 55.3** 0.741 1.22* -0.018 -0.30**
t-90 -0.067 -2.07** 36.5** -0.114 -0.18 -0.050 -1.35** 56.5** 0.791 1.30* -0.117 -2.38**
t-75 -0.033 -0.92** 43.5** -0.147 -0.23 -0.067 -1.35** 57.6** 0.858 1.43* -0.100 -1.63**
t-60 -0.035 -1.33** 49.4** -0.182 -0.29 -0.026 -0.52** 56.5** 0.832 1.39* -0.009 -0.15**
t-45 -0.068 -1.69** 43.5** -0.250 -0.39 -0.009 -0.17** 54.8** 0.823 1.36* -0.059 -0.91**
t-30 -0.053 -1.38** 45.9** -0.303 -0.48 -0.039 -1.07** 57.1** 0.862 1.43* -0.093 -1.74**
t-15 -0.077 -1.62** 32.9** -0.380 -0.60 -0.042 -0.91** 61.9** 0.905 1.46* -0.119 -1.79**
t-0 -0.195 -6.13** 0.0** -0.575 -0.90 -0.187 -2.82** 100.0** 1.092 1.77* -0.382 -5.72**
t+15 -0.077 -1.28** 42.4** -0.652 -1.00 -0.005 -0.08** 61.9** 1.097 1.75* -0.082 -0.98**
t+30 -0.070 -1.48** 43.5** -0.722 -1.09 -0.006 -0.08** 52.4** 1.103 1.76* -0.076 -0.89**
t+45 -0.023 -0.56** 41.2** -0.744 -1.10 -0.012 -0.19** 53.6** 1.091 1.75* -0.011 -0.14**
t+60 -0.021 -0.46** 42.4** -0.766 -1.12 -0.054 -1.00** 60.7** 1.145 1.82* -0.076 -1.07**
t+75 -0.045 -0.55** 52.9** -0.811 -1.19 -0.029 -0.55** 53.6** 1.116 1.77* -0.016 -0.16**
t+90 -0.046 -0.70** 46.4** -0.857 -1.24 -0.024 -0.79** 44.0** 1.092 1.74* -0.022 -0.30**
t+105 -0.008 -0.19** 38.1** -0.865 -1.24 -0.019 -0.60** 52.4** 1.073 1.71* -0.011 -0.21**
t+120 -0.020 -0.46** 50.6** -0.845 -1.20 -0.004 -0.10** 56.5** 1.076 1.71* -0.016 -0.30**
t+135 -0.017 -0.53** 51.2** -0.828 -1.16 -0.007 -0.18** 58.8** 1.069 1.70* -0.024 -0.48**
t+150 -0.074 -0.99** 53.6** -0.754 -1.06 -0.036 -1.12** 54.1** 1.105 1.76* -0.038 -0.47**
t+165 -0.003 -0.05** 44.7** -0.751 -1.03 -0.006 -0.16** 54.1** 1.111 1.75* -0.002 -0.03**
t+180 -0.019 -0.48** 51.8** -0.769 -1.04 -0.021 -0.55** 55.3** 1.132 1.78* -0.040 -0.73**
t+195 -0.122 -2.23** 40.5** -0.891 -1.20 -0.060 -1.36** 58.8** 1.192 1.87* -0.181 -2.59**
t+210 -0.014 -0.16** 48.2** -0.876 -1.19 -0.073 -2.14** 57.6** 1.265 1.99* -0.059 -0.63**
t+225 -0.008 -0.16** 50.6** -0.885 -1.20 -0.014 -0.47** 55.3** 1.279 2.00* -0.022 -0.38**
t+240 -0.088 -1.43** 54.8** -0.797 -1.07 -0.017 -0.51** 47.1** 1.296 2.00* -0.071 -1.02**
t+255 -0.062 -1.06** 54.8** -0.735 -0.97 -0.013 -0.48** 45.9** 1.309 2.00* -0.049 -0.75**
t+270 -0.038 -0.84** 48.8** -0.773 -1.02 -0.028 -0.73** 49.4** 1.337 2.04* -0.067 -1.12**
t+285 -0.058 -0.52** 58.8** -0.831 -1.02 -0.023 -0.49** 50.6** 1.314 1.98* -0.035 -0.29**
t+300 -0.006 -0.14** 50.6** -0.826 -1.00 -0.071 -1.71** 57.6** 1.385 2.06* -0.065 -1.12**
t+315 -0.036 -0.51** 50.6** -0.862 -1.01 -0.025 -0.46** 55.3** 1.410 2.11* -0.061 -0.68**
t+330 -0.023 -0.37** 48.2** -0.885 -1.00 -0.006 -0.10** 52.9** 1.415 2.10* -0.029 -0.35**
t+345 -0.041 -0.68** 51.8** -0.844 -0.92 -0.008 -0.19** 48.2** 1.407 2.10* -0.049 -0.66**
t+360 -0.029 -0.46** 49.4** -0.874 -0.93 -0.015 -0.43** 49.4** 1.392 2.07* -0.014 -0.19**
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Table 7.9: Mean ARs and CARs for the most negative ARs at t0, and most positive ARs at t0 samples,
containing 42 and 44 observations respectively.  The column, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage of positive
abnormal returns for each 15-minute interval, and it is tested for statistical difference from 50% using a non-
parametric binomial test.  The last two columns ARlow-ARhigh, refer to the mean difference in abnormal
returns between the two samples.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Most negative AR at t0 quartile Most positive AR at t0 quartile ARlow-ARhigh
Time AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff t-stat
t-360 -0.036 -0.62** 41.5** -0.202 -0.26* -0.117 -0.88** 52.3** 0.953 1.20** -0.153 -1.05**
t-345 -0.014 -0.20** 54.8** -0.216 -0.28* -0.090 -1.01** 40.9** 1.043 1.31** -0.076 -0.68**
t-330 -0.011 -0.20** 59.5** -0.227 -0.29* -0.091 -0.85** 40.9** 0.952 1.20** -0.102 -0.85**
t-315 -0.001 -0.00** 59.5** -0.226 -0.28* -0.038 -0.44** 45.5** 0.914 1.12** -0.037 -0.35**
t-300 -0.002 -0.03** 50.0** -0.228 -0.29* -0.018 -0.17** 61.4** 0.896 1.05** -0.020 -0.16**
t-285 -0.008 -0.12** 50.0** -0.237 -0.29* -0.297 -1.58** 61.4** 1.193 1.46** -0.289 -1.45**
t-270 -0.048 -0.47** 40.5** -0.188 -0.22* -0.019 -0.19** 56.8** 1.212 1.44** -0.067 -0.47**
t-255 -0.085 -0.90** 45.2** -0.103 -0.11* -0.049 -1.15** 50.0** 1.261 1.49** -0.134 -1.29**
t-240 -0.015 -0.34** 47.6** -0.088 -0.09* -0.045 -1.03** 65.9** 1.306 1.52** -0.060 -0.97**
t-225 -0.040 -0.78** 40.5** -0.048 -0.05* -0.055 -1.15** 50.0** 1.251 1.43** -0.015 -0.20**
t-210 -0.028 -0.54** 50.0** -0.020 -0.02* -0.035 -0.70** 52.3** 1.216 1.35** -0.007 -0.10**
t-195 -0.112 -1.59** 50.0** -0.132 -0.13* -0.027 -0.59** 52.3** 1.188 1.29** -0.140 -1.66**
t-180 -0.061 -1.14** 45.2** -0.193 -0.19* -0.022 -0.43** 45.5** 1.167 1.24** -0.083 -1.12**
t-165 -0.009 -0.29** 40.5** -0.184 -0.18* -0.042 -0.61** 52.3** 1.125 1.16** -0.033 -0.44**
t-150 -0.125 -1.88** 38.1** -0.059 -0.05* -0.013 -0.17** 50.0** 1.112 1.10** -0.113 -1.13**
t-135 -0.101 -1.44** 38.1** -0.042 -0.04* -0.031 -0.64** 45.5** 1.081 1.05** -0.070 -0.81**
t-120 -0.134 -2.25** 38.1** -0.176 -0.18* -0.059 -1.03** 56.8** 1.140 1.12** -0.193 -2.33**
t-105 -0.023 -0.31** 42.9** -0.199 -0.20* -0.030 -0.40** 52.3** 1.110 1.09** -0.007 -0.06**
t-90 -0.065 -1.31** 33.3** -0.264 -0.26* -0.045 -0.76** 59.1** 1.155 1.14** -0.110 -1.43**
t-75 -0.021 -0.41** 45.2** -0.285 -0.28* -0.100 -1.07** 54.5** 1.255 1.26** -0.121 -1.13**
t-60 -0.081 -1.97** 33.3** -0.366 -0.36* -0.028 -0.36** 61.4** 1.283 1.30** -0.109 -1.25**
t-45 -0.159 -2.18** 35.7** -0.525 -0.51* -0.028 -0.33** 68.2** 1.311 1.31** -0.187 -1.68**
t-30 -0.061 -0.86** 50.0** -0.586 -0.57* -0.073 -1.11** 63.6** 1.384 1.38** -0.134 -1.39**
t-15 -0.140 -1.64** 33.3** -0.726 -0.70* -0.098 -1.12** 75.0** 1.482 1.43** -0.237 -1.95**
t-0 -0.335 -5.94** 0.0** -1.061 -1.02* -0.325 -2.59** 100.0** 1.806 1.77** -0.660 -4.81**
t+15 -0.173 -1.49** 42.9** -1.234 -1.16* -0.001 -0.00** 61.4** 1.806 1.73** -0.172 -1.10**
t+30 -0.144 -2.00** 38.1** -1.378 -1.27* -0.020 -0.14** 54.5** 1.826 1.75** -0.164 -1.06**
t+45 -0.096 -1.55** 35.7** -1.474 -1.33* -0.049 -0.45** 63.6** 1.874 1.81** -0.144 -1.17**
t+60 -0.087 -1.06** 42.9** -1.561 -1.39* -0.115 -1.25** 77.3** 1.990 1.92** -0.203 -1.64**
t+75 -0.127 -0.79** 61.9** -1.688 -1.52* -0.022 -0.23** 54.5** 1.967 1.89** -0.104 -0.56**
t+90 -0.063 -0.50** 48.8** -1.751 -1.54* -0.017 -0.34** 45.5** 1.985 1.91** -0.081 -0.60**
t+105 -0.008 -0.12** 41.5** -1.743 -1.50* -0.020 -0.37** 56.8** 1.965 1.89** -0.027 -0.33**
t+120 -0.001 -0.01** 45.2** -1.745 -1.48* -0.007 -0.13** 59.1** 1.972 1.91** -0.008 -0.08**
t+135 -0.024 -0.48** 48.8** -1.721 -1.45* -0.025 -0.77** 56.8** 1.997 1.93** -0.001 -0.02**
t+150 -0.121 -0.84** 48.8** -1.600 -1.37* -0.094 -1.88** 65.9** 2.091 2.02** -0.027 -0.18**
t+165 -0.047 -0.90** 45.2** -1.647 -1.40* -0.029 -0.52** 61.4** 2.120 2.04** -0.076 -1.00**
t+180 -0.013 -0.25** 54.8** -1.660 -1.39* -0.076 -1.76** 56.8** 2.196 2.11** -0.089 -1.34**
t+195 -0.055 -0.92** 39.0** -1.715 -1.44* -0.148 -2.20** 70.5** 2.343 2.25** -0.202 -2.26**
t+210 -0.017 -0.37** 47.6** -1.732 -1.45* -0.153 -2.81** 65.9** 2.496 2.42** -0.170 -2.37**
t+225 -0.014 -0.22** 54.8** -1.719 -1.42* -0.045 -1.01** 65.9** 2.541 2.45** -0.032 -0.42**
t+240 -0.116 -1.44** 58.5** -1.603 -1.31* -0.063 -1.17** 54.5** 2.604 2.49** -0.053 -0.55**
t+255 -0.137 -1.22** 56.1** -1.466 -1.17* -0.030 -0.66** 43.2** 2.634 2.49** -0.107 -0.88**
t+270 -0.078 -0.99** 43.9** -1.544 -1.24* -0.003 -0.05** 47.7** 2.637 2.50** -0.081 -0.84**
t+285 -0.178 -0.83** 57.1** -1.722 -1.25* -0.024 -0.43** 50.0** 2.661 2.48** -0.202 -0.91**
t+300 -0.019 -0.31** 52.4** -1.703 -1.21* -0.055 -0.81** 54.5** 2.716 2.50** -0.036 -0.39**
t+315 -0.018 -0.14** 50.0** -1.721 -1.17* -0.006 -0.07** 52.3** 2.722 2.53** -0.024 -0.16**
t+330 -0.039 -0.33** 47.6** -1.760 -1.14* -0.040 -0.45** 52.3** 2.762 2.56** -0.079 -0.54**
t+345 -0.030 -0.25** 45.2** -1.730 -1.07* -0.016 -0.20** 50.0** 2.745 2.58** -0.046 -0.32**
t+360 -0.059 -0.47** 47.6** -1.789 -1.07* -0.097 -1.67** 43.2** 2.648 2.48** -0.039 -0.28**
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7.2 Randomisation approach
In this section, further analysis is presented on the market to book and cash flow
effects.  The analysis here is similar to the Fama and French (1992) approach in
which all observations are first sorted by their market to book ratio (or cash flow
ratio), and then divided into quartiles.  In each of the quartiles, they are
subsequently re-sorted by their cash flow ratio (market to book ratio).  This
method allows us to examine the cash flow (market to book) effect after
randomising on the market to book (cash flow).  We expect that once
observations are first sorted on the basis of market to book, the cash flow effect
can be tested.  That is, in each of the market to book ratio quartiles, which are
subsequently sorted by cash flow ratio, we do not expect to see any significant
difference in mean (median) CARs between the lowest and highest cash flow
cells.
Table 7.10 provides the results of the randomisation.  In Panels A (B) and C (D),
the value in each cell is mean (median) CARs.  In Panels A and B, the cash flow
effect is randomised with respect to controlling the market to book.  If the cash
flow effect is dominant, one expects to see that, after the randomisation process,
the difference in CARs between the highest and lowest cash flow ratio firms will
be significant.  The results in Panels A and B show that this is not the case as the
difference in CARs between the highest and lowest cash flow ratio firms is
insignificant.
Panels C and D provide the results from randomising the market to book effect
by controlling the cash flow effect.  If the market to book effect is dominant, its
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effect should persist such that the difference in CARs between the lowest and
highest market to book ratio quartiles is statistically significant.  The results in
Panels C and D indicate that the market to book effect persists after controlling
for the cash flow effect.
Panels A and B of Table 7.10 also reveal that when market to book is controlled,
the lowest and highest cash flow quartiles do not exhibit a consistent positive or
negative CAR.  In contrast, in Panels C and D, when the cash flow is controlled,
the lowest market to book ratio quartile persistently exhibits negative CARs, and
the highest market to book ratio quartile persistently exhibits positive CARs.
In this section, it is shown that the market to book effect is indeed dominant, and
the effect remains even after controlling for the cash flow effect.  On the other
hand, cash flow effect is weak in the presence of market to book.
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Table 7.10: The value in each cell represents mean CARs for the [-5+5] day window.  In Panel A, the
CARs are sorted into quartiles based on M/B ratio, and within each quartile, the CARs are sorted into
quartile based on the cash flow to total assets (CF/TA) ratio.  In Panel B, the same process is repeated
for median CARs.  In Panel C, the CARs are sorted on CF/TA first, and then on M/B ratio.  The same
process is repeated for Panel D.  The mean (median) difference is for the mean (median) difference in
CARs between the lowest and highest cells.  The t-statistic is for the mean (median) CARs difference.
* and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Panel A: Cash flow effect after controlling for market to book
Market to book
0.105 - 0.871 0.872 - 1.091 1.101 - 1.675 1.675 - 4.574
Lowest -5.11% -1.06% -2.59% 6.65%
Low -5.37% -1.56% -0.93% 6.65%
High -3.49% -0.78% -0.22% 1.70%
Cash
flow
Highest -2.93% -1.89% -0.71% 5.81%
Mean difference -2.18% -2.95% -3.30% 0.84%
t-stat -1.10% -1.47% -0.93% 0.22%
Panel B: Cash flow effect after controlling for market to book
Market to book
0.105 - 0.871 0.872 - 1.091 1.101 - 1.675 1.675 - 4.574
Lowest -5.13% -0.01% -1.71% -4.02%
Low -4.49% -0.30% -0.55% -6.10%
High -4.19% -1.39% -0.14% -1.24%
Cash
flow
Highest -2.54% -2.22% -1.67% -4.59%
Median difference -2.59% -2.23% -3.38% -0.57%
t-stat -0.88% -1.57% -0.96% -0.53%
Panel C: Market to book effect after controlling for cash flow
Cash flow
-0.338 - 0.034 0.036 - 0.068 0.068 - 0.094 0.096 - 0.301
Lowest -4.41% -5.80% -2.10% -3.63%
Low -0.96% -0.62% -0.79% -0.88%
High -0.11% -1.95% -2.11% -3.25%
Market
to
book
Highest -3.14% -4.80% -2.52% -5.98%
Mean difference -7.55% -10.60% -4.62% -9.61%
t-stat -2.60** -2.15** -2.46** -3.45**
Panel D: Market to book effect after controlling for cash flow
Cash flow
-0.338 - 0.034 0.036 - 0.068 0.068 - 0.094 0.096 - 0.301
Lowest -4.25% -4.49% -2.43% -3.20%
Low -0.51% -0.41% -1.45% -1.31%
High -0.56% -2.25% -1.72% -2.75%
Market
to
book
Highest -4.02% -6.22% -3.67% -5.80%
Median difference -8.27% -10.71% -6.10% -9.00%
t-stat -2.23** -2.02** -1.98** -2.29**
Noted that the original analysis included two observations with negative market to book value, namely CTR 25/10/95 and CTR 3/6/96.  The negative
market to book values were due to negative net assets in both years.  The exclusion of these two observations does not affect the results, in fact, the
inclusion of the two observations strengthen the results since the CARs associated with the two outliers are -9.17% and -4.552% respectively.
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7.3 Free cash flow analysis
In both sections 7.1.3 and 7.2, it was found that the cash flow variable does not
explain the market response to physical asset expenditure announcements.  In
this section, the role of cash flow is examined further by investigating the
interaction between the cash flow and market to book effects.
Jensen (1986a) argues that when firms lack growth opportunities, and if firms
have excess cash flow, managers will make negative net present value
investments.  Based on this line of reasoning, it is argued that the agency costs of
discretionary cash flow are likely to be substantial when firms do not have
growth opportunities, and vice versa.  Hence, a negative abnormal return is
expected when firms do not have growth opportunities but have high cash flow.
Table 7.11 presents the permutations of cash flow and growth opportunities.103
Briefly, firms with low growth opportunities and high cash flow are expected to
suffer agency costs of free cash flow.  Firms in cell (A) match these criteria of
being free cash flow firms.  For these firms, negative abnormal returns around
physical asset expenditure announcements are expected.  On the other hand,
firms in cells (B), (C) and (D) are not expected to have free cash flow.  Firms in
cells (B) and (D) exhibit high growth prospects, hence positive abnormal returns
are expected.  For firms in cell (C), positive abnormal returns are not expected
for these firms since they do not have growth prospects.  For free cash flow
theory to hold, it is necessary to demonstrate that the difference in CARs
                                                          
103 The description of the free cash flow proxy is detailed in Chapter 5.
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between free cash flow firms [cell (A)] and firms in cells (B), (C), and (D), is
statistically significant.
Table 7.11: Free cash flow analysis.
Growth opportunities
Cash flow Low High
High (A) (B)
Low (C) (D)
Tables 7.12 and 7.13 provide the mean CARs for each of the four cells for the [-
1890,+1890] minute and the [-60,+60] minute windows.  Both Tables 7.12 and
7.13 indicate firms with the combination of high cash flow and low growth
opportunities [cell (A)] suffer statistically significant negative abnormal returns
of -2.00% and -0.61% over the [-1890,+1890] minute and the [-60,+60] minute
windows respectively.  Firms with low cash flow and high growth opportunities
[cell (D)] exhibit insignificant abnormal returns of 1.72% and 0.22% over the
respective windows.  The difference in mean CARs between cells (A) and (D) is
-3.72% (t-stat: -2.40) and -0.84% (t-stat: -3.05) for the [-1890,+1890] minute and
the [-60,+60] minute windows respectively.  Hence, the free cash flow theory is
supported.
Firms with high cash flow and high growth prospects [cell (B)], exhibit the
highest abnormal returns of 3.87% (t-stat: 3.07) and 0.60% (t-stat: 2.73), and
firms in cell (C) exhibit insignificant abnormal returns of 1.72% (t-stat: 1.63) and
0.22% (t-stat: 1.62), over the two windows.  The difference in mean CARs
between firms in cells (A) and (B), and between firms in cells (A) and (C), are -
5.87% (t-stat: -3.40) and -0.17% (t-stat: -0.08) for the [-1890,+1890] minute
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window.  The results in both Tables 7.12 and 7.13 seem to indicate that the role
of cash flow is twofold.  In a low growth environment, where the agency costs of
discretionary cash flow are likely to be significant, the equity market reacts
negatively to these firms [especially the high cash flow firms in cell (A)] when
making physical asset expenditure announcements.  This is consistent with the
free cash flow theory.  On the other hand, in a high growth environment, cash
flow prevents firms from underinvestment problems [Myers (1977)], and restricts
issues of underpriced equity [Myers and Majluf (1984)].  Hence significant
positive abnormal returns are evident for firms in cell (B), and insignificant
abnormal returns are observed for firms in cell (C).
Finally, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that the mean CARs for the
four cells are significantly different, confirming that the market reaction to
physical asset expenditure announcements are different, depending on firm
characteristics.
7.4 Summary
In this section the CARs for the full sample were examined.  It is found that the
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the full physical asset
expenditure sample are zero over several windows.
The three primary hypotheses were then examined.  The examination of the
growth opportunities hypothesis was conducted by dividing the sample into high
and low growth firms based on their market to book ratio.  It is found that
significant positive abnormal returns are associated with high growth firms, and
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significant negative returns are associated with low growth firms.  When the
sample was segregated into quartiles, the market to book effect is more
pronounced.  These results are consistent with the extant literature of Szewczyk,
Testeskos and Zantout (1996), Chen and Ho (1997), and Chung, Wright and
Charoenwong (1998).
Table 7.12: Free cash flow analysis over a [-1890,1890] minute window.  Values in
parentheses are t-statistic, standard deviation, and number of observations respectively.  *
and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Growth opportunities
Cash flow Low High
High
(A)
-2.002%*
(-1.72, 0.074, 40)
(B)
3.865%**
(3.07, 0.083, 43)
Low
(C)
-1.828%
(-1.14, 0.107, 45)
(D)
1.722%
(1.63, 0.066, 42)
2-way ANOVA test, F-stat = 6.162
Table 7.13: Free cash flow analysis over a [-60,+60] minute window.  Values in parentheses
are t-statistic, standard deviation, and number of observations respectively.  * and **
represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Growth opportunities
Cash flow Low High
High
(A)
-0.614%**
(-2.51, 0.015, 40)
(B)
0.602%**
(2.73, 0.014, 43)
Low
(C)
-0.085%
(-0.48, 0.012, 45)
(D)
0.224%
(1.62, 0.009, 42)
2-way ANOVA test, F-stat = 3.113
It is found that the cash flow variable does not explain the market response to
physical asset expenditure announcements.  However, note that the insignificant
results may be due to the mixed effect of the capital market monitoring and the
pecking order theories.
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Extended analysis showed that after controlling for market to book ratio, the cash
flow variable does not explain abnormal returns of physical asset expenditure
announcements, and when the cash flow variable is controlled for, the market to
book effect persists.
Finally, analysis was conducted on the free cash flow theory.  The results
indicate that firms with high cash flow and low growth are penalised by the
equity market when announcing physical asset expenditure, and hence the free
cash flow theory is supported.  In addition, firms with high cash flow that operate
in a high growth environment exhibit significant positive abnormal returns.
These results also support the underinvestment problems [Myers (1977)], and
pecking order hypothesis [Myers and Majluf (1984)].
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CHAPTER 8
INTRADAY RESULTS – MULTIVARIATE
8 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 7 provides univariate analysis for the 170 physical asset expenditure
announcements, using intraday data.  While it has been documented that market
to book, cash flow and free cash flow variables, have some influence on share
prices, it is important to look at how the market reacts when all these three
factors are jointly taken into account.  Furthermore, the confounding factors
which were discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2 are also taken into
account here as control variables.
8.1 Results
As discussed in the literature review and hypotheses chapters, the three main
factors that are most likely to influence the abnormal returns of physical asset
expenditure announcements are growth opportunities, capital market monitoring
and free cash flow.  However, as noted earlier in the in the literature review and
hypotheses chapters, there are also other factors which may influence the
abnormal returns at physical asset expenditure announcements.  These factors are
the size of the physical asset expenditure, firm leverage, managerial
shareholding, and managerial past performance.  The model was defined in
section 4.1.4.3 as:
176
SIZEFCFDCFMBCAR 4321 ββββα ++++=
LEVMSPASTPERF 765 β+β+β+ + ε
where,
MB : market to book ratio,
CF : cash flow ratio,
FCFD : free cash flow dummy, where 1 is free cash flow and 0 otherwise,
SIZE : size of the physical asset expenditure transaction,
PASTPERF : managerial past performance,
MS : managerial shareholding,
LEV : leverage ratio, and
ε : error terms.
The proxies for each of the variables were discussed earlier in Chapter 5.
Briefly, the market to book ratio is a proxy for growth opportunities, the cash
flow ratio is a proxy for capital market monitoring, and a firm is identified as a
free cash flow firm if its cash flow ratio is greater than the median cash flow ratio
for the sample and its market to book ratio is less than the median market to book
ratio for the sample.  The size of the physical asset expenditure transaction is
measured by the dollar value of the transaction normalised by total assets.
Managerial past performance is measured by the risk-adjusted cumulative
abnormal returns for the past three years prior to the physical asset expenditure
announcements.  Managerial shareholding is defined as the fraction of common
shares held by officers and directors of the board, not including options.
Leverage is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Two different
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windows are selected for the dependent window, CAR, namely, [-1890,+1890]
and [-60,+60] minute windows.
The regression results are provided in Table 8.1.  Several heteroskedasticity tests
are provided, namely, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (B-P-G), ARCH,104 Harvey, and
Glejser.105  Both unadjusted t-statistics and White-adjusted statistics [White’s
(1980) heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation to correct the
estimates for an unknown form of heteroskedasticity], are provided.
Ramsey’s (1969) RESET test is a regression specification error test.  The
rationale for the Ramsey RESET procedure is that omitted variable effects can be
approximated by linear combinations of powers of fitted values, tµˆ .  If those
power terms are significant, then the original model is taken to be misspecified.
Model 1 consists of only the three main variables, namely, market to book, cash
flow and free cash flow.  Model 2 consists of all variables identified in the
literature review section in Chapter 2.  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and
Stulz (1988) argue that the relationship between managerial shareholding and
firm value may not be linear.  Both Morck et al, and McConnell and Servaes
(1990) find a curvilinear relationship between managerial shareholding and firm
value.  The non-linearity relationship of managerial shareholding is incorporated
in Model 3, by adding a quadratic term, MS^2, to the regression equation.
Model 4 excludes managerial shareholding variable since it can be argued that to
                                                          
104 ARCH is also known as the autogressive conditional heteroskedasticity, is introduced by
Engle (1982).
105 The thesis presents the results of all the four heteroskedasticity tests, since the four tests do not
always provide consistent results regarding the significant presence of heteroskedasticity.
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the extent that higher managerial shareholding alleviates agency problems, this is
already reflected in market to book ratio [Bhabra, Bhabra and Boyle (1999)].
Model 5 excludes the leverage ratio since it is argued that debt forces managers
to make value-maximising investment decisions, though this may be already
reflected in the cash flow ratio.106
In all the five models in Table 8.1, the Ramsey RESET tests results do not reveal
misspecification problems.  In additional, with the exception of Glejser test, all
other tests do not show the presence of heteroskedasticity.  Glejser test results
show that when managerial shareholding is included in the model,
heteroskedasticity is significant.
In all five models, the market to book variable is the only statistically significant
factor which explains the market variation associated with physical asset
expenditure announcements, even after controlling for all potential explanatory
factors.  None of the cash flow, free cash flow variables, or the other identified
confounding variables is significant.
                                                          
106 For example, low cash flow firms which visit the capital market invariably are forced by the
capital market to make value-maximising decisions.
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Table 8.1: Regression results for 170 intraday sample between 31 July 1995 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-1890, +1890] minute window.
Regression analysis was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Free cash flow is defined as firms with high cash
flow and low market to book ratio.  A dummy of one is assigned to FCF, and zero otherwise.  3-year pre-
announcement risk-adjusted CARs are used as a proxy for managerial past performance.  Square brackets
represent t-statistic.  {} brackets represent the White adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a degree
freedom of 1 for all the five models.  The B-P-G, Harvey and Glejser tests have degrees freedom of 1,7,
8, 6, and 5 for the respective models.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant -0.022**
[-1.57][*
{-1.38}[*
0.012**
[0.51]**
{0.44}[*
0.006**
[0.23]**
{0.22}[*
-0.003**
[-0.12]**
{-0.12}[*
-0.018**
[-0.80]**
{-0.54}[*
FCF -0.014**
[-0.82]**
{-0.75}[*
-0.017**
[-1.00]**
{-0.95}[*
-0.018**
[-1.02]**
{-0.98}[*
-0.014**
[-0.82]**
{-0.81}[*
-0.016**
[-0.93]**
{-0.96}[*
LEV 0.005**
[0.80]**
{0.76}[*
0.004**
[0.61]**
{0.57}[*
0.005**
[0.74]**
{0.80}[*
MB 0.032**
[4.13]**
{3.09}[*
0.033**
[4.15]**
{3.34}[*
0.032**
[4.00]**
{3.13}[*
0.034**
[4.12]**
{3.28}[*
0.034**
[4.16]**
{3.17}[*
MS 0.001**
[0.52]**
{0.22}[*
-0.003**
[-0.47]**
{-0.49}[*
MS^2 0.000**
[-0.66]**
{-0.49}[*
CF 0.000**
[0.20]**
{0.24}[*
0.002**
[0.71]**
{0.82}[*
0.002**
[0.65]**
{0.86}[*
0.001**
[0.60]**
{0.72}[*
0.001**
[0.48]**
{0.59}[*
PASTPERF -0.003**
[-0.15]**
{-0.11}[*
-0.004**
[-0.19]**
{-0.17}[*
0.004**
[0.20]**
{0.16}[*
0.006**
[0.27]**
{0.22}[*
SIZE 0.001**
[1.10]**
{1.61}[*
0.000**
[1.06]**
{1.63}[*
0.000**
[1.05]**
{1.61}[*
0.000**
[1.01]**
{1.63}[*
R-sq 0.118** 0.149** 0.152** 0.140** 0.137**
Adj R-sq 0.102** 0.107** 0.103** 0.106** 0.109**
F-significant 0.000** 0.002** 0.003** 0.001** 0.000**
B-P-G test 2.012** 11.385** 14.369** 2.017** 2.181**
ARCH test 0.091** 1.857** 1.771** 1.316** 1.173**
Harvey test 2.128** 9.861** 13.452** 2.593** 1.712**
Glejser test 1.114** 16.852** 24.258** 2.737** 2.927**
Ramsey Reset **
Reset (2) 1.875** 0.067** 0.016** 0.062** 0.334**
Reset (3) 2.030** 1.119** 1.330** 1.778** 1.111**
Reset (4) 1.678** 1.328** 1.457** 1.577** 1.747**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09 respectively.
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01
 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01 
for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01
 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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The free cash flow variable shows a negative coefficient in all models, a sign
which is consistent with prediction but statistically insignificant.  In contrast, the
cash flow variable shows a positive sign, which is contrary to the hypothesis, but
again insignificant.  Both leverage and size are positively related to the CARs,
and are consistent with the hypotheses but statistically insignificant.  The
coefficient signs for both managerial shareholding and past performance are not
consistent but not significant in any of the models.
The coefficients of the model, and the t-statistic associated with each of the
variable appear to be stable, and do not vary in any significant manner as a result
of the inclusion and exclusion of the identified confounding variables.  The
adjusted R square lies between 10% and 11%, and all the models are statistically
significant.
Table 8.2 provides the results of the same regression models, except the
dependent variable is now of a shorter window, namely [-60,+60] minute
window.
The market to book ratio remains a significant explanatory variable as shown in
Table 8.2, though the size of the coefficients is smaller in all models.  In contrast
to Table 8.1 the cash flow also emerges as a significant variable, consistent with
the hypothesis that abnormal returns associated with physical asset expenditure
announcements are negatively related to a firm’s cash flow ratio.  Free cash flow
along with other confounding explanatory variables remain insignificant in all
models.
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The adjusted R square increases slightly in all models, and the overall
significance of the model remains at better than the 1% level.  While the Ramset
RESET tests do not show any evidence of model misspecification, Glejser tests
indicate that heteroskedasticity is significant in all the models, and the B-P-G
tests indicate that heteroskedasticity is problem for model 1.
While not reported here, the regressions were also conducted using cumulative
abnormal returns of [-120,+120] and [0,+360] minute windows.  For the [-
120,+120] minute window, the results are very similar to the results presented in
Table 8.2, ie, cash flow is significant and negatively related to CARs.  However,
when a wider window [0,+360] is used, the significance of the cash flow variable
disappears, although the negative sign remains.  Thus the finer windows appear
to identify both cash flow and market to book effects with results consistent with
theory and also consistent with the earlier analyses in Tables 7.12 and 7.13.
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Table 8.2: Regression results for 170 intraday sample between 31 July 1995 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-60, +60] minute window.  Regression
analysis was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Free cash flow is defined as firms with high cash flow and
low market to book ratio.  A dummy of one is assigned to FCF, and zero otherwise.  3-year pre-
announcement CARs are used as a proxy for managerial past performance.  Square brackets represent t-
statistic.  {} brackets represent the White adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a degree freedom of 1
for all the five models.  The B-P-G, Harvey and Glejser tests have degrees freedom of 1,7, 8, 6, and 5 for
the respective models.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant -0.180**
[-4.14]**
{-2.97}**
-0.008**
[-1.33]**
{-1.26}**
-0.008**
[-1.29]**
{-1.19}**
-0.011**
[-1.85]**
{-1.88}**
-0.015**
[-2.73]**
{-2.59}**
FCF -0.001**
[-0.33]**
{-0.36}**
-0.001**
[-0.36]**
{-0.28}**
-0.001**
[-0.35]**
{-0.29}**
-0.001**
[-0.25]**
{-0.37}**
-0.000**
[-0.03]**
{-0.18}**
LEV 0.002**
[1.22]**
{1.16}**
0.002**
[1.16]**
{1.10}**
0.003**
[1.58]**
{1.19}**
MB 0.009**
[4.84]**
{3.51}**
0.007**
[4.87]**
{3.85}**
0.007**
[4.82]**
{3.77}**
0.009**
[4.87]**
{3.77}**
0.009**
[4.89]**
{3.61}**
MS 0.000**
[1.20]**
{0.71}**
0.000**
[0.11]**
{0.10}**
MS^2 0.000**
[-0.16]**
{-0.14}**
CF -0.002**
[-2.76]**
{-1.92}**
-0.001**
[-2.36]**
{-1.77}**
-0.001**
[-2.36]**
{-1.83}**
-0.001**
[-2.35]**
{-1.77}**
-0.002**
[-2.59]**
{-1.93}**
PASTPERF -0.000**
[-0.11]**
{-0.09}**
-0.000**
[-0.13]**
{-0.10}**
-0.002**
[-0.41]**
{-0.38}**
-0.001**
[-0.27]**
{-0.31}**
SIZE 0.001**
[0.85]**
{0.77}**
0.001**
[0.86]**
{0.75}**
0.001**
[1.07]**
{0.95}**
0.001**
[0.85]**
{1.11}**
R-sq 0.150** 0.169** 0.169** 0.162** 0.149**
Adj R-sq 0.135** 0.127** 0.122** 0.130** 0.121**
F-significant 0.000** 0.000** 0.001** 0.000** 0.000**
B-P-G test 5.665** 13.241** 13.590** 6.427** 5.587**
ARCH test 0.189** 0.164** 0.156** 0.193** 0.169**
Harvey test 9.853** 9.854** 9.892** 7.804** 7.787**
Glejser test 19.148** 26.346** 26.342** 19.692** 17.017**
Ramsey Reset
Reset (2) 1.295** 0.237** 0.279** 0.039** 0.441**
Reset (3) 2.406** 0.151** 0.152** 1.019** 1.846**
Reset (4) 1.619** 0.455** 0.556** 0.733** 1.251**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09 respectively.
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01
 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01 
for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01
 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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8.2 Control portfolio method, and finer free cash flow dummies
In Chapter 8, the free cash flow dummy is constructed by satisfying two
conditions, namely high cash flow and low market to book ratio, where high and
low is relative to the sample median.  The univariate analyses in Chapter 7 show
that both cash flow and market to book effects are accentuated when the sample
is partitioned into quartiles.  In order to fully capture both market to book and
cash flow effects, the following regression, using a finer partition, is conducted:
)CFDMBD(CFDCFDMBDMBDCAR HL5L4H3L2H1 ×β+β+β+β+β+α=
LEVMSPASTPERFSIZE 9876 β+β+β+β+  + ε
where,
MBDH   : MB dummy variable taking the value 1 for the highest
    MB quartile, and 0 otherwise,
MBDL   : MB dummy variable taking the value 1 for the lowest
    MB quartile, and 0 otherwise,
CFDH   : CF dummy variable taking the value 1 for the highest
    CF quartile, and 0 otherwise,
CFDL   : CF dummy variable taking the value 1 for the lowest
    CF quartile, and 0 otherwise,
HL CFDMBD ×  : interactive term, where 1 is free cash flow, and 0 otherwise,
SIZE   : size of the physical asset expenditure transaction,
PASTPERF   : managerial past performance,
MS   : managerial shareholding,
LEV   : leverage ratio, and
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ε   : error terms.
Consistent with the results presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, the results in Table
8.3 show that positive abnormal returns are associated with firms with high
market to book ratios, and negative abnormal returns are associated with firms
with low market to book ratios.  Previous regression analysis, especially the [-
60,+60] and [-120,+120] minute windows, shows that cash flow is negatively
related to abnormal returns whereas, free cash flow does not explain the
abnormal returns.  However, the regression results reported here in Table 8.3
provide a contrary result with respect to the free cash flow theory and the capital
market monitoring argument.  In particular, the results show that neither high nor
low cash flow is related to abnormal returns, whereas, free cash flow is
negatively related to abnormal returns, consistent with the prediction of free cash
flow theory advocated by Jensen (1986a).  It appears that a finer partition of
market to book and cash flow ratios captures a free cash flow effect.
Consistent with the results reported earlier, all other control variables are not
significant once market to book, cash flow and free cash flow variables are taken
into account.
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Table 8.3: Regression results for 170 intraday sample between 31 July 1995 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-60, +60] minute window.  Regression
analysis was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Square brackets represent t-statistic.  {} brackets represent the
White adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a degree freedom of 1 for all the five models.  The B-P-G,
Harvey and Glejser tests have degrees freedom of 1,7, 8, 6, and 5 for the respective models.  * and **
represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant -0.001**
[-0.09]**
{-0.14}**
0.006**
[0.27]**
{0.35}**
0.007**
[0.33]**
{0.43}**
0.003**
[0.16]**
{0.20}**
0.009**
[0.55]**
{0.77}**
MBDH 0.042**
[3.18]**
{3.72}**
0.044**
[3.30]**
{3.92}**
0.043**
[3.29]**
{3.92}**
0.043**
[3.24]**
{3.80}**
0.043**
[3.23]**
{3.81}**
MBDL -0.038**
[-2.22]**
{-2.09}**
-0.040**
[-2.14]**
{-2.17}**
-0.041**
[-2.18]**
{-2.24}**
-0.040**
[-2.16]**
{-2.10}**
-0.038**
[-2.16]**
{-2.00}**
CFDH 0.016**
[1.01]**
{0.97}**
0.015**
[0.89]**
{0.89}**
0.013**
[0.76]**
{0.78}**
0.014**
[0.86]**
{0.88}**
0.013**
[0.80]**
{0.79}**
CFDL 0.006**
[0.37]**
{0.47}**
0.003**
[0.21]**
{0.26}**
0.002**
[0.14]**
{0.16}**
0.004**
[0.22]**
{0.26}**
0.002**
[0.14]**
{0.18}**
MBDL x CFDH -0.040**
[-1.98]**
{-2.52}**
-0.043**
[-2.09]**
{-2.65}**
-0.042**
[-2.04]**
{-2.60}**
-0.042**
[-2.03]**
{-2.54}**
-0.041**
[-2.01]**
{-2.60}**
LEV -0.003**
[-0.41]**
{-0.46}**
-0.005**
[-0.64]**
{-0.70}**
-0.003**
[-0.37]**
{-0.43}**
MS 0.000**
[1.25]**
{0.71}**
0.000**
[0.71]**
{0.99}**
MS^2 -0.000**
[-0.71]**
{-0.98}**
PASTPERF -0.000**
[-1.18]**
{-0.84}**
-0.000**
[-1.21]**
{-0.86}**
-0.000**
[-0.57]**
{-0.60}**
-0.000**
[-0.55]**
{-0.57}**
SIZE 0.003**
[0.80]**
{1.10}**
0.002**
[0.57] **
{0.85}**
0.002**
[0.74]**
{1.02}**
0.003**
[0.91]**
{1.17}**
R-sq 0.149** 0.166** 0.169** 0.158** 0.157**
Adj R-sq 0.123** 0.119** 0.116** 0.116** 0.121**
F-significant 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
B-P-G test 3.135** 13.424** 14.900** 3.697** 3.505**
ARCH test 1.491** 2.261** 2.135** 1.670** 1.719**
Harvey test 7.866** 14.436** 14.159** 6.973** 6.406**
Glejser test 9.664** 26.154** 29.778** 11.313** 10.838**
Ramsey Reset
Reset (2) 2.619** 0.004** 0.047** 1.114** 0.937**
Reset (3) 1.301** 0.107** 0.094** 0.641** 0.550**
Reset (4) 0.890** 0.489** 0.731** 0.588** 0.554**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09 respectively.
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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8.3 Summary
The results of the multivariate analysis can be summarised as follows.  The
market to book ratio is the most important variable in explaining abnormal
returns in all windows, and remains significant after taking into account cash
flow, free cash flow, and other confounding factors.
The results for the cash flow variable are mixed, and sensitive to the span of the
event window.  The cash flow variable is significantly negatively related to the
CARs in shorter windows, namely, [-60,+60] and [-120,+120], but insignificant
in the larger window, [0,+360].  The positive coefficient for the cash flow
variable observed for the [-1890,+1890] minute window is inconsistent with the
hypothesised direction, though it is not statistically significant.  Hence, the
evidence for the capital market monitoring argument is mixed.  When further
analysis is conducted using a finer classification of market to book ratio and cash
flow ratio, there is no support for the capital market monitoring hypothesis.
The free cash flow variable is negatively related to the CARs but insignificant.
However, when the analysis is conducted using a finer free cash flow dummy,
the free cash flow theory is supported.
All other control variables include managerial shareholding, leverage, size of the
physical asset expenditure transactions, and managerial past performance are not
significant.  Bhabra, Bhabra and Boyle (1999) argue that to the extent that higher
managerial shareholdings does in fact mitigate agency problems, this should be
reflected in the market to book ratio.  Hence, the lack of significance for
187
managerial shareholding could be due to the fact that for market to book ratio
also proxies for managerial shareholding.  Similarly, the cash flow variable may
also proxy for leverage.  Contrary to the existing literature related to mergers and
takeovers, size does not appear to be significant.  This is consistent with the
argument that when a firm makes a physical asset expenditure announcement it
signals to the market the availability of growth opportunities.  A value-enhancing
growth option is identified.  In regard to past performance, the sign of the
coefficient is sensitive to the specification of the models and event window.
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CHAPTER 9
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - INTRADAY SAMPLES
9 INTRODUCTION
Recall that in Chapters 7 and 8, the control portfolio approach was used to
conduct univariate and multivariate analysis respectively.  In this chapter,
sensitivity analysis is conducted for both univariate and multivariate analysis,
using different intraday return measures to ensure that the results reported in
Chapters 7 and 8 are robust with respect to different abnormal returns methods.
This chapter repeats much of the analysis in Chapters 7 and 8.  When there is no
significant difference between the results in this chapter and those in Chapters 7
and 8, the results are reported in Appendix I, to avoid unnecessary repetition.
9.1 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
In this section, the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return effects for
the full sample, firms segregated by market to book ratio, and cash flow ratio are
re-examined using the alternative abnormal returns measure specified in equation
4.8 as follows:
ARit = Rit - Rmt
189
9.1.1 Full sample
Figure 9.1A [Appendix I] presents the CARs for the 170 physical asset
expenditure announcements using the alternate abnormal return measure.
Generally, the positive market reaction around the physical asset expenditure
announcements does not appear to be significant.  The lack of market response
over the [-360,+360] minute window is confirmed in Table 9.1A which shows
that both ARs and CARs are insignificant, with the exception of minute -195th.
Table 9.2A further confirms the insignificant market reaction.  All windows
except the [-2,+2] day window exhibit insignificant abnormal returns.  The
results here are generally consistent with the results presented in Chapter 7 using
the control portfolio method.
9.1.2 Market to book effect
The market to book effect is examined in this section.  The sample is divided into
high (market to book ratio greater than median) market to book ratio and low
(market to book ratio lower than median) market to book ratio firms as before.
The behaviour of CARs in Figure 9.2A for both high and low market to book
ratio firms resembles those presented in Chapter 7, viz, a significant positive
CAR of around 3.5% is observed for the high market to book ratio firms, and a
significant negative CAR of -2% is observed for the low market to book ratio
firms over the [-1890,+1890] minute window.  The CARs of the quartiles in
Figure 9.3A behave consistently with those presented in Chapter 7.  Both Figures
9.2A and 9.3A confirm that significant positive CARs are associated with high
growth firms, and significant negative CARs are associated with low growth
firms.  When the partition of sample is made even finer, the difference in CARs
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between the highest market to book ratio firms and the lowest market to book
ratio firms is accentuated.  Hence, the choice of adjusted returns method has little
impact on the results.
Tables 9.3A - 9.6A present the mean ARs and mean CARs for the market to
book quartiles, and their respective t-statistics.  The results set out in Tables 9.3A
- 9.6A confirm the previous findings in Chapter 7.  That is, positive abnormal
returns are associated with high market to book ratio firms, and negative
abnormal returns are associated with low market to book ratio firms.  The market
to book effect is even more pronounced when the sample is segregated into finer
partitions.  Again, the results are robust with respect to different methods of
calculating abnormal returns.
9.1.3 Capital market monitoring
In this section, the cash flow effect is re-examined using the alternate method of
calculating abnormal returns (as per equation [4.10]).  Consistent with the results
in Chapter 7, the CARs in Figure 9.4A do not exhibit a clear and systematic
pattern after the sample is divided into cash flow ratio quartiles.
The results in Table 9.7A resemble the results in Chapter 7, viz, neither the
lowest nor the highest cash flow ratio quartiles exhibits consistent positive or
negative ARs over the [-360,+360] minute window, and the CARs are not
significant for either group.  The difference in mean ARs between the two
samples is not significant.  Thus the choice of abnormal return model, again, has
little impact on the results.
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9.2 Randomisation approach
The results with respect to randomising the market to book effect and the cash
flow effect are set out in Table 9.8A.  The results are consistent with Chapter 7.
That is to say, the effect of market to book is dominant despite it is controlled for
the cash flow effect, whereas, the cash flow effect disappears once it is controlled
for the market to book effect.
This section corroborates the support for the market to book effect documented
earlier, and little support for the cash flow effect.  Again, the expected return
estimation approach has little impact on the analysis.
9.3 Free cash flow analysis
Tables 9.9A and 9.10A present the results for each of the four cash flow-market
to book combination samples.  Firms with the highest possibility of being free
cash flow firms, cell (A), exhibit CARs that are significantly negative.  Firms
with high growth opportunities, cells (B) and (D), exhibit significant positive
CARs irrespective of the level of cash flow.  Finally in cell (C), firms with low
cash flow and low growth opportunities experience an insignificant market
response.  The results in Table 9.9A are generally consistent with the free cash
flow theory, since the only significantly negative CARs documented are free
cash flow firms in cell (A).  Furthermore, consistent with the results reported in
Chapter 7, and consistent with the free cash flow theory, the difference in CARs
between the free cash flow sample [cell (A)] and high growth firms in cells (B)
and (D) are statistically significant for both [-1890,+1890] and [-60,+60] minute
windows.  The CARs difference between firms in cells (A) and (B), and (A) and
192
(D) for the [-1890,+1890] minute window are -5.60% (t-stat: -3.19) and -5.39%
(t-stat:-3.32) respectively; and for the [-60,+60] minute window, the CARs
difference are -1.02% (t-stat:-3.32) and -1.33% (t-stat: 3.34) respectively.
It should be noted that the results reported in Table 9.10A using a narrower
window are somewhat different from Table 9.9A and the results in Chapter 7.
The results in Table 9.10A appear to support the growth hypothesis more than
the free cash flow hypothesis since firms with low growth exhibit a significant
negative response, and firms with high growth exhibit a significant positive
response.  That is to say, irrespective of cash flow, the equity market penalises
firms with low growth and rewards firms with high growth at the announcement
of physical asset expenditures.  Thus, the expected return estimation method
appears to have some impact in the analysis, though the importance of growth is
consistent throughout.
9.4 Multivariate analysis
9.4.1 Market model
In this section, the regression analysis conducted in Chapter 8 is re-run using the
(0,1) market model specified in equation [4.10] in Chapter 4.  The regression
model is restated below as:
LEVMSPASTPERFSIZEFCFDCFMBCAR 7654321 βββββββα ++++++= +
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The results are provided in Tables 9.11A and 9.12A, using the [-1890,+1890] and
[-60,+60] minute windows respectively.
The results in both Tables 9.11A and 9.12A are similar to Tables 8.1 and 8.2 in
Chapter 8.  In brief, market to book ratio is significantly positively related with
abnormal returns around physical asset expenditure announcements in both [-
1890,+1890] and [-60,+60] minute windows.  Cash flow is found to be
negatively related to abnormal returns only for the [-60,+60] minute window.
Free cash flow is not significant in either window.  Other explanatory variables
are also not be statistically significant, consistent with earlier results in Chapter
8.
9.5 Summary
This chapter seeks to investigate whether the univariate and multivariate results
of Chapters 7 and 8 are robust with respect to different methods of calculation of
abnormal returns.
Consistent with the univariate results reported in Chapter 7, this chapter provides
evidence that the market reactions to physical asset expenditure announcements
are related to the market to book ratio, but not to cash flow ratio.  The findings
for the free cash flow theory are somewhat mixed, but generally there is some
supportive evidence that the equity market reacts negatively to high cash flow
firms operating in a low growth environment.
Again, consistent with the multivariate results reported in Chapter 8, the results
in this chapter reveal that the dominance of the market to book effect is
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unaffected by different abnormal return calculation methodologies, and different
event windows.  Importantly, the market to book effect is not impacted by other
control variables, including cash flow and free cash flow variables.  The results
with respect to the capital market monitoring argument are somewhat mixed with
changes in the length of event window.  However, no support is found for the
free cash flow theory.
In summary, this chapter presents evidence that the key results reported in
Chapters 7 and 8 are robust.
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CHAPTER 10
ANALYSIS USING DAILY SAMPLING
10 INTRODUCTION
Chapters 7 and 8 presented the results of analysis centred on intraday data.
Chapter 9 presented the sensitivity analysis using intraday data.  The sensitivity
results show that the intraday results documented in chapters 7 and 8 are robust
with respect to different measures of abnormal returns.  In this chapter, further
analysis is conducted using a different sampling interval, daily data.
As a precursor to presenting the daily results, section 10.1 discusses the rationale
of using different sampling intervals.  Descriptive statistics for the daily sample
are contained in section 10.2.  Sections 10.3 and 10.4 present the univariate and
multivariate results respectively.
10.1 Rationale for using daily data
The majority of capital expenditure research that examines market valuation
effects uses daily data.107  Generally, monthly data are preferred over daily data
when researchers are not confident whether the event period precisely captures
the market valuation effects.  This is especially the case for mergers and
takeovers where there may be information leakage prior to the actual
                                                          
107 See for instance, McConnell and Muscarella (1985), Woolridge (1988), Chan, Martin, and
Kensinger (1990), Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996), Vogt (1997), Chen and Ho (1997),
and Chung, Wright and Charoenwong (1998).
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announcement date.108  As explained in Chapter 2, the case of information
leakage is less likely with physical asset expenditure announcements and so daily
data should provide a useful check on the intraday analysis conducted so
far.109,110
There are four reasons for using daily data.  First, the use of daily data presents
an opportunity to check the sensitivity of the results to return interval choice.
Second, as noted earlier in Chapter 4, the intraday analysis is not risk adjusted.
The daily analysis uses a risk-adjusted abnormal return method which allows us
to confirm that the intraday day results are not sensitive abnormal return
measures.  Third, daily analysis allows a consistent comparison of results with
existing studies.  Finally, daily data permits the examination of post
announcement drift.  This analysis ensures that the positive (negative) abnormal
returns documented around the announcements of physical asset expenditures are
not due to the equity market over-reacting (under-reacting) to high (low) market
to book effects.
                                                          
108 See for instance Aitken and Czernkowski (1992), Eyssell and Arshadi (1993), Holland and
Hodgkinson (1994), and Murray (1994).  Generally, a large part of target cumulative abnormal
returns well documented three to four months before the actual announcement.
109 It is interesting to note that both daily data and monthly data are commonly used in the US to
examine the market valuations associated with mergers and takeovers.  For instance, in the US,
Mandelker (1974), Dodd and Ruback (1977), and Malatesta (1983) use monthly data to
investigate the announcement effects concerning mergers and takeovers.  In contrast, Langetieg
(1978), Dodd (1980, 1983), Asquith (1983), Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983), Eckbo (1983),
Eger (1983), Dennis and McConnell (1986), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Jarrell, Brickley
and Netter (1988), and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) use daily data.  The trend in Australia seems to
indicate that monthly data are more commonly used, for instance, Dodd (1976), Walter (1984)
Casey, Dodd and Dolan (1986), Bishop, Dodd and Officer (1987), and Brown and de Silva Rosa
(1997), all use monthly data to examine the announcement effects associated with takeovers in
Australia.
110 The problems associated with daily data have been noted in Chapter 4.  Briefly, the major
problems include thin trading and non-synchronous trading, and daily seasonality in returns.
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10.2 Descriptive statistics
Before presenting the results associated with physical asset expenditure
announcements, this section provides the descriptive statistics of the daily
sample.
10.2.1 Firm characteristics
Recall from Chapter 5 that the daily sample consists of 578 observations from
the period 1 July 1989 to 31 December 1997.  Table 10.1 provides descriptive
statistics with respect to firm size, leverage ratio, earnings, market to book ratio,
cash flow ratio, and managerial shareholding ratio for the sample firms.  Recall
also that in Chapter 5, the 578 observations for the daily sample also include the
220 announcements in the intraday sample.  Hence, some similarities are
expected to exist between Tables 6.1 and 10.1.
The mean market to book ratio for the sample is 1.195, close to unity.  The
frequency distribution of market to book ratio is presented in Figure 10.1.  The
two observations with negative market to book ratio have been already noted in
the intraday sample reported in Chapter 6.
Panel D of Table 10.1 shows that high market to book ratio firms are of
significantly greater size (both in terms of book value of total assets and net
assets, and market value), have higher earnings, higher cash flow ratio, and
exhibit more diluted managerial shareholding, than the low market to book ratio
firms.  As opposed to Table 6.1 which shows that the only differences between
the high and low market to book ratio firms are net assets and market
198
capitalisation, Table 10.1 reveals that the high market to book ratio firms also
exhibit higher earnings and higher cash flow than the low market book ratio
firms.
Table 10.1: Descriptive statistics summary for the full daily sample, and for samples segregated by high
and low market to book ratio.  Univariate comparison of mean measures of firm characteristics for the
period between January 1989 and December 1997.  Characteristics examined are total assets (TA), total
liabilities (TB), leverage ratio (TL/TA), net assets (NA), market capitalisation (MC), earnings before tax
(EBT), earnings after tax (EAT), market to book ratio (M/B), cash flow to total asset ratio (CF/TA), and
managerial shareholding (MS). * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
TA
$’m
TL
$’m
TL/TA NA
$’m
MC
$’m
EBT/TA M/B CF/TA MS
Panel A: Full sample
N 578 578 578 578 578 578 578 578 578
Mean 3,862 2,283 0.420 1,578 2,602 0.224 1.195 0.076 0.105
Median 566 181 0.458 369 412 0.036 1.230 0.069 0.002
Max 148,123 136,245 3.275 15,746 34,568 2.879 4.574 1.060 0.879
Min 0.875 0.000 0.009 -0.032 0.916 -0.949 -3.546 -0.328 0.000
Stdev 11,592 9,767 0.258 2,913 6,099 0.494 0.811 0.110 0.195
Panel B: Low market to book ratio (market to book ratio less than median)
N 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289
Mean 2,535 1,515 0.376 1,020 845 -2.925 0.826 0.063 0.512
Median 344 78 398 238 196 -2.755 0.914 0.064 0.163
Max 109,285 99,164 3.275 10,370 11,407 -1.462 1.249 0.351 7.752
Min 1.871 63 0.009 -0.032 0.916 -6.647 -3.546 -0.297 0.062
Stdev 9,255 8,173 0.325 1,701 1,420 0.766 0.457 0.077 0.835
Panel C: High market to book ratio (market to book ratio greater than median)
N 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289
Mean 5,188 3,051 0.465 2,136 4,359 -2.576 1.957 0.089 0.413
Median 1,555 795 0.483 726 1,136 -2.522 1.713 0.080 0.158
Max 148,123 136,245 0.973 15,746 34,567 -0.968 5.303 1.060 5.841
Min 0.875 0.143 0.026 0.732 0.128 -4.794 1.256 -0.328 0.062
Stdev 13,417 11,095 0.154 3,671 8,143 0.534 0.684 0.134 0.703
Panel D: Mean difference between low and high market to book ratio firms
Difference -2,653 -1,536 -0.089 -1,116 -3,515 -0.349 -1.131 -0.026 0.099
t-stat -2.77*** -1.90*** -4.21*** -4.69*** -7.23*** -6.36*** -9.36*** -2.85*** 1.54***
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Figure 10.1: Frequency distribution of market to book ratio.
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10.2.2 Size and range of physical asset expenditure
The daily data set is similar in terms of the range of the physical asset
expenditures documented in the intraday data, ie, between $2.55 million and $1.5
billion, as reported in Table 10.2.  The mean and median size of the transactions
are $85.812 million and $77.875 million respectively.  These figures are larger
than the mean and median values of $58.8 million and $33.65 million
respectively for the intraday data set.
Table 10.2: Summary statistics of physical asset expenditure.
Size of expenditure
$’000
N 578
Mean 85,812
Median 77,875
Min 2,550
Max 1,500,000
Stdev 125,101
Table 10.3 shows that 79% of the physical asset expenditure transactions are
below $100 million, 14% fall between $100 million and $250 million range, and
only forty transactions (7%) are valued at more than $250 million.
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Table 10.3: Physical asset expenditure range.
Range ($’000) Number of observations Percentage Cumulative Percentage
2,550 - 10,000 93 16% 16%
10,001 - 20,000 82 14% 30%
20,001 - 30,000 63 11% 41%
30,001 - 40,000 55 10% 51%
40,001 - 50,000 48 8% 59%
50,001 - 60,000 36 6% 65%
60,001 - 70,000 25 4% 70%
70,001 - 80,000 16 3% 72%
80,001 - 90,000 14 2% 75%
90,001 - 100,000 22 4% 79%
100,001 - 250,000 82 14% 93%
250,001 - 500,000 26 4% 97%
500,001 - 750,000 12 2% 99%
750,001 - 1,000,000 2 0% 100%
> 1,000,000 2 0% 100%
10.2.3 Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements
10.2.3.1 Frequency distribution by industry
Table 10.4 indicates that the physical asset expenditure transactions are clustered
in certain industries.  Five of the twenty-one industries (namely diversified
resources, developers & contractors, food & household, retail, and property trust)
comprise 43% of the physical asset expenditure transactions.
201
Table 10.4: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by industry
ASIC Code Industry Number of Announcements Percentage
012 Mining 7 1%
021-024 Other metals 11 2%
031-033 Diversified resources 39 7%
041 Oil and gas 20 3%
061-065 Developers and contractors 55 10%
071-074 Building materials 37 6%
081-082 Alcohol and tobacco 35 6%
091-094 Food and household 52 9%
101-103 Chemicals 13 2%
111-115 Engineering 24 4%
121-126 Paper and packaging 29 5%
131-134 Retail 52 9%
142-144 Transport 24 4%
152-154 Media 9 2%
161 Banks and finance 7 1%
192-195 Investment and financial services 18 3%
201-202 Property trust 45 8%
213-219 Miscellaneous services 29 5%
221-228 Miscellaneous industrials 17 3%
231 Diversified industrial 26 4%
242-243 Tourism and leisure 29 5%
10.2.3.2 Frequency distribution by day of the week
Table 10.5 presents the frequency distribution by day of the week for the daily
sample.  There is a slight variation between the distribution for daily data and the
intraday data with respect to day of the week.  In particular, the day of the week
distribution appears to be more evenly distributed than the intraday data.
Table 10.5: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by day of the week
Frequency distribution by week
Day of the Week Number of announcements Percentage
Monday 127 22%
Tuesday 118 20%
Wednesday 106 18%
Thursday 113 20%
Friday 114 20%
10.2.3.3 Frequency distribution by month
Table 10.6 shows the frequency distribution by month, and suggests some
seasonality patterns.  In particular, only 3% of the sample announcements were
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made in January.  The highest frequency of transactions occurs in September,
October and December.
Table 10.6: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by month.
Frequency distribution by month
Month of the Year Number of announcements Percentage
January 19 3%
February 46 8%
March 38 7%
April 43 7%
May 40 7%
June 48 8%
July 49 8%
August 50 9%
September 60 10%
October 61 11%
November 53 9%
December 71 12%
10.2.3.4 Frequency distribution by year
Table 10.7 shows that more than 50% of the sample physical asset expenditure
announcements occurred in 1995, 1996 and 1997, while only 6% occurred
between 1989 and 1991.  The difference is due to the fact that between July 1995
and December 1997, the data set was supplied by SIRCA, and it includes all
acquisitions-related announcements.  In contrast, the sample period between
1989 and 1997 was collected from a random sample of 300 listed companies
using the ASX Datadisc.111  The ASX Datadisc’s database is incomplete with
respect to 1989 because for the majority of the companies the information is only
available in the second half of 1989.  In addition, the economic recession over
the period 1990-1991 may partially explain the small number of physical asset
expenditure announcements over this period.
                                                          
111 See Chapter 5 for details of data selection and description.
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Table 10.7: Frequency distribution of physical asset expenditure announcements by year
Frequency distribution by year
Year Number of announcements Percentage
1989 13 2%
1990 13 2%
1991 13 2%
1992 33 6%
1993 48 8%
1994 47 8%
1995 102 18%
1996 149 26%
1997 160 28%
10.2.3.5 Summary
In this chapter, summary statistics for the daily data is provided.  Firms with a
market to book ratio greater than the sample median are generally larger in size,
have higher earnings, and higher cash flows, and exhibit a slightly more diluted
managerial shareholding, although the difference between the high and low
market to book ratio groups is insignificant.
The average size of a physical asset expenditure is less than $100 million, with
the majority of the transactions below $100 million.  Physical asset expenditures
generally occur in diversified resources, developers and contractors, food and
household, retail, and property trust.
10.3 Results
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 respectively present the univariate, multivariate and
sensitivity analysis results of the tests of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3
using the intraday data sample.  Results for the daily sample are now presented.
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10.3.1 Univariate analysis
Univariate results, similar to those presented in Chapter 7, are discussed in this
section.
Section 10.3.1.1 analyses the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns
associated with the 578 physical asset expenditure announcements over the
period July 1989 and December 1997.  Section 10.3.1.2 examines the market to
book effect, section 10.3.1.3 investigates the post-announcement CARs for firms
split into market to book ratio quartiles.  The cash flow effect is examined in
section 10.3.1.4, and section 10.3.1.5 investigates the Foster, Olsen and Shevlin
(1984) approach.  The results for the randomisation effect between market to
book effect and cash flow effect are contained in section 10.3.1.6, and free cash
flow analysis is set out in section 10.3.1.7.
The daily analysis from sections 10.3.1.1 to 10.3.2 closely resembles the analysis
conducted in Chapters 7 and 8, hence the results are generally presented in this
chapter only if the daily results bear some significant difference from the
intraday results or for discussion purpose.  Otherwise, the daily results are
contained in Appendix II.
10.3.1.1 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for all
firms
Recall from Chapter 4 that the method used to calculate expected returns for
daily sample is based on the market model as follows: Rit = αi + βi Rmt + eit (see
section 4.3.1.1 for details).  Abnormal returns are the difference between
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expected returns and actual returns.  CARs are calculated using the FFJR69
approach.  The mean CARs for the 578 physical asset expenditure
announcements over the [-20,+20] day window are presented in Figure 10.2.
The mean CAR for the entire window is relatively flat, in particular, the pre-
announcement and post-announcement periods.  Table 10.8 reveals that there is a
significant positive abnormal return of 0.271% on the announcement date.  Table
10.8 also shows that other than the significant positive market response on the
announcement date, there are also a few significant ARs sporadically on days -
19, -9, +5 and +7.  The twenty-day post-announcement drift is insignificant.  The
daily results are slightly inconsistent with the intraday results, given the
significant positive AR observed on the announcement day for the daily sample.
Figure 10.2: Mean CARs for the full sample over a [-20,+20] day window.
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Table 10.8: Mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the full sample (N=578).
The column, AR > 0 (%), is the percentage of positive abnormal returns, and it is tested for
statistical difference from 50% using a non-parametric binomial test.  * and ** represent the 5% and
1% levels of significance.
Day AR (%) t-stat AR>0 (%) CAR (%) t-stat
-20 -0.016 -0.19** 48.4 -0.016 -0.19
-19 0.108 1.72** 46.2 0.093 1.00
-18 0.025 0.40** 44.6 0.118 1.07
-17 -0.057 -0.79** 46.9 0.061 0.48
-16 -0.057 -0.85** 45.3 0.004 0.03
-15 0.006 0.09** 44.4 0.010 0.07
-14 -0.028 -0.42** 45.1 -0.018 -0.11
-13 0.058 0.79** 45.5 0.040 0.23
-12 -0.054 -0.70** 42.7 -0.014 -0.08
-11 0.000 0.00** 45.5 -0.013 -0.07
-10 0.012 0.19** 46.0 -0.001 -0.01
-9 -0.145 -2.03** 46.9 -0.146 -0.70
-8 -0.097 -1.32** 42.9 -0.243 -1.09
-7 0.000 -0.00** 44.8 -0.243 -1.06
-6 0.028 0.39** 43.7 -0.215 -0.91
-5 0.035 0.53** 45.1 -0.181 -0.73
-4 0.054 0.78** 48.2 -0.127 -0.51
-3 0.047 0.63** 45.8 -0.080 -0.32
-2 -0.038 -0.52** 46.0 -0.118 -0.49
-1 0.046 0.65** 52.0 -0.072 -0.27
0 0.271 3.08** 57.9 0.199 0.70
1 0.061 0.68** 49.4 0.260 0.88
2 -0.007 -0.06** 48.9 0.253 0.80
3 0.081 1.16** 47.5 0.334 1.04
4 -0.009 -0.14** 42.9 0.325 1.00
5 0.139 1.81** 45.1 0.463 1.42
6 0.055 0.83** 43.7 0.519 1.56
7 -0.122 -1.71** 40.1 0.397 1.17
8 0.008 0.10** 45.8 0.404 1.15
9 0.006 0.08** 43.2 0.410 1.14
10 0.010 0.11** 42.4 0.420 1.14
11 0.018 0.24** 44.6 0.438 1.14
12 0.081 1.03** 46.5 0.518 1.32
13 -0.036 -0.53** 46.2 0.483 1.22
14 -0.023 -0.41** 43.7 0.459 1.17
15 0.027 0.41** 45.3 0.486 1.23
16 0.027 0.42** 45.5 0.513 1.30
17 -0.066 -0.93** 43.9 0.447 1.11
18 0.117 1.61** 45.1 0.564 1.39
19 -0.014 -0.20** 43.9 0.550 1.35
20 0.059 0.74** 44.6 0.608 1.49
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Table 10.9: Summary of CARs for the full sample.  ** represents the 1% levels of significance.
Daily windows
Windows [-20,+20] [-5,+5] [-5,+1] [-1,0]
Mean CAR (%) 0.608 0.475 0.679 0.317
Std 0.098 0.048 0.059 0.028
t-statistic 1.488 2.37**7 2.77**7 2.69**9
Table 10.9 summarises the CAR and t-statistics for selected daily windows.  The
results show that firms that announce physical asset expenditure experience a
significant positive CAR of 0.475%, 0.679% and 0.317% over the [-5,+5], [-
5,+1] and [-1,0] day windows.  However, the CAR for the [-20,+20] day window
is insignificant.  Compare these daily results with the intraday results in Table
7.2, the size of the mean CARs over the same window, viz, [-5,+5] day window,
are rather similar, except that the mean CARs are significant for daily sample and
insignificant for the intraday sample.  In summary, the daily results are somewhat
inconsistent with the intraday results presented in Table 7.2 which reports
insignificant abnormal returns across all windows.
Given that both the intraday and daily samples are identical over the period 1995
and 1997, the difference in CARs (between the intraday and daily results) must
be attributable to announcements over the period 1989 and 1994.  The
descriptive statistics in Tables 10.1 (for daily sample over the period between
January 1989 and December 1997) and 6.1 (for intraday sample over the period
between July 1995 and December 1997) reveal that the median market to book
ratio is higher for the daily sample than the intraday sample.  This suggests that
the firms in the earlier sample period (eg, between 1989 and 1994) have a higher
market to book ratio.  Alternatively, the difference in CARs between the daily
and intraday samples may be due to the difference in the size of the physical
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asset expenditures.  Tables 6.2 and 10.2 show that the median size of the physical
asset expenditures for intraday and daily samples is $34 million and $78 million
respectively.
Though the magnitude of the CARs in Table 10.9 is slightly smaller, the
significant positive AR result is consistent with prior studies of McConnell and
Muscarella (1985), Chen and Ho (1997), and Woolridge (1988).  All these
studies document a significant positive market reaction at the announcement of
physical asset expenditures.
10.3.1.2 Market to book effect
In this section, the sample is segregated into two and four subsamples based on
market to book ratio to examine the market to book effect.  Analysis of the
growth opportunities hypothesis is conducted by comparing the mean CAR
between the highest market to book ratio firms with the lowest market to book
ratio firms.  It is hypothesised that the abnormal returns associated with high
market to book ratio firms are larger than the low market to book ratio firms.
The CARs for the market to book ratio quartiles are presented in Figure 10.3A.
Figure 10.3A resembles the intraday CARs presented in Figure 7.6.  The highest
market to book ratio and the lowest market to book ratio quartiles experience
significant CARs of approximately +2.5% and -2.0% over the [-20,+20] day
window.  Whereas the middle quartiles firms do not appear to experience any
significant CARs over the same window.
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Table 10.10A confirms the growth opportunities hypothesis.  Significant
negative ARs and positive ARs are observed mainly in days -1 and 0 for the
lowest and highest market to book ratio quartiles respectively, and the mean
difference in ARs between the highest and lowest quartiles are also observed to
be significant around the announcement day.  The results are also consistent with
the intraday results.
Table 10.11 summarises the mean CARs for each market to book ratio quartile,
and presents the results of the mean difference in CARs between the highest and
the lowest market to book ratio quartiles, and between the middle quartiles.  The
mean CARs are significantly positive at the 1% level for the highest market to
book ratio quartile, whereas for the lowest market to book ratio quartile,
significant negative CARs are observed.  For the second highest market to book
ratio quartile, all but the [-5,+1] day window, exhibit significant positive CARs.
The second lowest market to book ratio quartile does not exhibit significant
market reaction across any of the windows.  In Panel B of Table 10.11 it is
shown that the mean difference in CARs between the highest and the lowest
market to book ratio quartiles is significant at the 1% level, whereas for the
middle quartiles, the mean difference in CARs is not significant.  The growth
opportunities argument is therefore supported.112
                                                          
112 While not reported here, similar analysis is also conducted for firms separated by high and low
market to book ratio groups.  The high market to book ratio group experiences significant
positive CARs over the four windows, and the low market to book ratio group suffer significant
negative CARs over the same windows.  The difference in CARs between the two groups are
statistically significant.  These results are available upon request.
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Table 10.11: Summary of mean CARs and mean difference in CARs for the market to book ratio
quartiles.  The t-tests for the difference in CARs between the highest and lowest quartiles, and
for the difference in CARs between the middle quartiles are presented in Panel B.  * and **
represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Panel A
Highest M/B ratio quartile
Windows [-20,+20] [-5,+5] [-5,+1] [-1,0]
N 146** 146** 146** 146**
Mean CAR (%) 2.389** 1.881** 1.952** 1.671**
Stdev 0.098** 0.054** 0.045** 0.021**
t-statistic 2.93**6 4.19**6 5.29**6 5.60**6
Second highest M/B ratio quartile
N 144** 144** 144** 144**
Mean CAR (%) 1.120** 1.019** 0.519** 0.361**
Stdev 0.079** 0.059** 0.048** 0.026**
t-statistic 1.69**6 2.08**6 1.306** 1.68**6
Second lowest M/B ratio quartile
N 144** 144** 144** 144**
Mean CAR (%) 0.547** 0.755** 0.081** 0.057**
Stdev 0.117** 0.055** 0.046** 0.026**
t-statistic 0.566** 1.64**6 0.21**6 0.26**6
Lowest M/B ratio quartile
N 144** 144** 144** 144**
Mean CAR (%) -1.647** -0.957** -0.672** -0.842**
Stdev -0.092** -0.064** -0.051** -0.033**
t-statistic -2.16*6* -1.80**6 -1.59**6 -3.03**6
Panel B
Mean difference between the highest and lowest market to book ratio firms
CARhighest-CARlowest 4.037** 2.838** 2.624** 2.513**
t-statistic 3.613** 4.074** 4.669** 7.665**
Mean difference between second highest and lowest market to book ratio firms
CARhigh-CARlow 0.573 0.264 0.438 0.304
t-statistic 0.487 0.392 0.790 0.996
10.3.1.3 Post announcement cumulative abnormal returns
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find evidence that the equity market over extrapolates
the performance of high market to book ratio firms, and underestimates low
market to book ratio firms at merger announcements.  They report that high
market to book ratio acquirers underperform low market to book ratio acquirers
over a period of three years after the merger completion date.  They attribute the
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underperformance of high market to book ratio firms to the extrapolation
hypothesis.  That is, the market over extrapolates the past performance of the
bidder management when it assesses the NPV of an acquisition.  Consequently,
the market overestimates the ability of bidder management of high market to
book ratio firms.  Hence, in order to confirm that the positive abnormal returns
experienced by high market to book ratio firms documented in this thesis is not
due to the over extrapolation hypothesis, the post-announcement CARs are
examined.  If the extrapolation hypothesis prevails, one expects to see a negative
post-announcement drift for the high market to book ratio firms, and a positive
post-announcement drift for the low market to book ratio firms.  Alternatively, if
the growth opportunities hypothesis prevails, no post-announcement drift is
expected.
Figure 10.3 presents the mean CARs for the market to book ratio quartiles over a
3-year post-announcement period.  The monthly post-announcement mean CARs
for the market to book ratio quartiles, and the mean CAR difference between the
lowest and the highest quartiles over a 36-month period are set out in Table
10.12.
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Figure 10.3: Post-announcement monthly CARs for the market to book ratio quartiles, over
a period of 3 years.
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Both the highest and second highest market to book ratio quartiles experience an
insignificant positive drift of around 4.5% over the 3-year period.  The post-
announcement drift for the second highest market to book ratio quartile lacks
significance, but for the highest market to book ratio quartile, post-announcement
CARs are significant in months +3 to +5, and +34 to +36.  Overall, there is no
evidence of a significant positive drift for the highest and second highest market
ratio quartiles.  For the lowest market to book ratio quartile, a small positive drift
is observed but it is insignificant.  On the other hand, a negative drift of about 3%
is noted for the second lowest market to book ratio firms, but again, it is
insignificant.  The results in Table 10.12 show that other than the second lowest
market to book ratio quartile, the direction of the post-announcement drift is
inconsistent with the predictions of the extrapolation hypothesis.  Finally, there is
no significant difference in the post-announcement drift between the highest and
the lowest market to book ratio quartile, and hence the over extrapolation
hypothesis is not supported.
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Table 10.12: Monthly post-announcement mean CARs for the market to book ratio quartiles, over a period
of 3 years.  Mean CARs difference between the highest and lowest samples is provided.  * and ** represent
the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Lowest M/B 2nd Lowest M/B 2nd Highest M/B Highest M/B CARlowest -
CARhighest
Month CAR
(%)
t-stat CAR
(%)
t-stat CAR
(%)
t-stat CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff
(%)
t-stat
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.635 1.06 -0.163 -0.30 0.002 0.00 0.523 0.91* 0.112 0.14
2 1.003 1.08 0.280 0.43 0.122 0.19 1.088 1.38* -0.084 -0.07
3 0.941 0.94 0.210 0.26 0.144 0.22 2.283 2.15* -1.342 -0.92
4 1.189 1.02 0.259 0.29 0.184 0.23 2.488 1.85* -1.299 -0.73
5 1.077 0.88 0.604 0.56 0.163 0.18 2.490 1.74* -1.413 -0.75
6 1.354 0.97 0.568 0.43 0.140 0.13 2.537 1.56* -1.183 -0.55
7 1.248 0.83 0.743 0.62 0.179 0.15 2.515 1.53* -1.267 -0.57
8 1.430 0.89 0.862 0.58 0.039 0.03 2.701 1.43* -1.271 -0.51
9 1.967 1.15 0.260 0.18 0.095 0.07 2.774 1.33* -0.807 -0.30
10 1.799 1.00 -0.156 -0.05 0.162 0.12 2.728 1.16* -0.928 -0.31
11 2.276 1.09 -0.384 -0.18 0.217 0.14 2.794 1.06* -0.518 -0.15
12 2.043 0.99 -0.713 -0.29 0.373 0.22 3.175 1.09* -1.131 -0.32
13 1.778 0.80 -0.496 -0.20 0.463 0.23 3.514 1.20* -1.736 -0.47
14 1.974 0.84 -0.797 -0.30 0.445 0.22 3.285 1.17* -1.312 -0.36
15 2.274 0.91 -1.260 -0.48 0.644 0.29 3.767 1.41* -1.493 -0.41
16 1.975 0.84 -1.396 -0.53 0.763 0.33 4.025 1.45* -2.050 -0.56
17 2.252 0.98 -1.981 -0.72 0.893 0.40 3.914 1.26* -1.662 -0.43
18 2.281 0.91 -2.423 -0.88 1.082 0.45 3.993 1.31* -1.712 -0.44
19 2.024 0.82 -2.641 -0.96 1.278 0.49 4.091 1.29* -2.067 -0.52
20 2.281 0.89 -2.954 -1.10 1.211 0.46 4.046 1.30* -1.765 -0.44
21 2.306 0.84 -2.695 -0.96 1.416 0.51 3.942 1.28* -1.636 -0.40
22 2.511 0.85 -2.904 -1.05 1.832 0.65 3.851 1.22* -1.340 -0.31
23 2.307 0.75 -3.182 -1.14 2.073 0.71 4.055 1.38* -1.748 -0.41
24 1.735 0.61 -3.017 -1.07 2.104 0.74 4.139 1.41* -2.404 -0.59
25 2.323 0.84 -3.066 -1.08 2.205 0.78 4.045 1.38* -1.722 -0.43
26 2.512 0.93 -3.088 -1.07 2.641 0.91 4.223 1.42* -1.711 -0.43
27 2.316 0.82 -3.089 -1.12 2.855 0.98 4.286 1.38* -1.970 -0.47
28 2.733 0.93 -3.131 -1.15 3.200 1.10 4.290 1.37* -1.557 -0.36
29 2.276 0.76 -3.147 -1.13 3.533 1.21 4.428 1.43* -2.152 -0.50
30 2.546 0.84 -3.354 -1.19 3.874 1.26 4.569 1.47* -2.023 -0.47
31 2.287 0.76 -3.151 -1.08 4.326 1.34 4.479 1.56* -2.192 -0.54
32 2.293 0.78 -3.314 -1.13 4.293 1.34 4.428 1.59* -2.136 -0.53
33 2.066 0.65 -2.865 -0.96 4.081 1.24 4.358 1.60* -2.292 -0.55
34 1.768 0.55 -2.867 -0.94 4.440 1.32 4.676 1.72* -2.908 -0.69
35 2.070 0.65 -3.034 -1.01 4.300 1.28 4.729 1.69* -2.659 -0.63
36 2.438 0.76 -3.276 -1.08 4.308 1.25 4.750 1.66* -2.312 -0.54
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10.3.1.4 Capital market monitoring
In this section, the capital market monitoring hypothesis is examined.  The CARs
for the cash flow ratio quartiles are presented in Figure 10.4A.  Overall, there is
no systematic pattern as hypothesised in Chapter 3, such that firms with low cash
flow are expected to experience a significant higher abnormal return than firms
with high cash flow.  In contrast to the hypothesised direction, Table 10.13
reveals that more negative ARs are observed for the lowest cash flow ratio
quartile, whereas more positive ARs are observed for the highest cash flow ratio
quartile.
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Table 10.13: Mean ARs and CARs for the lowest and highest cash flow ratio quartiles, containing 144 and 146
respectively.  The columns, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage of positive abnormal returns, and it is tested for
whether the percentage is statistically different from 50% using non-parametric binomial test.  * and **
represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Lowest CF/TA ratio quartile Highest CF/TA ratio quartile ARlowest-ARhighest
Day AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff t-stat
-20 -0.361 -1.54* 29.2** -0.361 -1.54* 0.157 1.16** 39.0* 0.157 1.16** -0.100 -0.73**
-19 0.128 0.80* 35.4** -0.233 -1.10* 0.282 2.37** 38.4* 0.439 2.41** 0.063 0.53**
-18 0.008 0.05* 36.1** -0.225 -0.85* -0.022 -0.21** 30.8* 0.417 1.96** 0.041 0.35**
-17 -0.055 -0.29* 38.9** -0.281 -0.86* -0.148 -1.05** 33.6* 0.269 1.07** -0.072 -0.61**
-16 -0.029 -0.20* 35.4** -0.310 -0.92* -0.104 -0.84** 37.0* 0.165 0.60** -0.051 -0.38**
-15 -0.022 -0.12* 33.3** -0.332 -0.96* 0.124 0.88** 39.7* 0.289 1.03** -0.054 -0.40**
-14 -0.083 -0.61* 28.5** -0.414 -1.10* -0.022 -0.13** 39.7* 0.267 0.83** -0.119 -1.01**
-13 0.102 0.59* 34.0** -0.312 -0.74* 0.069 0.48** 34.2* 0.336 0.94** -0.006 -0.04**
-12 0.068 0.37* 33.3** -0.244 -0.57* -0.127 -0.95** 29.5* 0.209 0.57** -0.160 -1.04**
-11 -0.106 -0.68* 33.3** -0.350 -0.75* 0.032 0.27** 42.5* 0.241 0.64** 0.102 0.58**
-10 0.121 0.82* 36.8** -0.229 -0.48* -0.035 -0.27** 34.2* 0.206 0.54** -0.091 -0.76**
-9 -0.333 -1.61* 38.9** -0.562 -1.09* -0.164 -1.44** 32.2* 0.042 0.10** -0.085 -0.79**
-8 -0.452 -2.31* 28.5** -1.015 -1.73* 0.108 0.83** 37.0* 0.150 0.35** -0.020 -0.16**
-7 0.206 1.21* 36.8** -0.809 -1.36* 0.037 0.34** 38.4* 0.187 0.43** -0.079 -0.64**
-6 0.192 1.06* 30.6** -0.617 -1.05* 0.082 0.75** 35.6* 0.268 0.57** -0.218 -1.40**
-5 -0.040 -0.23* 32.6** -0.657 -1.03* -0.038 -0.35** 31.5* 0.230 0.47** 0.144 1.13**
-4 0.334 2.05* 41.0** -0.323 -0.53* 0.176 1.48** 41.8* 0.406 0.79** -0.365 -2.50**
-3 0.134 0.67* 33.3** -0.189 -0.33* 0.002 0.02** 38.4* 0.409 0.78** 0.007 0.05**
-2 -0.281 -1.58* 27.1** -0.470 -0.77* -0.042 -0.33** 39.0* 0.366 0.67** 0.142 0.97**
-1 -0.108 -0.71* 38.2** -0.579 -0.89* 0.318 2.42** 49.3* 0.684 1.25** -0.261 -1.84**
0 0.150 0.63* 35.4** -0.428 -0.62* 0.347 2.30** 54.1* 1.031 1.77** 0.149 0.91**
1 -0.339 -1.67* 31.9** -0.767 -1.03* -0.040 -0.22** 42.5* 0.991 1.67** 0.421 2.89**
2 -0.293 -0.77* 41.7** -1.060 -1.27* 0.098 0.75** 39.0* 1.089 1.78** 0.041 0.27**
3 0.325 1.89* 39.6** -0.735 -0.87* -0.078 -0.47** 34.9* 1.011 1.59** -0.100 -0.89**
4 0.095 0.60* 37.5** -0.640 -0.76* 0.013 0.11** 33.6* 1.024 1.60** -0.085 -0.64**
5 -0.017 -0.13* 29.2** -0.657 -0.79* 0.108 0.62** 35.6* 1.132 1.82** 0.281 1.66**
6 0.297 2.16* 37.5** -0.360 -0.43* 0.045 0.35** 30.8* 1.177 1.86** -0.139 -0.91**
7 -0.100 -0.66* 29.9** -0.461 -0.54* -0.284 -1.61** 21.9* 0.893 1.35** 0.002 0.02**
8 -0.164 -0.72* 30.6** -0.625 -0.70* 0.130 1.00** 41.8* 1.023 1.55** -0.018 -0.14**
9 -0.059 -0.39* 29.2** -0.684 -0.74* -0.070 -0.47** 35.6* 0.954 1.42** 0.113 0.93**
10 0.417 1.63* 36.1** -0.267 -0.28* -0.008 -0.06** 31.5* 0.946 1.34** -0.323 -2.28**
11 -0.309 -1.97* 28.5** -0.576 -0.59* 0.170 1.18** 36.3* 1.116 1.50** 0.069 0.42**
12 -0.091 -0.49* 33.3** -0.667 -0.65* 0.108 0.73** 39.0* 1.224 1.61** 0.260 1.48**
13 -0.240 -1.36* 31.9** -0.907 -0.90* -0.127 -1.14** 33.6* 1.096 1.43** 0.181 1.52**
14 0.038 0.30* 35.4** -0.869 -0.87* -0.143 -1.33** 33.6* 0.954 1.25** -0.007 -0.06**
15 -0.064 -0.42* 33.3** -0.933 -0.93* 0.049 0.39** 35.6* 1.002 1.30** 0.100 0.79**
16 -0.032 -0.22* 34.0** -0.965 -0.98* -0.162 -1.48** 30.1* 0.840 1.08** 0.074 0.64**
17 -0.095 -0.53* 30.6** -1.060 -1.05* -0.059 -0.44** 36.3* 0.781 0.99** -0.147 -1.24**
18 0.041 0.36* 29.9** -1.019 -1.00* 0.333 1.61** 37.7* 1.115 1.40** 0.145 1.17**
19 -0.112 -0.82* 24.3** -1.131 -1.12* 0.096 0.67** 38.4* 1.211 1.50** -0.053 -0.39**
20 -0.054 -0.34* 29.9** -1.185 -1.16* 0.017 0.12** 32.2* 1.228 1.49** 0.149 0.89**
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Table 10.14 presents the CARs for selected windows for the cash flow ratio
quartiles, the mean difference in CARs between the highest and lowest cash flow
ratio quartiles, and the middle quartiles.  The table shows that both the highest
and second highest cash flow ratio quartiles experience significant positive CARs
for most windows, whereas, both the lowest and second lowest cash flow ratio
quartiles experience insignificant CARs for all windows.  However, it is
interesting to note that it is the second highest cash flow ratio quartile that
experiences the highest CARs.  Furthermore it is the middle quartiles (second
highest and second lowest cash flow ratio quartiles) that show a significant
difference in CARs.  There is no difference in CARs between the highest and the
lowest cash flow ratio quartiles.  If cash flow has a role, then one should observe
a systematic pattern like the market to book effect, eg, the higher the cash flow
ratio, the higher the ARs.  However, the highly positive significant CARs for the
second highest cash flow ratio quartile might be due to the fact that the second
highest cash flow ratio quartile has the highest market to book ratio among all
other quartiles.  The issue is examined further in sections 10.3.1.6 and
10.3.1.7.113
In summary, the cash flow ratio result in this section does not support the capital
market monitoring hypothesis.  Contrary to the capital market monitoring
hypothesis, the results show that firms in the highest and second highest cash
flow ratio quartiles experience significant positive ARs, but firms in the lowest
and second lowest cash flow ratio quartiles experience insignificant ARs.
Consistent with the intraday findings reported in Chapter 7, the cash flow
                                                          
113 The results in this section do not change when the analysis is conducted using a more coarse
partition of the sample, viz, high and low cash flow ratio firms.
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univariate analysis using daily data does not provide support for the capital
market monitoring argument.
Table 10.14: Summary of mean CARs and mean difference in CARs for the cash flow ratio
quartiles.  The t-tests for the difference in CARs between the highest and lowest quartiles, and for
the difference in CARs between the middle quartiles are presented in Panel B.  * and ** represent
5% and 1% levels of significance.
Panel A
Highest CF/TA ratio quartile
Windows [-20,+20] [-5,+5] [-5,+1] [-1,0]
N 146** 146** 146** 146**
Mean CAR (%) 1.228** 0.864** 0.723** 0.665**
Stdev 0.099** 0.051** 0.046** 0.026**
t-statistic 1.493** 2.03**3 1.90**3 3.10**3
Second highest CF/TA ratio quartile
N 144** 144** 144** 144**
Mean CAR (%) 2.451** 1.516** 1.087** 0.666**
Stdev 0.074** 0.048** 0.041** 0.024**
t-statistic 3.98**3 3.77**3 3.18**3 3.35**3
Second lowest CF/TA ratio quartile
N 144 144 144 144
Mean CAR (%) -0.070 0.373 0.237 -0.112
Stdev -0.088 0.054 0.042 -0.028
t-statistic -0.103 0.823 0.683 -0.493
Lowest CF/TA ratio quartile
N 144 144 144 144
Mean CAR (%) -1.185 -0.041 -0.150 0.042
Stdev -0.123 -0.077 -0.061 0.034
t-statistic -1.163 -0.063 -0.303 0.153
Panel B
Mean difference between the highest and lowest cash flow ratio firms
CARhighest-CARlowest 2.413 0.904 0.873 0.623
t-statistic 1.843 1.183 1.383 1.743
Mean difference between second highest and lowest cash flow ratio firms
CARhigh-CARlow 2.521** 1.143** 0.850** 0.778**
t-statistic 2.63**v 1.89**3 1.73**3 2.56**3
10.3.1.5 Foster, Olsen and Shevlin’s (1984) approach
In this section, the Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) method of examining the
CARs is presented.  Figure 10.5A presents the CAR for quartiles sorted by ARs
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at the announcement date, and Table 10.15A presents the mean ARs and mean
CARs for the lowest and highest ARs at t0 quartiles, and the difference between
the two extreme quartiles.  The results are similar to the intraday results
presented earlier in Chapter 7.
10.3.1.6 Randomisation approach
Table 10.16 presents the results of the randomisation.  The results in Panels A
and B show that, except for the lowest market to book ratio quartile, the
difference in CAR between the highest and lowest cash flow ratio quartiles is
insignificant, once the market to book effect is controlled for.  This is somewhat
different from the results presented in Chapter 7, where it is documented that
once the market to book effect is controlled for, the CAR difference between the
highest and lowest cash flow ratio quartiles is statistically insignificant across all
the market to book ratio quartiles.  This suggests that market to book effect for
daily results is not as strong as for the intraday results.
It should also be noted that, in both Panels A and B, the difference in CAR
between the highest and lowest cash flow ratio cells is not consistent across the
four market to book ratio subsamples.  For instance, the highest cash flow cell
exhibits a higher CAR than the lowest cell when the market to book ratio is
relatively low.  However, at high levels of market to book ratio, the lowest cash
flow cell exhibits a higher CAR than the highest cell.
In Panels C and D, the market to book effect is examined after controlling for the
cash flow effect.  The results show that even after the cash flow effect is
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controlled for, the difference in CARs between the highest and lowest market to
book ratio cells remains statistically significant.  For instance, across the four
cash flow ratio subsamples, the mean CARs for the highest market to book ratio
quartiles are significantly greater than the mean CARs for the lowest market to
book ratio quartiles.  While not reported, the results are unchanged when a wider
window of [-20,0] days is used.114
In summary, daily analysis presented in this section is consistent with the
intraday results presented earlier in Chapters 7 and 8.  That is, the market to book
effect remains significant the cash flow effect is controlled for.
                                                          
114 The results are available upon request.
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Table 10.16: The value in each cell represents mean CARs for the [-1,0] day window.  In Panel A, the
CARs are sorted into quartiles based on M/B ratio, and within each quartile, the CARs are sorted into
quartiles based on cash flow to total assets (CF/TA) ratio.  In Panel B, the same process is repeated for
median CARs.  Panel C, the CARs are sorted on CF/TA first, and then on M/B ratio.  The same process
is repeated for Panel D.  The mean (median) difference is for the mean (median) difference in CARs
between the lowest and highest cells.  The t-statistic is for the mean (median) CARs difference.  * and
** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Panel A: Cash flow effect after controlling for market to book
Market to book
0.298 - 0.914 0.914 - 1.24 1.249 - 1.713 1.713 - 5.303
Lowest -2.39% -2.31% 2.78% 3.19%
Low -2.93% -1.58% -3.91% 2.52%
High -0.42% -1.22% -0.63% 5.54%
Cash
flow
Highest -0.38% -0.52% -1.14% 1.63%
Mean difference -2.77% -2.83% -1.64% 1.56%
t-stat -2.09** -1.49% -1.12% 1.27%
Panel B: Cash flow effect after controlling for market to book
Market to book
0.298 - 0.914 0.914 - 1.24 1.249 - 1.713 1.713 - 5.303
Lowest -3.59% -1.20% -1.97% -2.15%
Low -3.41% -1.60% -2.62% -2.65%
High -0.60% -0.63% -0.38% -3.37%
Cash
flow
Highest -1.37% -0.57% -0.62% -0.47%
Median difference -2.22% -1.77% -1.35% -1.68%
t-stat -1.52% -1.16% -0.87% -1.09%
Panel C: Market to book effect after controlling for cash flow
Cash flow
-0.329 - 0.036 0.036 - 0.069 0.069 - 0.101 0.102 - 0.609
Lowest -4.00% -3.22% -3.98% -2.47%
Low -2.86% -2.08% -1.19% -0.73%
High -2.73% -1.51% -1.22% -2.56%
Market
to
book
Highest -2.09% -2.11% -2.63% -2.93%
Mean difference -6.09% -5.33% -6.61% -5.40%
t-stat -2.75** -2.29** -2.47** -2.38**
Panel D: Market to book effect after controlling for cash flow
Cash flow
-0.329 - 0.036 0.036 - 0.069 0.069 - 0.101 0.102 - 0.609
Lowest -2.46% -2.75% -1.91% -1.86%
Low -1.71% -2.85% -1.72% -0.63%
High -1.15% -0.53% -1.01% -1.23%
Market
to
book
Highest -2.25% -3.12% -2.08% -4.02%
Median difference -4.71% -5.87% -3.99% -5.88%
t-stat -1.97** -2.13** -2.05** -2.22**
Note that the original analysis included two observations with negative market to book value, namely Centaur Mining & Exploration Limited
25/10/95 and 3/6/96.  The negative market to book values were due to negative net assets in the corresponding years.  The exclusion of these three
observations does not affect the results, in fact, the inclusion of the three observations strengthen the results since the CARs associated with the two
outliers are -11.6% and -10.62% respectively.
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10.3.1.7 Free cash flow analysis
Table 10.17 provides the results for the free cash flow analysis.  Cell (A) consists
of firms with high cash flow and low growth opportunities, ie, free cash flow
firms.  This group experiences an insignificant CAR of -1.21%.  The
counterparts, which are firms with high growth opportunities and low cash flow
[cell (D)] also experience an insignificant CAR of 1.60%.  Firms with low cash
flow and low growth opportunities suffer a significant negative CAR of -2.887%.
In contrast, firms with high cash flow and high growth opportunities experience a
significant positive CAR of 2.437%.  The differences in CARs between firms in
cells (A) and (B), (A) and (C), and (A) and (D), are -3.65% (t-stat: -2.69), 1.68%
(t-stat: 1.18) and -2.80% (t-stat: -2.00) respectively.  While free cash flow firms
[cell (A)] do not exhibit a significant negative abnormal returns, the difference in
CARs between free cash flow firms, cell (A), and other non-free cash flow firms,
cells (B) and (D), are statistically different.  The results in Table 10.17 do not
change when CARs for longer windows are conducted namely, [-20,0] and [-
20,+20] day windows.
In summary, daily results provide mixed evidence for the free cash flow theory,
but generally, the free cash flow theory cannot be rejected in light of the
evidence that there is a significant difference in CARs between free cash flow
firms and non-free cash flow firms.  Daily analysis provides consistent results
with the intraday analysis, though intraday analysis provides stronger support for
the free cash flow theory.
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Table 10.17: Free cash flow analysis over a [-1,0] day window.  Values in parentheses are t-
statistic, standard deviation, and number of observations respectively.  * and ** represent
the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Growth opportunities
Cash flow Low High
High
(A)
-1.210%
(-1.29, 0.102, 119)
(B)
2.437%**
(2.63, 0.121, 170)
Low
(C)
-2.887%**
(-2.90, 0.130, 170)
(D)
1.597%
(1.53, 0.114, 119)
2-way ANOVA test, F-stat = 3.444
10.3.2 Multivariate analysis
The results of multivariate analysis are presented in this section.  The
independent variables are similar to those in Chapter 8, viz, market to book, cash
flow, free cash flow, leverage, size of transactions and managerial shareholding.
The five regressions models are also similar to those presented in Chapter 8.
Model 1 includes the three fundamental explanatory variables (namely, growth
opportunities, free cash flow, and capital market monitoring).  Model 2 includes
all the control variables, and Model 3 adds a quadratic managerial shareholding
term to allow for non-linearity in managerial shareholding.  Model 4 excludes
managerial shareholding, and Model 5 further excludes leverage.  Table 10.18
summarises the regression results.
Of the five models, all the heteroskedasticity tests, except for ARCH test,
indicate the existence of heteroskedasticity.  In addition, the Ramsey RESET test
results show some misspecification problems for Models 1, 4 and 5.  This model
misspecification issue will be addressed further in section 10.3.3.
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Using daily data, the market to book variable is significant in all of the five
models.  The cash flow variable which is significant in the intraday data sample
in Table 8.2, is not significant using the daily data sample.  The free cash flow
variable which shows a positive coefficient is inconsistent with the hypothesised
sign, but is insignificant.
None of the control variables is significant in the five models.  Contrary to
predictions, a negative coefficient is observed for leverage, past performance and
size, though none of them is significant.
It should be noted that the coefficients and t-statistics for all models are relatively
stable.  The R-square and adjusted R-square are quite low and lie between 0.021-
0.029 and 0.011-0.018 respectively.  However, the overall model is significant,
as shown by the F-test.  The inclusion of the managerial shareholding variable in
Models 2 and 3 seems to resolve the Ramsey RESET problem.
In summary, consistent with the intraday results, daily analysis shows that
market to book variable is the only significant variable explaining the CARs.
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Table 10.18: Regression results for 578 daily sample between 31 July 1989 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-20, +20] daily window.  Regression
analysis was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Free cash flow is defined as firms with high cash flow and
low market to book ratio.  A dummy of one is assigned to FCF, and zero otherwise.  3-year pre-
announcement risk-adjusted CARs are used as a proxy for managerial past performance.  Square brackets
represent t-statistic.  {} brackets represent the White adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a degree
freedom of 1 for all the five models.  The B-P-G, Harvey and Glejser tests have degrees freedom of 1,7,
8, 6, and 5 for the respective models.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant -0.014**
[-1.12]**
{-1.05}**
-0.012**
[-0.29]**
{-0.29}**
-0.001**
[-0.08]**
{-0.07}**
-0.012**
[-0.76]**
{-0.70}**
-0.012**
[-0.89]**
{-0.81}**
FCF 0.000**
[0.54]**
{0.49}**
0.000**
[0.43]**
{0.47}**
0.002**
[0.45]**
{0.53}**
0.002**
[0.61]**
{0.77}**
0.002**
[0.73]**
{0.75}**
LEV -0.003**
[-0.60]**
{-0.63}**
-0.003**
[-0.45]**
{-0.46}**
-0.000**
[-0.00]**
{-0.00}**
MB 0.015**
[2.86]**
{2.69}**
0.015**
[2.85]**
{2.75}**
0.016**
[2.93]**
{2.80}**
0.015**
[2.80]**
{2.66}**
0.015**
[2.79]**
{2.70}**
MS 0.002**
[1.61]**
{1.55}**
0.004**
[1.20]**
{1.22}**
MS^2 0.000**
[0.65]**
{0.72}**
**
CF 0.002**
[1.06]**
{0.73}**
0.002**
[0.85]**
{0.94}**
0.002**
[0.86]**
{0.94}**
0.002**
[1.07]**
{0.76}**
0.002**
[1.07]**
{0.73}**
PASTPERF -0.000**
[-0.24]**
{-0.20}**
-0.000**
[-0.23]**
{-0.19}**
-0.000**
[-0.43]**
{-0.37}**
-0.000**
[-0.44]**
{-0.38}**
SIZE -0.001**
[-0.30]**
{-0.30}**
-0.001**
[-0.43]**
{-0.41}**
-0.001**
[-0.26]**
{-0.11}**
-0.000**
[-0.19]**
{-0.12}**
R-sq 0.023** 0.028** 0.029** 0.021** 0.021**
Adj R-sq 0.018** 0.016** 0.015** 0.011** 0.012**
F-significant 0.004** 0.027** 0.035** 0.064** 0.037**
B-P-G test 12.457** 13.391** 13.914** 13.013** 12.823**
ARCH test 0.158** 0.040** 0.035** 0.157** 0.157**
Harvey test 12.402** 15.901** 16.736** 17.301** 12.758**
Glejser test 20.275** 25.695** 25.986** 23.997** 21.559**
Ramsey Reset
Reset (2) 9.269** 2.511** 2.893** 8.509** 8.150**
Reset (3) 7.667** 1.998** 2.527** 6.710** 6.711**
Reset (4) 5.546** 1.441** 1.683** 4.575** 4.577**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09 respectively.
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 
for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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Consistent with the results reported earlier, the market to book variable is
statistically significant across all the models.  While the cash flow variable has
the correct coefficient sign, it is not significant.  Further, the free cash flow
variable remains insignificant with a positive coefficient sign.  None of the other
control variables is significant.
Again, market to book variable is the only significant explanatory variable in this
shorter window regression model, and is consistent with the existing capital
expenditure studies.
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Table 10.19: Regression results for 578 daily sample between 31 July 1989 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-1,0] daily window.  Regression analysis
was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Free cash flow is defined as firms with high cash flow and low market
to book ratio.  A dummy of one is assigned to FCF, and zero otherwise.  3-year pre-announcement risk-
adjusted CARs are used as a proxy for managerial past performance.  Square brackets represent t-statistic.
{} brackets represent the White adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a degree freedom of 1 for all the
five models.  The B-P-G, Harvey and Glejser tests have degrees freedom of 1,7, 8, 6, and 5 for the
respective models.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant -0.016**
[-4.66]**
{-3.94}**
-0.021**
[-4.38]**
{-3.47}**
-0.020**
[-3.88]**
{-3.09}**
-0.021**
[-4.39]**
{-3.37}**
-0.016**
[-4.04]**
{-3.37}**
FCF 0.003**
[1.37]**
{1.44}**
0.002**
[1.36]**
{1.26}**
0.002**
[1.39]**
{1.40}**
0.003**
[1.31]**
{1.21}**
0.003**
[1.33]**
{1.23}**
LEV -0.002**
[-1.44]**
{-1.15}**
-0.002**
[-1.21]**
{-0.95}**
-0.003**
[-1.55]**
{-1.48}**
MB 0.012**
[8.51]**
{6.52}**
0.013**
[8.58]**
{6.54}**
0.013**
[8.64]**
{6.58}**
0.013**
[8.60]**
{6.58}**
0.013**
[8.42]**
{6.58}**
MS 0.000**
[0.53]**
{0.60}**
0.001**
[0.71]**
{0.81}**
MS^2 -0.000**
[-0.37]**
{-0.55}**
**
CF -0.000**
[-0.14]**
{-0.11}**
-0.000**
[-0.38]**
{-0.31}**
-0.000**
[-0.32]**
{-0.30}**
-0.000**
[-0.27]**
{-0.19}**
-0.000**
[-0.17]**
{-0.18}**
PASTPERF -0.000**
[-1.50]**
{-1.45}**
-0.000**
[-0.66]**
{-0.78}**
-0.000**
[-0.86]**
{-0.79}**
-0.000**
[-0.87]**
{-0.79}**
SIZE -0.000**
[-0.47]**
{-0.47}**
-0.000**
[-0.45]**
{-0.45}**
-0.000**
[-0.64]**
{-0.53}**
-0.000**
[-0.43]**
{-0.43}**
R-sq 0.116** 0.123** 0.124** 0.123** 0.117**
Adj R-sq 0.112** 0.112** 0.112** 0.113** 0.110**
F-significant 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
B-P-G test 6.619** 16.559** 16.462** 15.447** 13.388**
ARCH test 0.000** 0.001** 0.007** 0.002** 0.000**
Harvey test 1.327** 4.008** 9.270** 4.315** 9.968**
Glejser test 6.977** 24.086** 24.419** 23.281** 21.013**
Ramsey Reset
Reset (2) 8.676** 6.403** 6.429** 5.068** 8.349**
Reset (3) 6.807** 5.913** 6.538** 5.331** 6.634**
Reset (4) 4.616** 4.017** 4.548** 3.777** 4.506**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09 respectively.
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 
for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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10.3.3 Model misspecification
In order to deal with the misspecification problems encountered in both Tables
10.18 and 10.19, several methods were used.
First, residual plots were obtained to check for outliers and influential
observations.  Figure 10.6 shows the residual plot for Model 1, using [-1,0] daily
window.  The problem of heteroskedasticity is not apparent from the residual
plot.  Two influential observations (circled) and one outlier (squared) are
identified.  Regression analysis was then conducted without these three
observations.  While the results are not shown here, the overall results are very
similar to those presented in Tables 10.18 and 10.19, and the Ramsey RESET
tests suggest functional problems still exist.
Residual Plots For Model 1
Regression Standardized Predicted Value
6420-2-4-6-8
[-
1,0
]
.2
.1
-.0
-.1
-.2
-.3
Figure 10.6:
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Second, when the three influential observations and outliers were excluded, the
scatterplot diagram between market to book ratio and dependent CARs reveals
some evidence of non-linearity.  A quadratic term was then added to market to
book, and the regression was run again.  The misspecification problems shown
by Ramsey RESET still remain.115
Finally, the market to book ratio was transformed using natural logs, and
regression analysis was repeated.  While natural log transformation removed the
misspecification problem, the R-square and adjusted R-square fell somewhat.
Further, the size of the coefficients also reduces.  Despite the significant decrease
in the size of the coefficient of market to book parameter, it remains significant.
The results of the regression using Ln(MB) over the [-1,0] day window is
presented in Table 10.20.
In conclusion, the results in this section provide evidence that market to book
ratio dominates all other explanatory variables in explaining the share price
variation associated with physical asset expenditure announcements.  The market
to book effect is robust with respect to different models and different windows of
the dependent variable.  The daily analysis is also generally consistent with the
intraday analysis.
                                                          
115 The results are available at request from the author.
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Table 10.20: Regression results for 578 daily sample between 31 July 1989 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-1,0] daily window.  Regression analysis
was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Free cash flow is defined as firms with high cash flow and low market
to book ratio.  A dummy of one is assigned to FCF, and zero otherwise.  3-year pre-announcement risk-
adjusted CARs are used as a proxy for managerial past performance.  Square brackets represent t-statistic.
{} brackets represent the White adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a degree freedom of 1 for all the
five models.  The B-P-G, Harvey and Glejser tests have degrees freedom of 1,7, 8, 6, and 5 for the
respective models.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant 0.006**
[2.61]**
{2.68}**
0.005**
[1.27]**
{1.27}**
0.005**
[1.23]**
{1.18}**
0.007**
[1.73]**
{1.74}**
0.006**
[1.86]**
{1.98}**
FCF -0.003**
[-0.98]**
{-1.09}**
-0.002**
[-0.75]**
{-0.81}**
-0.002**
[-0.75]**
{-0.82}**
-0.003**
[-0.93]**
{-1.03}**
-0.003**
[-0.98]**
{-1.09}**
LEV 0.001**
[0.78]**
{0.75}**
0.001**
[0.80]**
{0.76}**
0.001**
[0.35]**
{0.35}**
LN(MB) 0.000**
[3.80]**
{2.06}**
0.000**
[3.88]**
{2.14}**
0.000**
[3.88]**
{2.14}**
0.000**
[3.76]**
{2.09}**
0.000**
[3.78]**
{2.06}**
MS 0.000**
[1.16]**
{1.17}**
0.000**
[0.26]**
{0.28}**
MS^2 0.000**
[0.19]**
{0.24}**
CF 0.000**
[0.98]**
{0.82}**
0.000**
[0.72]**
{0.65}**
0.000**
[0.72]**
{0.65}**
0.000**
[1.01]**
{0.88}**
0.000**
[1.01]**
{-1.09}**
PASTPERF 0.000**
[1.15]**
{1.26}**
0.000**
[1.15]**
{1.26}**
0.000**
[1.02]**
{1.22}**
0.000**
[1.03]**
{1.13}**
SIZE 0.000**
[0.59]**
{0.64}**
0.000**
[0.55]**
{0.59}**
0.000**
[0.28]**
{0.29}**
0.000**
[0.19]**
{0.20}**
R-sq 0.029** 0.033** 0.034** 0.032** 0.031**
Adj R-sq 0.024** 0.022** 0.020** 0.021** 0.023**
F-significant 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
B-P-G test 7.411** 12.147** 12.184** 8.444** 7.940**
ARCH test 0.031** 0.024** 0.028** 0.037** 0.039**
Harvey test 11.577** 15.382** 19.293** 10.110** 11.964**
Glejser test 17.199** 32.775** 34.632** 27.702** 27.292**
Ramsey Reset
Reset (2) 0.840** 2.938** 2.622** 0.561** 0.036**
Reset (3) 1.127** 2.206** 2.337** 1.578** 1.663**
Reset (4) 1.983** 2.303** 2.408** 1.287** 1.451**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09 respectively.
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 
for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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10.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, further regression analysis is conducted.  In section 10.3.2, the
free cash flow dummy is identified by satisfying the two conditions, namely high
cash flow and low market to book ratios.  Given the earlier results in this chapter
and the intraday analysis in Chapter 7, it is shown that both cash flow and market
to book effects are accentuated when the sample is partitioned into quartiles.  In
order to fully examine both market to book and cash flow effects, the following
regression, similar to the one in Chapter 9, is conducted:
)CFDMBD(CFDCFDMBDMBDCAR HL5L4H3L2H1 ×β+β+β+β+β+α=
LEVMSPASTPERFSIZE 9876 β+β+β+β+ ……..[9.1]
where,
MBDH   : 1 for the highest market to book ratio quartile, and 0 otherwise,
MBDL   : 1 for the lowest market to book ratio quartile, and 0 otherwise,
CFDH   : 1 for the highest cash flow ratio quartile, and 0 otherwise, and
CFDL   : 1 for the lowest cash flow ratio quartile, and 0 otherwise, and
HL CFDMBD ×  : interactive term, where 1 is free cash flow and 0 otherwise.
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Table 10.21: Regression results for 578 daily sample between 31 July 1989 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-1, 0] daily window.  Regression analysis
was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Square brackets represent t-statistic.  {} brackets represent the White
adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a degree freedom of 1 for all the five models.  The B-P-G, Harvey
and Glejser tests have degrees freedom of 1,7, 8, 6, and 5 for the respective models.  * and ** represent
5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant 0.003**
[1.64]**
{1.61}**
-0.003**
[-0.83]**
{-0.68}**
-0.003**
[-0.88]**
{-0.73}**
-0.003**
[-0.82]**
{-0.68}**
0.004**
[1.42]**
{1.40}**
MBDH 0.015**
[5.47]**
{6.27}**
0.016**
[5.77]**
{6.54}**
0.016**
[5.78]**
{6.55}**
0.016**
[5.79]**
{6.58}**
0.016**
[5.59]**
{6.36}**
MBDL -0.012**
[-4.04] **
{-3.57}**
-0.015**
[-4.71]**
{-3.82}**
-0.014**
[-4.61]**
{-3.71}**
-0.015**
[-4.74]**
{-3.84}**
-0.012**
[-4.00]**
{-3.55}**
CFDH -0.003**
[-1.03]**
{-1.11}**
-0.002**
[-0.66]**
{-0.72}**
-0.002**
[-0.64]**
{-0.69}**
-0.002**
[-0.67]**
{-0.73}**
-0.004**
[-1.14]**
{-1.25}**
CFDL -0.002**
[-0.67]**
{-0.62}**
-0.001**
[-0.23]**
{-0.22}**
-0.001**
[-0.19]**
{-0.18}**
-0.001**
[-0.24]**
{-0.23}**
-0.002**
[-0.82]**
{-0.78}**
MBDL x CFDH -0.007**
[-1.18]**
{-1.08}**
-0.009**
[-1.42]**
{-1.23}**
-0.009**
[-1.44]**
{-1.22}**
-0.009**
[-1.41]**
{-1.24}**
-0.007**
[-1.22]**
{-1.08}**
LEV -0.004**
[-3.02]**
{-2.39}**
-0.004**
[-2.58]**
{-1.90}**
-0.005**
[-3.02]**
{-2.39}**
MS -0.000**
[-0.12]**
{-0.23}**
-0.000**
[-0.43]**
{-0.44}**
MS^2 0.000**
[0.43]**
{0.43}**
PASTPERF -0.000**
[-0.71]**
{-1.09}**
-0.000**
[-0.70]**
{-1.08}**
-0.000**
[-1.47]**
{-1.60}**
-0.000**
[-1.39]**
{-1.57}**
SIZE -0.000**
[-0.24]**
{-0.22}**
-0.000**
[-0.16]**
{-0.14}**
-0.000**
[-0.23]**
{-0.23}**
0.000**
[0.59]**
{0.59}**
R-sq 0.105** 0.123** 0.123** 0.123** 0.109**
Adj R-sq 0.097** 0.109** 0.108** 0.111** 0.098**
F-significant 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
B-P-G test 8.182** 10.247** 10.301** 8.765** 7.902**
ARCH test 0.000** 0.007** 0.006** 0.007** 0.000**
Harvey test 9.000** 11.773** 15.375** 9.755** 11.587**
Glejser test 14.153** 15.903** 18.574** 14.309** 15.343**
Ramsey Reset
Reset (2) 0.627** 0.128** 0.070** 0.135** 1.032**
Reset (3) 5.264** 15.841** 17.628** 1.816** 2.105**
Reset (4) 3.510** 10.552** 11.731** 1.535** 1.511**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09 respectively.
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 
for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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Consistent with previous intraday results, Table 10.21 shows that abnormal
returns are significantly positively related to firms with high market to book
ratio, and are significantly negatively related to firms with low market to book
ratio.  However, the results for cash flow show that neither high nor low cash
flow is related to abnormal returns associated with physical asset expenditure
announcements.  While the free cash flow interaction term, MBDL × CFDH,
shows the correct coefficient sign, it is not significant.  This is in contrast to the
intraday results presented in Table 8.3.
An unexpected result in Table 10.21 is the significant and negative relationship
between abnormal returns and leverage ratio.  This is contrary to notion that debt
reduces managerial inefficiencies proposed by Jensen (1986a, 1989), Hart and
Moore (1990) and Stulz (1990).  This finding for the leverage ratio is consistent
with the findings of Bhabra, Bhabra and Boyle (1999) who support the argument
that high leverage constrains investment.
10.5 Summary
To conclude, with respect to univariate analysis, the results of the daily analysis
are consistent with the intraday analysis, in particular, the market to book effect
is significant but cash flow effect is not.  The evidence on free cash flow is
generally supported, and is generally consistent with the intraday analysis, except
that the free cash flow evidence is stronger with intraday analysis.
With respect to multivariate analysis, the market to book ratio is significant in all
models, but the cash flow ratio and free cash flow are not significant in any
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models.  Hence, the free cash flow theory and the capital market monitoring
hypothesis are not supported using the daily sample.  No other control variables
are found to be significant except for leverage which is found to be significant
when finer-partitioned dummies are used for the market to book and cash flow
ratios in Table 10.21.
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CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY OF THESIS
11 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a summary of the results and implications of the research.
Comments on directions for future research are also discussed.
11.1 Thesis summary
The thesis represents the first study concerning share price reaction to physical
asset expenditure announcements for Australian firms.  Motivation for the
research was provided in Chapter 1.  Chapter 2 reviewed the theory and
empirical evidence concerning the market variations of physical asset
expenditure announcements.  Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 discussed the three main
theories which are commonly cited in explaining the market responses to capital
expenditures, and mergers and acquisitions.  Section 2.6 provided a discussion of
other explanatory variables.  Hypothesis development was provided in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 discussed the methodological issues.  Chapter 5 described the data
sample and selection procedures.  Chapter 6 provided the descriptive statistics for
the intraday sample.  The univariate and multivariate intraday results were
contained in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively.  Finally, Chapters 9 and 10 provided
the results of sensitivity analysis in relation to different abnormal return
calculation methodology and sampling interval.
The work in this thesis has addressed the following four questions:
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1. What is the overall market reaction to physical asset expenditure
announcements in Australian?
2. Does the market reaction to physical asset expenditure announcements
follow the accumulated evidence of market reaction to merger and
takeover announcements?
3. What are the main factor(s) that determine the market variation associated
with physical asset expenditure announcements? and
4. Is free cash flow an important variable in explaining the market reaction
for physical asset expenditure announcements?
The contribution of this thesis can be summarised as follows.  First, as noted
earlier, this is the first empirical study to examine the share price reaction to
physical asset expenditure announcements in Australia.  Second, this thesis
shows that growth opportunities is the main variable in explaining the market
reaction.  Third, consistent with the extant studies in this area, this thesis
generally does not find support for either the capital monitoring argument or the
free cash flow theory.  Although, when a finer free cash flow proxy is used, free
cash flow is found to be significantly negatively related to abnormal returns.
Hence, we suggest that prior capital expenditure studies which fail to find
evidence for the free cash flow theory may be due to their use of a coarse proxy
for the free cash flow variable.  Finally, this thesis presents evidence which is
inconsistent with the mergers and takeovers literature.  First, the relative size of
physical asset expenditure transactions to firm value is not found to be a
economically significant variable.  Second, all the control variables, which are
found to be important variables in mergers and takeovers, are not found to be
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economically significant explanators once market to book ratio is included.  The
implications of this is further discussed in Section 11.3.
11.2 Summary of results
The main results are summarised in Table 11.1:
Table 11.1: Summary of main findings
Panel A: Univariate
Intraday
Control portfolio Market model
Daily
Growth opportunities   
Free cash flow   
Capital market
monitoring ✗ ✗ ✗
Panel B: Multivariate
Intraday
Control portfolio Market model
Daily
[-1890,
+1890]
[-60,
+60]
Finer
dummy
[-1890,
+1890]
[-60,
+60]
[-20,
+20]
[-1,0] Finer
dummy
Growth opportunities        
Free cash flow ✗ ✗  ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Capital market
monitoring ✗  ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Others ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
1. Intraday analysis reveals that the market response to the overall 170
physical asset expenditure announcements is insignificant across all
windows.  However, the daily analysis reveals that a small but significant
positive CAR is associated with the announcements.  Of the four
windows centred on daily data, three windows exhibit significant CARs.
2. Both intraday analysis and daily analysis show that when the sample is
segregated into high and low market to book ratio samples, the CARs
become significant.  The high market to book ratio sample experiences a
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significant positive CAR, and the low market to book ratio experiences an
insignificant CAR.  The difference in CARs between the high and low
market to book ratio samples is significant across all windows.
3. When both intraday and daily samples are segregated into market to book
ratio quartiles, the market to book effect is even more pronounced, such
that the highest market to book ratio quartile exhibits a significant
positive CAR over all windows, and the lowest market to book ratio
quartile exhibits a significant negative CAR over the majority windows.
The difference in CARs between the highest and lowest market to book
ratio quartiles is significant across all windows.
4. The univariate results concerning the free cash flow are generally
supported.  Intraday analysis provides stronger evidence supporting the
free cash flow theory than daily analysis.
5. Neither intraday nor daily analysis supports the capital market monitoring
argument in a univariate setting.
6. Multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis reveals that the market to
book ratio is significantly positively related to the CARs in all the five
regression models, and the significant positive relation is robust to
different abnormal return measures and different sampling interval.
7. The results of free cash flow are mixed in multivariate analysis.  For
intraday data, free cash flow is found to be insignificant in all the five
regression models using both the control portfolio method, and the
constrained (0,1) market model.  However, the free cash flow variable is
significantly negatively related to CARs when a finer free cash flow
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dummy is used.  When daily data are used, the free cash flow variable is
never significant.
8. The capital market monitoring hypothesis is generally not supported in
the multivariate analysis.  The cash flow variable is not significant in any
case using daily data.  Using intraday data, regression analysis shows that
cash flow is significantly negatively related to CARs for the two shorter
windows, but insignificant over the remaining longer windows.
9. Control variables are not significant in any case with one exception.
Leverage is found to be significantly negatively related to CARs in the
regression model in which a finer free cash flow proxy is used but only in
the daily sample.
10. There is little difference in the intraday results between the control
portfolio method and the constrained (0,1) market model.
11.3 Implications
Physical asset expenditure announcements using intraday data are associated
with an insignificant abnormal return across the full sample.  This is consistent
with the mergers and takeovers literature [Jensen and Ruback (1983), and Jarrell,
Brickley and Netter (1988)], but prima facie inconsistent with the capital
expenditure literature [Woolridge (1988), Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990),
Szewczyk, Testeskos and Zantout (1996), and Chen and Ho (1997)].  However,
the results of the daily analysis provide evidence consistent with existing capital
expenditures studies.  It should be noted that the results for the full sample may
not be particularly important as they mask other effects which are revealed in
disaggregated analysis.
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The overall evidence suggests that growth opportunities is singularly the most
important variable explaining the abnormal returns of physical asset expenditure
announcements.  This finding is consistent with previous work of Chen and Ho
(1997), Chung, Wright and Charoenwong (1998), and Szewczyk, Testeskos and
Zantout (1996).
The relative size of the physical asset expenditure transactions to firm value is
not found to be an important explanator in the multivariate analysis.  This is in
contrast to the findings of Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983).  This suggests
that the equity market in Australia reacts to physical asset expenditure
announcements because of the information concerning growth opportunities
rather than the size of the transactions.
The free cash flow variable is not found to be a significant variable.  It is hard to
envisage why free cash flow is found to be an important variable in the context
of mergers and acquisitions, but not in capital expenditures studies.  For instance,
Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), Smith and Kim (1994), and Harford (1999) all
find support for free cash flow theory.  One conjecture is that if a firm is
endowed with free cash flow, and if managers are self-interested such that they
are motivated to increase the size of firms at the expense of shareholders, it is
possible that mergers and takeovers are a better means of achieving their goals
than physical asset expenditures.
No support is found for capital market monitoring.  This suggests that there may
be more than one disciplinary mechanism for monitoring managers in Australia.
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For instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) find that for the
majority of the 27 wealthy nations (other than the US), controlling shareholders
are important in monitoring self-interested managers, and have power over firms’
excess cash flow.
When the sample is segregated into market to book ratio quartiles, the market to
book effect accentuates these results such that the highest market to book ratio
quartile enjoys significant positive abnormal returns, whereas, the lowest market
to book ratio quartile suffers significant negative abnormal returns.  The market
to book effect in the middle quartiles is obscure.  This suggests that previous
research which fails to segregate the market to book into finer partitions, might
mask important results.
This research refutes the argument that the stock market is myopic since no
consistent evidence of negative abnormal returns is documented in physical asset
expenditure announcements.  The overriding factor which determines the market
response is the market to book ratio.  To the extent that market to book ratio
measures a firm’s growth opportunities, the results suggest that positive
abnormal returns can be earned if a firm’s growth opportunities are favourable.
11.4 Future research
Finally, several issues remain unexplored.  First, the difference in market
reaction between mergers and acquisitions, and physical asset expenditures is not
well understood.  A comparative analysis of the same firms concerning mergers
and acquisitions and physical asset expenditures may help to determine whether
241
there is any fundamental difference between these two forms of acquisitions.  A
second question is how does the market react to physical asset expenditure
announcements made by financially distressed firms?  Specifically, does the
equity market view physical asset expenditures as one of the means of
restructuring when firms are in financial distress?  Further, what is the impact on
operating performance after the physical asset expenditure announcements take
place?
In conclusion, the thesis and its results pave the way for further research in this
area.  The findings demonstrate new insights into the areas of agency
relationships, free cash flow and investment decisions.  However, there is much
work that remains to be done.
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APPENDIX I
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - INTRADAY SAMPLES
Figure 9.1A: Mean CARs for the full sample over a [-1890,+1890] minute window.
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Table 9.1A: Mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the full sample (N=170).  The
column, AR > 0 (%), is the percentage of positive abnormal returns for each 15-minute interval, and it is
test for statistical difference from 50% using a non-parametric binomial test.  Mean CARs are calculated by
first summing up ARs across time in order to get the desired window, and then summing up each CAR
cross-sectionally to get the CAR for the full sample.  Finally the CAR for the full sample is divided by
number of observations.  See Chapter 4 for a description of the methodology.  * and ** represent the 5%
and 1% levels of significance.
Time AR (%) t-stat AR>0 (%) CAR (%) t-stat
t-360 -0.042 -0.44 49.7 0.282 0.41
t-345 -0.007 -0.72 53.5 0.275 0.47
t-330 -0.011 -0.52 50.6 0.286 0.42
t-315 -0.024 -0.29 55.3 0.310 0.44
t-300 -0.041 -0.71 58.8 0.352 0.50
t-285 -0.003 -0.87 56.5 0.355 0.68
t-270 -0.010 -0.69 53.8 0.366 0.58
t-255 -0.018 -0.33 53.5 0.348 0.54
t-240 -0.004 -0.51 55.3 0.352 0.57
t-225 -0.011 -1.06 46.5 0.341 0.49
t-210 -0.031 -1.24 58.2 0.371 0.55
t-195 -0.011 -1.77* 53.5 0.382 0.66
t-180 -0.018 -0.92 52.4 0.400 0.70
t-165 -0.016 -0.04 48.8 0.384 0.69
t-150 -0.039 -1.12 48.8 0.423 0.60
t-135 -0.035 -1.56 48.8 0.388 0.50
t-120 -0.025 -0.21 48.2 0.413 0.49
t-105 -0.017 -0.47 52.4 0.396 0.46
t-90 -0.018 -0.36 51.2 0.379 0.48
t-75 -0.013 -1.04 52.4 0.392 0.56
t-60 -0.010 -0.86 52.9 0.402 0.50
t-45 -0.010 -0.12 47.9 0.412 0.51
t-30 -0.023 -0.62 51.5 0.436 0.54
t-15 -0.049 -0.31 47.9 0.387 0.56
t-0 -0.005 -0.83 51.8 0.382 0.63
t+15 -0.007 -0.40 56.8 0.375 0.59
t+30 -0.055 -0.66 45.6 0.430 0.52
t+45 -0.012 -0.54 48.5 0.442 0.47
t+60 -0.029 -0.98 48.5 0.471 0.55
t+75 -0.018 -0.83 52.7 0.490 0.45
t+90 -0.025 -1.04 46.4 0.464 0.35
t+105 -0.002 -0.74 45.8 0.463 0.31
t+120 -0.026 -0.54 55.3 0.489 0.34
t+135 -0.035 -0.41 56.8 0.524 0.36
t+150 -0.057 -1.52 52.1 0.581 0.49
t+165 -0.004 -0.20 50.6 0.577 0.49
t+180 -0.019 -0.03 54.1 0.596 0.49
t+195 -0.011 -0.80 51.5 0.607 0.43
t+210 -0.005 -0.86 52.9 0.602 0.51
t+225 -0.004 -0.07 50.6 0.605 0.52
t+240 -0.015 -1.57 49.1 0.621 0.62
t+255 -0.011 -1.17 51.5 0.631 0.69
t+270 -0.007 -0.24 49.7 0.639 0.68
t+285 -0.037 -0.66 56.8 0.602 0.56
t+300 -0.032 -1.26 53.5 0.634 0.62
t+315 -0.012 -0.39 53.5 0.622 0.58
t+330 -0.007 -0.24 50.0 0.614 0.54
t+345 -0.005 -0.38 50.6 0.619 0.56
t+360 -0.025 -0.77 48.8 0.595 0.50
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Table 9.2A: Summary of mean CARs for the full sample.  * represents the 5% level of significance.
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] [-60,+60] [0,+360] [-5,+5] [-2,+2] [-1+1]
N 170 170 170 170 170* 170
Mean CAR (%) -0.013 -0.018 0.133 0.731 1.115* 0.358
t-statistic -0.061 -0.115 0.380 1.102 2.21*3 0.770
Figure 9.2A: Mean CARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window segregated into high and
low market to book ratio samples.
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Figure 9.3A: Mean CARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window segregated into market to
book ratio quartiles respectively, lowest (Q1), second lowest (Q2), second highest (Q3),
and highest (Q4).
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Table 9.3A: Mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the lower and higher than median
market to book ratio samples.  Each sample contains 85 observations.  The column, AR > 0 (%), is the
percentage of positive abnormal returns for each 15-minute interval, and it is tested for statistical difference
from 50% using a non-parametric binomial test.  The last two columns ARlow-ARhigh, refer to the mean
difference in abnormal returns between the two samples.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of
significance.
Lower than median subsample Higher than median subsample ARlow-ARhigh
Time AR
(%)
t-stat AR >0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR >0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff
(%)
t-stat
t-360 -0.010 -0.25** 45.9 -0.659 -1.23** -0.039 -0.60** 53.6 1.021 1.98** -0.028 -0.38**
t-345 -0.003 -0.10** 54.1 -0.656 -1.23** -0.040 -0.77** 52.9 1.060 2.07** -0.036 -0.49**
t-330 -0.010 -0.31** 47.1 -0.666 -1.23** -0.044 -0.75** 54.1 1.017 1.98** -0.034 -0.45**
t-315 -0.008 -0.18** 58.8 -0.658 -1.22** -0.018 -0.49** 51.8 1.035 2.01** -0.010 -0.13**
t-300 -0.053 -1.70** 55.3 -0.604 -1.11** -0.056 -1.28** 62.4 1.091 2.12** -0.002 -0.03**
t-285 -0.029 -0.34** 62.4 -0.633 -1.24** -0.070 -1.33** 50.6 1.161 2.25** -0.099 -1.37**
t-270 -0.056 -0.64** 54.8 -0.690 -1.37** -0.044 -1.50** 52.9 1.205 2.30** -0.100 -1.38**
t-255 -0.035 -0.70** 56.5 -0.724 -1.39** -0.014 -0.54** 50.6 1.219 2.31** -0.049 -0.66**
t-240 -0.001 -0.03** 54.1 -0.723 -1.37** -0.037 -1.17** 56.5 1.256 2.36** -0.036 -0.48**
t-225 -0.015 -0.43** 44.7 -0.739 -1.37** -0.040 -1.18** 48.2 1.216 2.24** -0.024 -0.32**
t-210 -0.035 -1.24** 58.8 -0.703 -1.28** -0.032 -0.87** 57.6 1.248 2.24** -0.003 -0.04**
t-195 -0.072 -2.11** 56.5 -0.631 -1.15** -0.050 -1.21** 50.6 1.298 2.28** -0.022 -0.28**
t-180 -0.100 -2.71** 52.9 -0.531 -0.96** -0.030 -0.82** 51.8 1.328 2.26** -0.070 -0.86**
t-165 -0.021 -0.55** 51.8 -0.510 -0.91** -0.001 -0.02** 45.9 1.329 2.21** -0.020 -0.24**
t-150 -0.052 -1.43** 43.5 -0.562 -1.00** -0.021 -0.47** 54.1 1.350 2.19** -0.073 -0.87**
t-135 -0.019 -0.72** 50.6 -0.581 -1.03** -0.019 -0.72** 47.1 1.369 2.22** -0.038 -0.45**
t-120 -0.084 -2.56** 40.0 -0.665 -1.17** -0.081 -2.81** 56.5 1.450 2.33** -0.165 -1.96**
t-105 -0.033 -0.96** 49.4 -0.698 -1.23** -0.024 -0.59** 55.3 1.474 2.37** -0.057 -0.68**
t-90 -0.059 -1.74** 41.2 -0.757 -1.33** -0.084 -2.33** 61.2 1.558 2.53** -0.143 -1.71**
t-75 -0.065 -1.72** 38.8 -0.822 -1.43** -0.083 -3.31** 65.9 1.641 2.65** -0.148 -1.75**
t-60 -0.188 -3.25** 37.6 -1.010 -1.79** -0.079 -3.03** 68.2 1.720 2.75** -0.267 -3.17**
t-45 -0.070 -1.65** 36.5 -1.080 -1.90** -0.095 -2.55** 59.5 1.815 2.91** -0.165 -1.95**
t-30 -0.073 -2.05** 32.9 -1.153 -2.04** -0.109 -2.72** 70.2 1.924 3.06** -0.182 -2.16**
t-15 -0.107 -2.38** 41.2 -1.261 -2.20** -0.100 -2.71** 54.8 2.024 3.16** -0.207 -2.41**
t-0 -0.074 -1.55** 37.8 -1.335 -2.31** -0.143 -3.15** 65.5 2.167 3.31** -0.217 -2.49**
t+15 -0.090 -1.30** 58.8 -1.425 -2.41** -0.046 -1.26** 54.8 2.213 3.37** -0.136 -1.53**
t+30 -0.114 -2.52** 35.3 -1.539 -2.59** -0.069 -1.78** 56.0 2.282 3.45** -0.183 -2.06**
t+45 -0.020 -0.48** 47.1 -1.559 -2.60** -0.052 -1.05** 50.0 2.334 3.48** -0.073 -0.81**
t+60 -0.031 -0.77** 44.7 -1.590 -2.62** -0.039 -0.75** 52.4 2.373 3.56** -0.070 -0.77**
t+75 -0.036 -0.86** 52.9 -1.626 -2.64** -0.040 -0.79** 52.4 2.413 3.66** -0.076 -0.84**
t+90 -0.008 -0.23** 45.9 -1.634 -2.62** -0.024 -0.58** 47.0 2.389 3.67** -0.016 -0.17**
t+105 -0.023 -0.66** 46.4 -1.658 -2.62** -0.019 -0.53** 45.2 2.370 3.67** -0.005 -0.05**
t+120 -0.041 -0.97** 54.1 -1.617 -2.52** -0.008 -0.26** 56.5 2.378 3.71** -0.033 -0.36**
t+135 -0.038 -1.26** 56.5 -1.579 -2.45** -0.004 -0.10** 57.1 2.374 3.71** -0.042 -0.47**
t+150 -0.008 -0.25** 45.9 -1.587 -2.45** -0.059 -1.66** 58.3 2.434 3.81** -0.068 -0.74**
t+165 -0.039 -1.46** 44.7 -1.626 -2.48** -0.071 -1.22** 56.5 2.504 3.87** -0.110 -1.19**
t+180 -0.048 -1.21** 51.8 -1.675 -2.51** -0.057 -1.71** 56.5 2.561 3.94** -0.105 -1.13**
t+195 -0.080 -1.56** 48.2 -1.755 -2.60** -0.011 -0.23** 54.8 2.572 4.01** -0.091 -0.97**
t+210 -0.040 -0.47** 48.2 -1.715 -2.57** -0.025 -0.62** 57.6 2.597 4.09** -0.015 -0.16**
t+225 -0.035 -0.87** 45.9 -1.750 -2.64** -0.017 -0.42** 55.3 2.614 4.05** -0.052 -0.56**
t+240 -0.049 -0.86** 48.2 -1.701 -2.56** -0.056 -1.30** 50.0 2.669 4.06** -0.007 -0.07**
t+255 -0.007 -0.16** 45.9 -1.695 -2.55** -0.054 -1.10** 57.1 2.724 4.03** -0.048 -0.51**
t+270 -0.000 -0.00** 45.9 -1.695 -2.53** -0.040 -0.98** 53.6 2.764 4.15** -0.040 -0.42**
t+285 -0.109 -0.87** 49.4 -1.804 -2.44** -0.037 -1.19** 64.3 2.801 4.20** -0.147 -1.47**
t+300 -0.007 -0.19** 48.2 -1.797 -2.40** -0.108 -2.59** 58.8 2.909 4.31** -0.101 -1.00**
t+315 -0.062 -0.90** 52.9 -1.859 -2.39** -0.019 -0.40** 54.1 2.928 4.30** -0.080 -0.78**
t+330 -0.069 -1.10** 50.6 -1.928 -2.39** -0.060 -1.18** 49.4 2.988 4.30** -0.130 -1.22**
t+345 -0.044 -0.80** 54.1 -1.885 -2.26** -0.011 -0.23** 47.1 2.977 4.23** -0.054 -0.50**
t+360 -0.083 -1.39** 48.2 -1.967 -2.29** -0.018 -0.41** 49.4 2.995 4.20** -0.100 -0.90**
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Table 9.4A: Summary of mean CARs and mean difference in CARs for the high and low market to
book ratio firms.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
HIGH MARKET TO BOOK
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] [-60,+60] [0,+360] [-5,+5] [-2,+2] [-1+1]
N 85** 85** 85** 85** 85** 85**
Mean CAR (%) 1.009** 0.732** 0.971** 3.499** 2.940** 2.013**
Stdev 0.022** 0.017** 0.027** 0.076** 0.056** 0.041**
t-statistic 4.27**3 4.04**3 3.36**3 4.26*3* 4.83**3 4.55**3
LOW MARKET TO BOOK
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] [-60,+60] [0,+360] [-5,+5] [-2,+2] [-1+1]
N 85** 85** 85** 85** 85** 85**
Mean CAR (%) -1.036** -0.768** -0.706** -2.117** -0.631** -1.298**
Stdev -0.031** -0.021** -0.058** -0.088** -0.074** -0.072**
t-statistic -3.06**3 -3.46**3 -1.126** -2.22*3* -0.783** -1.666**
Test for mean CAR difference between high market to book and low market to book firms
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] [-60,+60] [0,+360] [-5,+5] [-2,+2] [-1+1]
Mean CARs
difference (%) 2.045** 1.500** 1.678** 5.616** 3.571** 3.311**
t-statistic 4.95**3 5.22**3 2.43**3 4.46**3 3.54**3 3.70**3
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Table 9.5A: Mean ARs and CARs for the lowest and highest market to book ratio quartiles, containing 42
and 44 respectively.  The column, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage of positive abnormal returns for each 15-
minute interval, and it is tested for statistical difference from 50% using a non-parametric binomial test.
The last two columns ARlow-ARhigh, refer to the mean difference in abnormal returns between the two
samples.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Lowest M/B Ratio Quartile Highest M/B Ratio Quartile ARlow-ARhigh
Time AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff t-stat
t-360 -0.047 -0.88** 35.7 -1.009 -1.52** -0.145 -1.22** 59.1 2.023 2.80** -0.192 -1.31**
t-345 -0.033 -0.64** 54.8 -0.976 -1.46** -0.047 -0.52** 52.3 2.070 2.92** -0.014 -0.10**
t-330 -0.031 -0.57** 47.6 -1.008 -1.48** -0.054 -0.74** 59.1 2.124 2.99** -0.085 -0.59**
t-315 -0.068 -0.93** 52.4 -1.076 -1.57** -0.036 -0.80** 54.5 2.160 3.04** -0.105 -0.72**
t-300 -0.099 -1.97** 59.5 -0.977 -1.41** -0.077 -1.52** 68.2 2.238 3.17** -0.022 -0.15**
t-285 -0.054 -1.23** 61.9 -0.922 -1.32** -0.191 -2.78** 63.6 2.428 3.51** -0.136 -0.94**
t-270 -0.023 -0.23** 46.3 -0.945 -1.29** -0.072 -1.69** 59.1 2.500 3.54** -0.095 -0.65**
t-255 -0.006 -0.07** 69.0 -0.939 -1.21** -0.022 -0.58** 54.5 2.522 3.54** -0.015 -0.10**
t-240 -0.046 -0.97** 59.5 -0.893 -1.12** -0.074 -1.71** 56.8 2.596 3.61** -0.028 -0.18**
t-225 -0.016 -0.28** 47.6 -0.877 -1.06** -0.005 -0.13** 56.8 2.591 3.56** -0.021 -0.14**
t-210 -0.028 -0.57** 61.9 -0.849 -1.00** -0.059 -1.61** 65.9 2.650 3.59** -0.031 -0.21**
t-195 -0.112 -2.05** 61.9 -0.737 -0.87** -0.023 -0.48** 50.0 2.673 3.52** -0.089 -0.58**
t-180 -0.111 -1.96** 50.0 -0.626 -0.73** -0.108 -1.92** 61.4 2.781 3.52** -0.003 -0.02**
t-165 -0.003 -0.15** 47.6 -0.622 -0.72** -0.095 -2.71** 59.1 2.877 3.62** -0.092 -0.60**
t-150 -0.122 -2.14** 38.1 -0.745 -0.85** -0.050 -1.21** 56.8 2.927 3.73** -0.173 -1.13**
t-135 -0.000 -0.01** 47.6 -0.745 -0.85** -0.007 -0.19** 43.2 2.920 3.74** -0.007 -0.04**
t-120 -0.131 -2.61** 38.1 -0.876 -0.98** -0.135 -3.53** 65.9 3.055 3.86** -0.266 -1.75**
t-105 -0.013 -0.28** 47.6 -0.889 -1.00** -0.088 -1.51** 63.6 3.144 3.97** -0.102 -0.67**
t-90 -0.086 -1.81** 33.3 -0.975 -1.09** -0.124 -2.57** 63.6 3.267 4.14** -0.210 -1.38**
t-75 -0.077 -1.23** 42.9 -1.052 -1.16** -0.088 -2.32* 61.4 3.355 4.23** -0.165 -1.09**
t-60 -0.319 -3.00** 33.3 -1.371 -1.55** -0.124 -3.06** 75.0 3.480 4.35** -0.443 -3.03**
t-45 -0.087 -1.58** 38.1 -1.458 -1.63** -0.151 -2.69** 65.1 3.630 4.56** -0.238 -1.61**
t-30 -0.102 -1.93** 38.1 -1.560 -1.77** -0.142 -2.12** 67.4 3.772 4.63** -0.243 -1.67**
t-15 -0.231 -3.26** 26.2 -1.791 -2.04** -0.169 -2.77** 58.1 3.941 4.70** -0.400 -2.74**
t-0 -0.185 -2.94** 33.3 -1.976 -2.23** -0.277 -3.72** 74.4 4.218 4.93** -0.462 -3.16**
t+15 -0.219 -1.76** 50.0 -2.196 -2.42** -0.111 -2.04** 62.8 4.329 5.09** -0.330 -2.24**
t+30 -0.171 -1.97** 31.0 -2.366 -2.58** -0.134 -2.32** 62.8 4.463 5.22** -0.305 -2.06**
t+45 -0.008 -0.10** 50.0 -2.374 -2.55** -0.075 -0.99** 48.8 4.538 5.23** -0.083 -0.90**
t+60 -0.018 -0.24** 47.6 -2.392 -2.51** -0.032 -0.35** 44.2 4.570 5.36** -0.050 -0.52**
t+75 -0.081 -1.05** 52.4 -2.473 -2.53** -0.067 -0.81** 46.5 4.637 5.57** -0.148 -1.51**
t+90 -0.060 -0.90** 42.9 -2.533 -2.52** -0.020 -0.28** 51.2 4.618 5.65** -0.040 -0.40**
t+105 -0.039 -0.62** 48.8 -2.572 -2.49** -0.009 -0.22** 41.9 4.609 5.64** -0.031 -0.30**
t+120 -0.049 -0.75** 61.9 -2.523 -2.38** -0.020 -0.39** 50.0 4.589 5.68** -0.069 -0.65**
t+135 -0.051 -1.08** 59.5 -2.472 -2.30** -0.014 -0.39** 56.8 4.603 5.70** -0.037 -0.34**
t+150 -0.019 -0.36** 42.9 -2.491 -2.30** -0.053 -0.93** 56.8 4.657 5.77** -0.073 -0.67**
t+165 -0.044 -1.29** 42.9 -2.536 -2.32** -0.070 -0.66** 56.8 4.726 5.76** -0.114 -1.04**
t+180 -0.110 -2.13** 42.9 -2.646 -2.39** -0.054 -1.27** 52.3 4.780 5.82** -0.164 -1.48**
t+195 -0.143 -1.88** 33.3 -2.789 -2.52** -0.003 -0.04** 56.8 4.783 5.96** -0.146 -1.32**
t+210 -0.071 -0.44** 38.1 -2.717 -2.52** -0.008 -0.17** 54.5 4.775 5.98** -0.080 -0.74**
t+225 -0.010 -0.14** 45.2 -2.727 -2.54** -0.012 -0.19** 54.5 4.787 5.80** -0.022 -0.20**
t+240 -0.084 0.85** 38.1 -2.643 -2.47** -0.054 -0.86** 50.0 4.841 5.72** 0.029 0.27**
t+255 -0.043 -1.16** 42.9 -2.687 -2.51** -0.138 -1.59** 59.1 4.979 5.62** -0.181 -1.69**
t+270 0.033 -0.42** 47.6 -2.653 -2.47** -0.027 -0.65** 59.1 4.952 5.62** -0.060 -0.56**
t+285 -0.222 -0.95** 47.6 -2.875 -2.35** -0.020 -0.54** 70.5 4.972 5.59** -0.242 -1.98**
t+300 -0.004 -0.08** 47.6 -2.871 -2.31** -0.182 -2.79** 63.6 5.154 5.73** -0.178 -1.43**
t+315 -0.130 -1.26** 40.5 -3.000 -2.30** -0.018 -0.26** 54.5 5.172 5.59** -0.147 -1.13**
t+330 -0.151 -1.43** 45.2 -3.152 -2.30** -0.104 -1.21** 56.8 5.277 5.47** -0.256 -1.87**
t+345 -0.024 -0.23** 42.9 -3.176 -2.21** -0.062 -0.77** 50.0 5.339 5.42** -0.086 -0.60**
t+360 -0.118 -1.37** 45.2 -3.294 -2.22** -0.041 -0.62** 50.0 5.380 5.33** -0.159 -1.08**
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Table 9.6A: Summary of mean CARs and mean difference in CARs for the market to book ratio quartiles.
* and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
PANEL A
HIGHEST MARKET TO BOOK
Minute windows Daily windows
[-120,+120] [-60,+60] [0,+360] [-5,+5] [-2,+2] [-1+1]
N 44** 44** 44** 44** 44** 44**
Mean CAR (%) 1.669** 1.215** 1.439** 6.381** 5.108** 3.502**
Stdev 0.023** 0.019** 0.030** 0.077** 0.055** 0.045**
t-statistic 4.795** 4.231** 3.179** 5.501** 6.161** 5.186**
SECOND HIGHEST MARKET TO BOOK
N 42** 42** 42** 42** 42** 42**
Mean CAR (%) 0.288** 0.188** 0.400** 0.225** 0.570** 0.383**
Stdev 0.018** 0.012** 0.022** 0.061** 0.047** 0.028**
t-statistic 1.048** 1.018** 1.188** 0.237** 0.778** 0.871**
SECOND LOWEST MARKET TO BOOK
N 42** 42** 42** 42** 42** 42**
Mean CAR (%) -0.313** -0.192** 0.034** 0.002** 0.834** -0.273**
Stdev -0.019** -0.015** 0.005** 0.082** 0.060** -0.042**
t-statistic -1.049** -0.814** 0.489** 0.001** 0.894** -0.421**
LOWEST MARKET TO BOOK
N 42** 42** 42** 42** 42** 42**
Mean CAR (%) -1.778** -1.340** -1.503** -4.113** -2.081** -2.331**
Stdev -0.039** -0.024** -0.047** -0.091** -0.085** -0.093**
t-statistic -2.962** -3.658** -2.073** -2.944** -1.588** -1.631**
PANEL B: TEST FOR MEAN DIFFERENCE IN CARs
Mean difference in CARs between the highest and lowest market to book ratio firms
Mean CAR
difference (%) 3.446** 2.555** 2.942** 10.494** 7.189** 5.834**
t-statistic 4.967** 5.489** 3.442** 5.779** 4.636** 3.690**
Mean difference in CARs between the 2nd highest and 2nd lowest market to book ratio firms
Mean CAR
difference (%) 0.600** 0.380** 0.366** 0.223** -0.264** 0.656**
t-statistic 1.481** 1.268** 1.063** 0.141** -0.222** 0.837**
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Figure 9.4A: Mean CARs over a [-1890,+1890] minute window segregated into cash flow
ratio quartiles respectively, lowest (Q1), second lowest (Q2), second highest (Q3), and
highest (Q4).
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Table 9.7A: Mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the lowest and highest cash flow
ratio quartiles, containing 42 and 44 observations respectively.  The column, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage
of positive abnormal returns for each 15-minute interval, and it is tested for statistical difference from 50%
using a non-parametric binomial test.  The last two columns ARlow-ARhigh, refer to the mean difference in
abnormal returns between the lowset and highest cash flow ratio firms.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1%
levels of significance.
Lowest CF/TA Ratio Quartile Highest CF/TA Ratio Quartile ARlow-ARhigh
Time AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff t-stat
t-360 -0.095 -1.68* 50.0 -0.790 -1.20 -0.045 -1.71* 50.0 0.579 1.00 -0.140 -1.61*
t-345 -0.064 -1.00* 64.3 -0.725 -1.13 -0.007 -0.20* 43.2 0.572 0.98 -0.071 -0.82*
t-330 -0.045 -0.48* 57.1 -0.681 -1.06 -0.007 -0.18* 52.3 0.578 0.99 -0.038 -0.44*
t-315 -0.020 -0.20* 57.1 -0.661 -1.00 -0.013 -0.37* 50.0 0.565 0.98 -0.032 -0.37*
t-300 -0.177 -1.54* 40.5 -0.838 -1.19 -0.064 -1.86* 59.1 0.629 1.08 -0.240 -2.24*
t-285 -0.187 -0.87* 52.4 -0.651 -1.00 -0.000 -0.01* 52.3 0.629 1.08 -0.187 -2.15*
t-270 -0.127 -0.97* 54.8 -0.778 -1.14 -0.047 -1.71* 61.4 0.676 1.16 -0.175 -1.96*
t-255 -0.002 -0.02* 57.1 -0.780 -1.15 -0.018 -0.98* 56.8 0.695 1.18 -0.020 -0.23*
t-240 -0.118 -2.03* 42.9 -0.898 -1.31 -0.033 -1.21* 59.1 0.728 1.23 -0.151 -1.68*
t-225 -0.031 -0.65* 50.0 -0.930 -1.36 -0.014 -0.40* 50.0 0.742 1.25 -0.046 -0.51*
t-210 -0.075 -1.97* 57.1 -0.854 -1.23 -0.065 -2.23* 65.9 0.807 1.35 -0.010 -0.11*
t-195 -0.100 -2.16* 52.4 -0.755 -1.08 -0.041 -1.94* 59.1 0.847 1.41 -0.059 -0.65*
t-180 -0.028 -0.42* 50.0 -0.783 -1.10 -0.071 -2.24* 61.4 0.958 1.61 -0.139 -1.50*
t-165 -0.011 -0.21* 35.7 -0.794 -1.10 -0.051 -1.36* 56.8 1.009 1.69 -0.062 -0.66*
t-150 -0.055 -1.27* 40.5 -0.849 -1.15 -0.006 -0.25* 54.5 1.015 1.70 -0.062 -0.65*
t-135 -0.045 -0.93* 57.1 -0.894 -1.17 -0.083 -1.26* 47.7 0.932 1.56 -0.038 -0.39*
t-120 -0.092 -1.70* 54.8 -0.802 -1.07 -0.006 -0.14* 59.1 0.938 1.59 -0.086 -0.91*
t-105 -0.061 -1.39* 50.0 -0.742 -0.99 -0.011 -0.25* 45.5 0.927 1.59 -0.071 -0.76*
t-90 -0.022 -0.64* 45.2 -0.719 -0.99 -0.013 -0.40* 61.4 0.940 1.60 -0.009 -0.10*
t-75 -0.048 -0.51* 45.2 -0.672 -0.96 -0.008 -0.19* 52.3 0.948 1.65 -0.040 -0.45*
t-60 -0.043 -0.83* 50.0 -0.715 -1.01 -0.082 -1.79* 70.5 1.030 1.81 -0.125 -1.39*
t-45 -0.025 -0.38* 45.2 -0.690 -0.98 -0.026 -0.44* 56.8 1.004 1.77 -0.051 -0.56*
t-30 -0.071 -1.08* 61.9 -0.619 -0.87 -0.014 -0.85* 36.4 0.990 1.73 -0.086 -0.94*
t-15 -0.019 -0.28* 42.9 -0.638 -0.91 -0.006 -0.19* 47.7 0.984 1.68 -0.013 -0.14*
t-0 -0.009 -0.10* 45.2 -0.647 -0.93 -0.017 -0.54* 54.5 1.000 1.71 -0.026 -0.28*
t+15 -0.060 -0.66* 57.1 -0.707 -1.01 -0.019 -0.65* 47.7 0.981 1.67 -0.041 -0.45*
t+30 -0.006 -0.07* 45.2 -0.701 -1.01 -0.034 -0.72* 52.3 1.015 1.69 -0.028 -0.31*
t+45 -0.060 -0.79* 40.5 -0.642 -0.94 -0.011 -0.39* 54.5 1.004 1.67 -0.071 -0.78*
t+60 -0.235 -2.09* 61.9 -0.406 -0.58 -0.036 -1.60* 36.4 0.969 1.61 -0.271 -2.95*
t+75 -0.082 -0.91* 52.4 -0.488 -0.69 -0.041 -1.89* 40.9 0.927 1.55 -0.041 -0.44*
t+90 -0.189 -1.79* 33.3 -0.677 -0.94 -0.051 -2.29* 31.8 0.877 1.46 -0.138 -1.47*
t+105 -0.046 -0.99* 42.9 -0.723 -1.01 -0.033 -1.47* 43.2 0.844 1.41 -0.013 -0.14*
t+120 -0.040 -0.76* 50.0 -0.763 -1.09 -0.030 -0.80* 52.3 0.874 1.45 -0.070 -0.76*
t+135 -0.049 -0.90* 54.8 -0.812 -1.17 -0.014 -0.47* 38.6 0.860 1.42 -0.035 -0.38*
t+150 -0.195 -1.32* 61.9 -0.618 -0.89 -0.000 -0.02* 45.5 0.860 1.41 -0.195 -2.12*
t+165 -0.126 -2.19* 40.5 -0.743 -1.08 -0.079 -0.83* 45.5 0.939 1.45 -0.205 -2.16*
t+180 -0.048 -1.26* 45.2 -0.791 -1.13 -0.100 -2.13* 54.5 1.039 1.59 -0.148 -1.54*
t+195 -0.024 -0.34* 64.3 -0.815 -1.14 -0.044 -0.79* 56.8 1.083 1.69 -0.068 -0.71*
t+210 -0.155 -0.98* 57.1 -0.660 -0.93 -0.008 -0.24* 54.5 1.091 1.71 -0.147 -1.54*
t+225 -0.010 -0.18* 47.6 -0.651 -0.92 -0.000 -0.00* 38.6 1.091 1.71 -0.010 -0.10*
t+240 -0.009 -0.30* 45.2 -0.641 -0.90 -0.011 -0.17* 56.8 1.102 1.72 -0.002 -0.02*
t+255 -0.014 -0.41* 50.0 -0.627 -0.88 -0.057 -0.74* 38.6 1.160 1.76 -0.043 -0.45*
t+270 -0.001 -0.04* 50.0 -0.626 -0.88 -0.058 -1.28* 36.4 1.101 1.67 -0.060 -0.61*
t+285 -0.055 -1.78* 61.9 -0.571 -0.80 -0.005 -0.09* 52.3 1.106 1.64 -0.050 -0.51*
t+300 -0.111 -1.95* 52.4 -0.460 -0.64 -0.106 -1.95* 31.8 1.000 1.46 -0.217 -2.19*
t+315 -0.037 -0.82* 52.4 -0.497 -0.70 -0.005 -0.08* 45.5 1.005 1.50 -0.042 -0.43*
t+330 -0.055 -1.04* 50.0 -0.552 -0.78 -0.017 -0.47* 50.0 0.987 1.49 -0.038 -0.39*
t+345 -0.074 -1.13* 45.2 -0.479 -0.68 -0.063 -1.42* 40.9 0.925 1.40 -0.136 -1.41*
t+360 -0.048 -0.93* 64.3 -0.431 -0.61 -0.018 -0.56* 36.4 0.907 1.36 -0.066 -0.68*
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Table 9.8A: The value in each cell represents mean CARs for the [-5,+5] day window.  In Panel A,
the CARs are sorted into quartiles based on M/B ratio, and within each quartile, the CARs are sorted
into quartiles based on the cash flow to total assets (CF/TA) ratio.  In Panel B, the same process is
repeated for median CARs.  In Panel C, the CARs are sorted on CF/TA first, and then on M/B ratio.
The same process is repeated for Panel D.  The mean (median) difference is for the mean (median)
difference in CARs between the lowest and highest cells.  The t-statistic is for the mean (median)
CARs difference.  * and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Panel A: Cash flow effect after controlling for market to book
Market to book
0.105 - 0.871 0.872 - 1.091 1.101 - 1.675 1.675 - 4.574
Lowest -5.88% -2.93% 3.46% -8.16%
Low -6.94% -1.77% 1.25% -7.79%
High -4.63% -0.86% 2.20% -2.29%
Cash
Flow
Highest -3.57% -2.23% 2.05% -9.12%
Mean difference -2.31% -0.70% 1.41% -0.96%
t-stat -1.19** -0.13- -0.47- -0.19-
Panel B: Cash flow effect after controlling for market to book
Market to book
0.105 - 0.871 0.872 - 1.091 1.101 - 1.675 1.675 - 4.574
Lowest -5.76% -1.90% -2.27% -4.65%
Low -5.24% -0.34% -0.48% -7.25%
High -4.63% -1.58% -1.39% -2.03%
Cash
flow
Highest -3.22% -5.01% -2.69% -6.11%
Median difference -2.54% -3.11% -0.42% -1.46%
t-stat -0.89% -0.25% -0.97% -1.11%
Panel C: Market to book effect after controlling for cash flow
Cash flow
-0.338 - 0.034 0.036 - 0.068 0.068 - 0.094 0.096 - 0.301
Lowest -5.05% -7.44% -3.03% -4.46%
Low -2.67% -0.74% -0.88% -1.05%
High -2.84% -1.37% -0.84% -3.64%
Market
to
book
Highest -5.16% -7.66% -3.27% -9.25%
Mean difference -10.21% -10.10% -6.30% -13.71%
t-stat -2.06** -2.50** -2.98** -2.88**
Panel D: Market to book effect after controlling for cash flow
Cash flow
-0.338 - 0.034 0.036 - 0.068 0.068 - 0.094 0.096 - 0.301
Lowest -4.84% -5.24% -3.05% -4.89%
Low -2.62% -0.48% -1.68% -1.50%
High -2.27% -0.91% -1.56% -3.06%
Market
to
book
Highest -2.72% -5.53% -4.45% -6.90%
Median difference -7.56% -10.77% -7.50% -11.79%
t-stat -2.18** -2.03** -1.99** -2.05**
Noted that the original analysis included two observations with negative market to book value, namely CTR 25/10/95 and CTR 3/6/96.  The negative
market to book values were due to negative net assets in both years.  The exclusion of these two observations does not affect the results, in fact, the
inclusion of the two observations strengthen the results since the CARs associated with the two outliers are -9.407% and -4.436% respectively.
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Table 9.9A: Free cash flow analysis over [-1890,+1890] day window.  Values in parentheses
are t-statistic, standard deviation, and number of observations respectively.  * and **
represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Growth opportunities
Cash flow Low High
High
(A)
-2.179*
(-1.74, 0.082, 38)
(B)
3.424**
(3.21, 0.072, 45)
Low
(C)
-1.937%
(-1.34, 0.096, 44)
(D)
3.213%**
(2.63, 0.08, 43)
2-way ANOVA test, F-stat = 4.255
Table 9.10A: Free cash flow analysis over [-60,+60] minute window.  Values in parentheses
are t-statistic, standard deviation, and number of observations respectively.  * and **
represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Growth opportunities
Cash flow Low High
High
(A)
-0.483%*
(-1.94, 0.015, 38)
(B)
0.538%**
(2.78, 0.013, 45)
Low
(C)
-1.025%**
(-2.77, 0.024, 44)
(D)
0.842%*
(2.77, 0.02, 43)
2-way ANOVA test, F-stat = 4.487
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Table 9.11A: Regression results for 170 intraday sample between 31 July 1995 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-1890, +1890] minute window.
Regression analysis was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Free cash flow is defined as firms with high cash
flow and low market to book ratio.  A dummy of one is assigned to FCF, and zero otherwise.  3-year pre-
announcement risk-adjusted CARs are used as a proxy for managerial past performance.  Square brackets
represent t-statistic.  {} brackets represent the White adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a degree
freedom of 1 for all the five models.  The B-P-G, Harvey and Glejser tests have degrees freedom of 1,7,
8, 6, and 5 for the respective models.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant -0.000**
[-1.02][*
{-0.95}[*
0.024**
[1.45]**
{1.11}[*
0.006**
[0.23]**
{0.25}[*
-0.010**
[-0.37]**
{-0.33}[*
-0.018**
[-0.80]**
{-0.75}[*
FCF -0.009**
[-0.47]**
{-0.38}[*
-0.027**
[-1.42]**
{-1.35}[*
-0.028**
[-1.48]**
{-1.42}[*
-0.008**
[-0.42]**
{-0.40}[*
-0.008**
[-0.44]**
{-0.43}[*
LEV 0.000**
[0.52]**
{0.48}[*
0.000**
[0.42]**
{0.41}[*
0.000**
[0.47]**
{0.44}[*
MB 0.049**
[3.85]**
{2.95}[*
0.033**
[2.59]**
{2.22}[*
0.031**
[2.44]**
{2.14}[*
0.047**
[3.69]**
{2.88}[*
0.047**
[3.71]**
{3.50}[*
MS 0.000**
[0.47]**
{0.44}[*
-0.000**
[-0.34]**
{-0.25}[*
MS^2 0.000**
[-0.51]**
{-0.44}[*
CF 0.003**
[0.89]**
{0.87}[*
0.004**
[1.18]**
{1.11}[*
0.005**
[1.48]**
{1.23}[*
0.003**
[0.95]**
{0.89}[*
0.003**
[0.99]**
{0.94}[*
PASTPERF -0.007**
[-0.96]**
{-0.90}[*
-0.007**
[-0.98]**
{-0.94}[*
0.000**
[0.49]**
{0.42}[*
0.000**
[0.58]**
{0.55}[*
SIZE 0.002**
[1.28]**
{1.20}[*
0.002**
[1.33]**
{1.31}[*
0.003**
[1.61]**
{1.55}[*
0.003**
[1.63]**
{1.53}[*
R-sq 0.103** 0.131** 0.132** 0.126** 0.124**
Adj R-sq 0.094** 0.095** 0.090** 0.093** 0.092**
F-significant 0.000** 0.004** 0.007** 0.000** 0.000**
B-P-G test 2.854** 10.394** 10.258** 1.087** 1.951**
ARCH test 1.132** 1.479** 1.389** 1.591** 1.100**
Harvey test 2.226** 8.413** 10.111** 2.149** 1.254**
Glejser test 2.587** 15.146** 20.648** 3.624** 2.541**
Ramsey Reset **
Reset (2) 1.195** 0.118** 1.133** 1.265** 1.164**
Reset (3) 1.537** 1.258** 0.871** 1.994** 2.047**
Reset (4) 1.028** 1.369** 1.958** 1.254** 1.514**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09  respectively.
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01
 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01 
for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F
0.05
 and F
0.01
 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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Table 9.12A: Regression results for 170 intraday sample between 31 July 1995 and 31 December 1998.
Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns for the [-60, +60] minute window.  Regression
analysis was conducted using Shazam 7.0.  Free cash flow is defined as firms with high cash flow and
low market to book ratio.  A dummy of one is assigned to FCF, and zero otherwise.  3-year pre-
announcement CARs are used as a proxy for managerial past performance.  ARCH test is for testing of
heteroskedasticity with 1 degree of freedom.  Ramsey reset tests relate to specification test.  Square
brackets represent t-statistic.  {} brackets represent the White adjusted t-statistic.  The ARCH test has a
degree freedom of 1 for all the five models.  The B-P-G, Harvey and Glejser tests have degrees freedom
of 1,7, 8, 6, and 5 for the respective models.  * and ** represent 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Constant -0.006**
[-1.84]**
{-1.77}**
-0.002**
[-0.62]**
{-0.60}**
-0.002**
[-0.61]**
{-0.58}**
-0.004**
[-1.23]**
{-1.18}**
-0.004**
[-1.24]**
{-1.19}**
FCF -0.002**
[-0.45]**
{-0.44}**
-0.001**
[-0.22]**
{-0.20}**
-0.001**
[-0.23]**
{-0.20}**
-0.000**
[-0.11]**
{-0.10}**
-0.000**
[-0.15]**
{-0.11}**
LEV 0.001**
[0.66]**
{0.59}**
0.001**
[0.65]**
{0.61}**
0.001**
[0.67]**
{0.62}**
MB 0.007**
[3.25]**
{2.87}**
0.005**
[3.37]**
{2.54}**
0.005**
[3.33]**
{2.48}**
0.007**
[3.58]**
{2.64}**
0.008**
[3.75]**
{2.77}**
MS 0.000**
[0.08]**
{0.10}**
0.000**
[0.07]**
{0.11}**
MS^2 0.000**
[-0.11]**
{-0.08}**
CF -0.004**
[-2.89]**
{-2.87}**
-0.003**
[-2.18]**
{-2.11}**
-0.003**
[-2.22]**
{-2.15}**
-0.002**
[-1.75]**
{-1.74}**
-0.003**
[-2.46]**
{-2.39}**
PASTPERF -0.003**
[-1.11]**
{-1.01}**
-0.003**
[-1.13]**
{-0.98}**
-0.002**
[-0.67]**
{-0.61}**
-0.001**
[-0.65]**
{-0.59}**
SIZE 0.001**
[0.75]**
{0.74}**
0.001**
[0.70]**
{0.66}**
0.002**
[1.33]**
{1.28}**
0.002**
[1.18]**
{1.10}**
R-sq 0.135** 0.147** 0.147** 0.150** 0.134**
Adj R-sq 0.125** 0.131** 0.132** 0.132** 0.119**
F-significant 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
B-P-G test 3.244** 10.213** 11.721** 4.687** 3.847**
ARCH test 0.274** 0.255** 0.247** 0.371** 0.286**
Harvey test 7.554** 9.953** 12.228** 8.665** 6.283**
Glejser test 16.465** 23.231** 20.774** 17.992** 16.367**
Ramsey Reset
Reset (2) 0.152** 0.511** 0.685** 0.117** 0.663**
Reset (3) 2.258** 0.347** 0.395** 1.185** 1.927**
Reset (4) 1.823** 1.092** 1.201** 0.887** 1.044**
The 5% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 3.84, 7.81, 11.07, 12.59, 14.07 and 15.51 respectively.
The 1% critical chi-square values (with 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 degrees of freedom) are 6.63, 11.34, 15.09, 16.82, 18.48 and 20.09  respectively.
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (2) are 3.84 and 6.63 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 
for Reset (3) are 3.00 and 4.61 respectively
The critical F0.05 and F0.01 for Reset (4) are 2.60 and 3.78 respectively
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APPENDIX II
ANALYSIS USING DAILY SAMPLING
Figure 10.3A: Mean CARs over a [-20,+20] day window segregated into market to book
ratio quartiles respectively, lowest (Q1), second lowest (Q2), second highest (Q3), and
highest (Q4).
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Table 10.10A: Mean ARs and CARs for the lowest and highest market to book ratio quartiles, containing
144 and 146 respectively.  The columns, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage of positive abnormal returns, and it
is tested for whether the percentage is statistically different from 50% using non-parametric binomial test.
* and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Lowest M/B ratio quartile Highest M/B ratio quartile ARlowest-ARhighest
Day AR
(%)
t-stat  AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat % of
AR>0
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff t-stat
-20 -0.124 -0.76 40.6c* -0.124 -0.76** -0.141 -0.75** 52.5 -0.141 -0.75** 0.000 0.10**
-19 -0.098 -0.89 38.5** -0.222 -1.13** 0.395 2.76** 55.9 0.254 1.64** -0.005 -3.84**
-18 0.119 0.75 41.3** -0.103 -0.41** -0.037 -0.29** 51.1 0.217 1.17** 0.002 1.08**
-17 -0.111 -0.92 39.9** -0.215 -0.83** 0.019 0.10** 51.8 0.236 0.91** -0.001 -0.82**
-16 -0.044 -0.36 35.7** -0.259 -0.98** 0.047 0.37** 56.6 0.283 0.96** -0.001 -0.73**
-15 0.020 0.14 41.9** -0.239 -0.88** -0.007 -0.06** 49.7 0.276 0.84** 0.000 0.20**
-14 -0.004 -0.04 43.3** -0.243 -0.90** -0.098 -0.76** 43.6* 0.178 0.49** 0.001 0.78**
-13 0.013 0.10 38.5** -0.231 -0.78** -0.032 -0.20** 48.4 0.146 0.35** 0.000 0.31**
-12 0.108 0.66 41.9** -0.123 -0.41** -0.005 -0.03** 49.0 0.141 0.31** 0.001 0.72**
-11 -0.046 -0.42 37.8** -0.169 -0.57** 0.209 1.22** 48.6 0.351 0.76** -0.003 -1.77**
-10 0.027 0.28 35.7** -0.142 -0.46** 0.049 0.32** 60.0 0.399 0.81** 0.000 -0.17**
-9 -0.342 -2.07** 35.7** -0.484 -1.40** -0.126 -1.06** 52.5 0.273 0.54** -0.002 -1.50**
-8 -0.020 -0.17 34.3** -0.504 -1.42** -0.187 -1.42** 47.0 0.086 0.16** 0.002 1.33**
-7 -0.106 -0.87 36.4** -0.610 -1.57** 0.086 0.70** 51.8 0.172 0.33** -0.002 -1.57**
-6 0.038 0.24 36.4** -0.571 -1.43** -0.137 -0.93** 47.0 0.035 0.06** 0.002 1.14**
-5 0.146 0.98 41.9** -0.426 -1.01** 0.076 0.59** 51.8 0.110 0.20** 0.001 0.50**
-4 0.180 1.54 37.5** -0.246 -0.57** -0.065 -0.40** 49.7 0.045 0.08** 0.002 1.02**
-3 0.020 0.13 31.9** -0.227 -0.55** 0.052 0.38** 51.8 0.097 0.17** 0.000 -0.23**
-2 -0.108 -1.02 34.3** -0.335 -0.79** 0.050 0.30** 57.3 0.147 0.26** -0.002 -1.14**
-1 -0.370 -2.40** 33.6** -0.705 -1.64** 0.481 4.10** 66.4* 0.629 1.07** -0.009 -6.21**
0 -0.471 -2.43** 31.2** -1.176 -2.36** 1.190 6.78** 76.7* 1.819 3.13** -0.017 -8.97**
1 -0.067 -0.43 36.4** -1.243 -2.27** 0.168 1.23** 61.4 1.987 3.33** -0.002 -1.59**
2 -0.400 -1.16 30.6** -1.643 -2.62** -0.001 -0.01** 55.2 1.986 3.20** -0.004 -1.48**
3 0.192 1.27 31.9** -1.450 -2.25** 0.009 0.07** 55.9 1.995 3.12** 0.002 1.31**
4 -0.063 -0.47 35.0** -1.514 -2.44** -0.022 -0.19** 49.7 1.973 3.02** 0.000 -0.33**
5 -0.014 -0.10 39.9** -1.528 -2.43** -0.057 -0.48** 47.0 1.916 2.82** 0.000 0.33**
6 -0.092 -0.69 35.7** -1.620 -2.50** 0.238 1.78** 53.2 2.154 3.23** -0.003 -2.47**
7 -0.129 -1.11 32.9** -1.749 -2.64** -0.185 -1.44** 44.2 1.968 2.87** 0.001 0.46**
8 0.060 0.46 35.7** -1.688 -2.50** 0.030 0.27** 51.1 1.998 2.96** 0.000 0.25**
9 -0.045 -0.37 32.9** -1.734 -2.52** 0.031 0.23** 51.8 2.029 2.96** -0.001 -0.60**
10 0.070 0.55 31.9** -1.664 -2.35** 0.120 0.49** 42.9* 2.149 2.98** -0.001 -0.26**
11 -0.206 -1.30 35.7** -1.870 -2.56** 0.040 0.32** 47.7 2.189 2.99** -0.002 -1.73**
12 0.152 0.94 37.1** -1.718 -2.31** -0.037 -0.23** 51.1 2.152 3.01** 0.002 1.17**
13 -0.027 -0.19 33.3** -1.744 -2.34** 0.002 0.02** 52.5 2.154 2.98** 0.000 -0.22**
14 -0.016 -0.16 39.9** -1.761 -2.37** 0.097 1.01** 57.3 2.251 3.13** -0.001 -1.15**
15 0.030 0.25 40.6** -1.731 -2.36** 0.037 0.26** 51.1 2.288 3.13** 0.000 -0.06**
16 0.021 0.20 41.3** -1.710 -2.31** -0.022 -0.20** 45.6 2.265 3.00** 0.000 0.40**
17 0.025 0.18 37.8** -1.685 -2.22** 0.000 -0.00** 54.5 2.265 2.85** 0.000 0.18**
18 0.072 0.66 35.7** -1.613 -2.11** 0.080 0.50** 41.1 2.345 2.88** 0.000 -0.06**
19 0.026 0.22 39.2** -1.587 -2.07** 0.042 0.40** 39.7 2.387 2.89** 0.000 -0.14**
20 -0.061 -0.46 35.0** -1.647 -2.16** 0.002 0.02** 41.1 2.389 2.93** -0.001 -0.49**
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Figure 10.4A: Mean CARs over a [-20,+20] day window, segregated into cash flow ratio
quartiles respectively, lowest (Q1), second lowest (Q2), second highest (Q3), and highest (Q4).
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Figure 10.5A: Mean CARs sorted by abnormal returns at t0 over a [-20,+20] day
window.  Lowest ARs at t0 is denoted by Q1, and highest ARs t0 is denoted by Q4.
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Table 10.15A: Mean ARs and CARs for the lowest and highest ARs at t0 quartiles, containing 144 and 146
observations respectively. The columns, AR > 0 (%) is the percentage of positive abnormal returns, and it is
tested for whether the percentage is statistically different from 50% using non-parametric binomial test.  *
and ** represent the 5% and 1% levels of significance.
Lowest ARs at t0 quartile Highest ARs at t0 quartile ARlowest-ARhighest
Day AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat AR
(%)
t-stat AR>0
(%)
CAR
(%)
t-stat Diff
(%)
t-stat
-20 -0.034 -0.23** 43.1** -0.034 -0.23** 0.049 0.37** 43.8** 0.049 0.37** -0.084 -0.42**
-19 0.052 0.35** 44.4** 0.017 0.09** -0.071 -0.74** 30.8** -0.021 -0.13** 0.123 0.69**
-18 0.043 0.41** 38.9** 0.060 0.29** 0.063 0.48** 36.3** 0.042 0.19** -0.021 -0.12**
-17 0.136 1.14** 49.3** 0.196 0.86** -0.279 -1.74** 34.9** -0.237 -0.98** 0.415 2.08**
-16 0.000 0.00** 41.0** 0.196 0.86** -0.157 -1.33** 37.7** -0.394 -1.45** 0.158 0.92**
-15 0.158 1.44** 41.0** 0.355 1.50** -0.108 -0.74** 37.7** -0.502 -1.68** 0.267 1.46**
-14 -0.225 -1.42** 38.2** 0.130 0.45** 0.062 0.55** 38.4** -0.440 -1.43** -0.287 -1.48**
-13 0.110 0.85** 40.3** 0.240 0.74** 0.248 1.46** 43.2** -0.192 -0.50** -0.138 -0.64**
-12 -0.120 -0.89** 33.3** 0.120 0.38** 0.013 0.10** 39.0** -0.180 -0.48** -0.133 -0.70**
-11 -0.223 -1.73** 36.1** -0.104 -0.31** 0.081 0.54** 45.2** -0.099 -0.25** -0.304 -1.54**
-10 -0.048 -0.48** 32.6** -0.151 -0.43** 0.207 1.32** 45.2** 0.108 0.25** -0.254 -1.37**
-9 -0.260 -2.24** 32.6** -0.411 -1.07** 0.159 1.36** 43.8** 0.267 0.62** -0.419 -2.54**
-8 -0.087 -0.61** 36.8** -0.497 -1.20** 0.022 0.16** 34.2** 0.289 0.62** -0.109 -0.55**
-7 0.044 0.33** 41.0** -0.454 -1.09** -0.190 -1.43** 31.5** 0.100 0.20** 0.233 1.24**
-6 0.029 0.30** 37.5** -0.424 -0.97** 0.043 0.28** 36.3** 0.143 0.28** -0.014 -0.08**
-5 0.084 0.73** 44.4** -0.341 -0.76** -0.020 -0.14** 32.9** 0.123 0.24** 0.103 0.58**
-4 0.003 0.03** 38.2** -0.337 -0.76** 0.070 0.39** 43.8** 0.193 0.36** -0.067 -0.31**
-3 0.102 0.59** 36.1** -0.236 -0.50** 0.164 1.25** 38.4** 0.357 0.65** -0.062 -0.29**
-2 0.018 0.14** 37.5** -0.217 -0.50** -0.012 -0.07** 41.8** 0.344 0.59** 0.031 0.14**
-1 -0.266 -1.60** 38.2** -0.483 -0.94** 0.164 0.96** 47.9** 0.508 0.84** -0.430 -1.80**
0 -1.942 -11.0** 0.0** -2.425 -4.25** 2.426 15.45** 100.0** 2.934 5.01** -4.368 -18.5**
1 -0.348 -1.68** 35.4** -2.773 -4.59** 0.291 1.73** 50.7** 3.225 5.48** -0.639 -2.40**
2 -0.165 -0.78** 47.9** -2.938 -4.81** 0.342 2.33** 45.9** 3.567 5.83** -0.507 -1.97**
3 0.104 0.57** 41.7** -2.834 -4.49** -0.029 -0.27** 42.5** 3.538 5.65** 0.133 0.63**
4 -0.092 -0.77** 34.0** -2.926 -4.55** -0.099 -0.82** 35.6** 3.439 5.40** 0.007 0.04**
5 0.055 0.34** 36.1** -2.871 -4.61** -0.051 -0.38** 37.0** 3.388 5.24** 0.106 0.51**
6 -0.082 -0.58** 37.5** -2.954 -4.63** 0.103 0.79** 34.2** 3.491 5.35** -0.185 -0.96**
7 -0.049 -0.35** 34.0** -3.003 -4.77** 0.012 0.08** 36.3** 3.503 5.26** -0.061 -0.29**
8 -0.006 -0.04** 36.8** -3.009 -4.58** 0.060 0.49** 42.5** 3.563 5.50** -0.066 -0.32**
9 0.002 0.02** 37.5** -3.007 -4.38** -0.008 -0.06** 35.6** 3.555 5.42** 0.010 0.05**
10 -0.096 -0.69** 36.1** -3.103 -4.47** 0.042 0.17** 30.8** 3.598 5.17** -0.139 -0.49**
11 0.041 0.28** 40.3** -3.062 -4.18** 0.064 0.50** 37.0** 3.662 5.09** -0.023 -0.12**
12 0.016 0.09** 38.2** -3.046 -4.12** 0.137 0.82** 41.8** 3.798 5.42** -0.121 -0.49**
13 -0.117 -1.07** 41.7** -3.164 -4.27** 0.019 0.18** 37.7** 3.818 5.29** -0.137 -0.88**
14 -0.060 -0.57** 35.4** -3.223 -4.31** -0.078 -0.72** 36.3** 3.740 5.27** 0.019 0.12**
15 -0.120 -1.06** 34.7** -3.343 -4.50** 0.049 0.44** 40.4** 3.788 5.29** -0.168 -1.07**
16 -0.047 -0.37** 38.9** -3.389 -4.55** 0.171 1.25** 38.4** 3.959 5.43** -0.217 -1.17**
17 -0.127 -1.09** 37.5** -3.517 -4.61** -0.154 -0.86** 39.7** 3.805 4.86** 0.027 0.13**
18 0.014 0.116** 34.0** -3.502 -4.62** 0.135 1.04** 42.5** 3.940 5.01** -0.121 -0.67**
19 -0.032 -0.21** 41.7** -3.535 -4.51** -0.030 -0.23** 31.5** 3.910 4.92** -0.003 -0.01**
20 -0.033 -0.26** 36.1** -3.568 -4.64** 0.205 1.31** 41.8** 4.115 5.30** -0.237 -1.18**
